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SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
Part U - Summary of Information Developed in the
Panel's Fact-Finding Activities
June 1976
PREFACE
Part I provides an outline arc the Panel's most significant ob-
servations and assessments based on fact-finding inspections this past
	 I
year.
This volume, Part II, summarizes the information developed dur-
ing these fact-finding inspections. It is organized along the lines
of the Panels eight Task Teams. The team approach was used this
year to enable the members to focus on areas of Shuttle critical to
mission reliability and crew safety. The intent here is to prov'_de
the reader with both (a) an accurate description of the data examined
including its relevance to the achievement of a safe and successful
mission, and Co) a status report on each area with particular atten-
tion to the resolution of technical and managment challenges.
Part II of this volume when used with the related portions of
the Panel's last Annual Report (June 1975) provides the reader with
substantial background on the Space Shuttle's design and expected
performance, and many of the critical management systems and organ-
izations. Since the Panel's reviews are cumulative, the statement
in last yee.r's Annual Report continues to be true; "This material will
be utilized by the Panel in further reviews during the coming year as
a baseline and reference manual."
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Operational Mode
The Panel's operational mode since its inception has been to
conduct monthly inspections by the full Panel. These are held at
both NASA and contractor sites. With the completion of the Apollo
Soyuz Test Project in July 1975, the Panel was able to focus on
the Space Shuttle. As a result, the Panel agreed that they would
augment the full Panel inspections with individual fact-finding
in areas requiring more intensive review. Thus the Panel held in-
spections and/or reviewed data at Rockwell International, Downey,
California on October 2930, 1975, at Monsanto Research Corporation
in St. Loui8, Missouri on December S, 1975, and at thz! Johnson
Space Center, Texas on February 9-10 and May 24-25, 1976. Members used the
time normally allocated for full Panel {nspections in September,
November, J4nuary and March for fact finvIng research.
1.2 Operational Scope
The Panel's use of a "task team" fact-finding approach as well
as full Panel inspections enables the Panel to cover a large number
of significant tasks in much greater depth while continuing to monitor
the status of the program as a whole. The task areas have been stated
r
in broad terms so that each member can define the specifics of his
task based on his analysis of the situation. The task areas are:
1
L
at	 Systems Integration and Technical Conscience.
b.	 Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME).
•
C. Avionics and its Management System.
d. Risk . Management.	 •
e. Ground Test Program and Ground Support Equipment.
f. Flight Test Program (Approach and Landing, Orbital,
Ferry).
g. Orbiter Thermal Protection System.
h. External Tank Program and the Solid Rocket Booster
Program.
Panel members have assigned themselves to -more than one task
team to reflect the interdependence or commonality between task
areas. In each team one member has accepted responsibility for the
team product to assure clear accountability.
The task teams use a variety of ways to obtain the information
they feel is necessary to the completion of their tasks. In addition
to specific fact-finding visits to the NASA Centers and contractors,
they have been attending various in-house reviews as well. These
include Quarterly Status Reviews and System Design Reviews. Also, the
Panel uses telephone conferences and correspondence with the program
offices to assure a thorough understanding of the area under con-
sideration. This also provides the Panel's conclusions and recom-
2
mendation to the program organizations so that they may make use of
the Panel's findings as quickly as possible.
Full Panel inspections provide the forum for members to share
their findings and observations.
I
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2.0 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
2.1 Introduction
The Panel reviewed those management functions which integrate
the project management elements into a program management system and
assure integrated flight hardware and software systems. Particular
attention was given to those management functions which provide a
check and balance on the various project elements and assure a tech-
nical conscience. The Panel's last annual report recommended that
the "check and balance" capability be further strengthened. The pro-
gram's response to this recommendation is included as Attachment 2-1.
The NASA Deputy Administrator asked the Panel to continue this re-
view of the evolution of these management functions to assure that
the program continues to develop a management capability appropriate
to the challenge of this program.
Systems management as used here includes the following manage-
ment functions:
a. Systems integration refers to the management functions
which provide for systems engineering, technical integration, and test
and ground operations. These management functions include the pro-
gram level office for systems integration and a large number of
technical panels
b. Technical conscience refers to those forums which pro-
.
vide people throughout the organization suitable op portunities to
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express their concerns to management. The Panel and review systems
are classic examples.
Co Check and balance refers to the technical management
capability outside of these day-to-day operations to provide independent
assessments on key technical and management issues. The new technical
assessment groups are an example.
2.2 Systems Integration - NASA
The systems integration office is involved in defining Shuttle—
wide requirements such as (1) the flight dynamics, loads and structural
dynamics environment for the total vehicle, (2) the design require-
ments for such Shuttle wide flight systems as propulsion and avionics,
and	 common requirements and specifications for materials, pro-
cesses and manufacturing. They are also involved in managing the
systems for development of the Shuttle specification and interface
documents and monitoring the activities of the individual elements to
meet these specifications. They develop trade studies and assessments
of proposed engineering changes that affect more than one element as
well as participate in working problems that are faced by more than
one element.
The office faces a large responsibility and workload and so they
have augmented their capability by establishing a systems integration
r	support contractor, and developing a system of inhouse panels and
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system management reviews. Their approach is to develop a system
which bringitogether knowledgeable engineering and other personnel
from the "line" organizations to work common problems and critique
each others efforts and then to manage this system by chartering
	 •
each group,defining its task/product, and evaluating its processes
and results. This also assures efficient use of manpower while
giving up some degree of "independent assessment" capability. Among
the major management steps this year, MSFC established a Space Shuttle
Main Propulsion System Integration Office to review and evaluate the
plans and activities for the design and verification of the individual
elements and assure that there is an adequate basis for confidence in
the end-to-end system from the External Tank to the SSME nozzle.
A "systems engineering plan" is also to be released this year.
It will be the single source document on how the systems engineering
function in the program is being implemented; (1) what needs to be
done, (2) who is doing it, (3) how is it being accomplished, and
(4) when it needs to be done. The main text will have the data on
the management organizations roles and responsibilities, management
techniques and interfaces, task descriptions and implementation, and
the expected products and documentation. Appended to this main text
will, be a set of sub-plans detailing major integrated areas of concern,
e.g., integrated schedules, flight performance, loads and dynamics,
6
guidance, navigation and control.
2.3 Systems Integration - Support Coc^tractor
r
The contractor has two principal to ks: (a) to assure compatibil-
ity of hardware and software for farm, fit and function of elements,
ground support and facilities, and (b) assure that there is known
compliance with the design requirements and performance requirements
from a systems viewpoint. This is in effect an expanded configuration
control system across the entire program.
The role and principal functional areas involved in this work are
as follows:
n^s1 g engineering deA l s wi. i th sttbsys tem and groundca •	 L/c .7 ^. j^ as 	 _ _
system compatibility along with related software and test require-
ments.
b.	 Systems engineering covers mission and operations
analysis, trajectory analysis along with thermal analysis and re-
sultant requirements, and flight dynamics requirements.
C.	 Design integration provides requirements allocation,
interface analyses and requirements between hardware and software
between all elements of the Shuttle system, and the attendant soft-
ware, requirements, change analysis to support program and element
change control board operations. A special area is the integration
8
of measurements and stimuli for both ground and flight tests and operations.
7
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d.	 Maintainability seeks to assure that the many elements of
the system can be serviced and maintained in the shuttle operational
phase once '-he DDT&E program is complete.
Their activities support and help to produce such items as:
a. System Requirements Definition. The JSC 07700, Level II
documents, "Space Shuttle Level II Program Definition and Requirements"
and the "Shuttle Master Verification Plan," Volumes I and II.
b. Requirements Analysis. The Contract End Item Specifi-
cation, Requirements Definition Documents, Volume III of the Master
Verification Plan "Orbiter Verification Plan," Test Requirement Require-
ments' Specifications, Test Plans, Shuttle Operational Data Book
C.	 Integration Analysis. Integrated schematics, Inter-
face Control Documents (ICD's) for Level II (across elements),
Master Measurements List.
d.	 Compatibility Analysis. Problem reports and their
resolution.
2.4 Technical Conscience - Technical Panels
The Systems Integration Office identifies the needs for a panel,
charters it and defines the task/product. The engineering organization
staffs it, defines the approach and implements it. Over the years
the number of panels has grown until there is now at least fifty-four
panels. Since these are listed in Attachment 2-2 and the directives
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spell out in considerable detail the purposes, responsibilities and
procedures the work of the individual panels is not described here in
detail. However, one case study is cited here to illustrate how the
system operates.
The Manager for Systems Integration is responsible for the in-
tegration of propulsion and fluid systems. He in turn has delegated
responsibility to the Manager, Systems Engineering Office. The
Systems Engineering Manager has established a technical manager for
this area and the principal management mechanisms to help him. These
include the Main Propulsion System Panel and coordinators to support
the manager in the areas of integration of the solid propulsion system
and integration of the auxiliary propulsion and fluid systems with
other elements of the Shuttle. The Main Propulsion System Panel is
responsible for assuring sufficient detailed understanding of the
total vehicle to recommend specific overall vehicle requirements, allo-
cation of these requirements to each major element and the interface
relationships between elements. The panel by continuous assessment
insures that test results satisfy system performance requirements.
Through its periodic technical reviews and studies the panel identi-
fies problems, determines corrective action and recommends such action
to the technical manager. The systems engineering office maintains
contact with the operation of this management system through a desig-
9
nated liaison officer.
Earlier it was noted that technical conscience implies suitable
l
forums for knowledgeable personnel to raise questions and critique
each others work. Many panels by their intercenter and interdisci-
plinary membership are such forums. The Crew Safety Panel is a classic
example. The panel is chartered to assure (1) development of crew
safety and crew-vehicle risk assessment requirements for the Shuttle
and all its mission phases, (2) identification of individual and inte-
grated subsystem failure modes and hazardous operating conditions which
might lead to luss of vehicle or crew, and then (3) identification of
modifications in hardware, software, and procedures to reduce or
resolve these hazards. Thus they have both policy and operating
responsibilities. The membership illustrates the scope of the panel
as a forum for it is not limited to safety personnel. Members are
drawn from the disciplines represented by the Systems Integration
Office, the Operational Integration Office, the Orbiter Project office,
Engineering and Development Directorate, Data Systems and Analysis
Directorate (software)- Flight Operations Directorate and Life
Sciences Directorate. In addition each of the three manned flight
centers, as well as the Dryden Flight Research Center with its	 .
experience in experiemental aircraft and lifting bodies and the Air
Force have members on this panel.
10
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The Systems Integration Office continues to review the structure
of the system as well as the operation of individual panels so they
can adapt the system to current requirements. This past year they
M
completed a comprehensive review and consolidated some panels where
their activities had turned out to be interdependent. For instance,
the avionics panel now has responsibility for lightning and EMI effects
since avionics may be vulnerable to them. They also identified new
needs and established the Ascent Flight Systems Working Group as a
senior management group responsi.ble for the trade-offs between the
integration of the individual flight systems that are critical during
the ascent phase.
The Panel monitors the operation of this system by evaluating
the role and contribution of individual panels in areas under review
by panel members such as propulsion, avionics and crew safety.
2.5 Technical Conscience - The Review System
The review system also provides a number of forums to bring to-
gether knowledgeable people to raise and work concerns rather than let
them slip by without the appropriate management attention.
The Shuttle Program Manager has the responsibility to control
and manage the overall integration of the vehicle. His personal
management tool is the Program Requirements Control Board. The delib-
erations of this board are supported by the activities and resultant
11
information provided by the Systems Integration Review (SIR) tech-
nical management system.
The SIR's, chaired by the Manager for System Integration, are to
assure that specifications are in fact defined and met. These specifi-
cations may be for various areas of the environment such as the ascent
phase or such integrated systems as avionics and propulsion. here
is a list of the functions to be accomplished by the SIR'S.
a. Specification of the ascent flight vehicle systems
integrated performance requirements for the Shuttle system and the
analysis of integrated vehicle design and test data to assure com-
pliance and compatibility.
b. Specification of the flight performance requirements
for the Shuttle system and the analysis of element design and test
data to assure compliance and compatibility.
C.	 Specification of the loads and structural dynamics
requirements for the Shuttle system and the analysis of element de-
sign and test data to assure compliance and compatibility.
d. Specification of the guidance, navigation and control
system performance requirements for the Shuttle system and the analysis
of element design and test data to assure compliance and compatibility.
e. Specification of the integrated avionics requirements
for the Shuttle system and the analysis of element design and test
.
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data to assure compliance and compatibility.
f. Specification of the integrated propulsion system
.	 and fluids requirements for the Shuttle system and the analysis of
element design and test data to assure compliance and compatibility.
g. Specification of the requirements for the integrated
vehicle attachment, release, a^ ,d ^.?aration systems and the analysis
of element design and test data to assure compliance and compatibility.
h. Specification of the integrated thermal design require-
ments for the Shuttle system and the analysis of element design and
test data to assure compliance and compatibility.
i. The development of element-to-element and element-to-
ground interfaces and preparation of necessary documentation.
J.	 Specification of'the ground operations requirements
for landing, turnaround, launch preparation, and major ground test,
including GSE and facilities, and analysis of element design and
test data to assure compliance and compatibility.
To exercise control over such a wide range of functions the
systems integration office found it necessary to establish technical
managers for specific areas. Thus there are managers for flight
performance, loads and structural dynamics, flight control integrated
avionics, integrated propulsion and fluids, mechanical systems,
system interfaces, thermal design integration and ground operations.
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The membership of the SIR Board is composed of these tech;.Lcal
managers as well as representations from a variety of organization
to assure all informed viewpoints are represented. Thus there are
representatives from; 	 4
Space Shuttle Program Systems Engineering Office, JSC
Space Shuttle Program Operations Integration Office, JSC
Space Shuttle Program Management Integration Office, JSC
Space Shuttle Program Resources and Schedules Integration
Office, JSC
Engineering and Development Directorate, JSC
Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, NASA Headquarters
Space Shuttle Projects Office, Engineering Management Office, MSFC
Science and Engineering, System Analysis and Integration
Laboratory, MSFC
Science and Engineering, Systems Dynamics Laboratory, MSFC
Space Shuttle Projects Office, KSC
Orbiter Project Office, JSC
Space Shuttle Main Engine Project Office, MSFC
External Tank Project Office, MSFC
Solid Rocket Booster Project Office, MSFC
Rockwell-Space Division
In addition to these reviews the Systems Integration Office mon-
itors technical progress through attendance at such project reviews
14
as the ALT design review and the Orbiter 101 and 102 design review.
These reviews bring together the knowledgeable people to critique
s	 each others work and raise issues. Issues that cannot be resolved
at one level are referred to a higher level of management, Manage-
r
ment also has the opportunity to review significant decisions made
at the lower levels.
For instance, the Approach and Landing Test Critical Design
Review completed in April covered in detail the test and test support
operations to be performed, the facilities and equipment to be used,
and the management and working relationships of the test organizations
conducting the approach and landing test program. Further, the ALT
Critical Design Review covered the activation of the ALT capability,
the conduct of the test program itself, and the deactivation, of the
program.
The design and manufacturing status reviews for a vehicle en-
ables people to express their concerns about individual flight and
ground systems as well as the status of systems integration and
reliability, quality and safety work before proceeding to the next
phase. These concerns, expressed in the format of RIDS, are officially
tracked and formally dispositioned. 	 To give the reader a sense of
the issues raised and worked through this system, there were 2400 RIDS
identified through the Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews and
15
Customer Acceptance Reviews on the first flight vehicle 101. Almost
all have been worked and closed at this time.
The Panel monitors this area actively by attending selected re-
views to evaluate the process as well as issues and their resolution.
2.6 Check and Balance - The Technical Assessment Croups.
it is through the system of technical panels and reviews that
technical conscience can find its expression and because people from
differing backgrounds can critique one anothers work there is a check
and balance and independent assessment process at work. The Panel's
recommendation was that this process be further strengthened by per-
sohnel outside day—to-Iday responsibility for the program. 
This 
'Last
section describes what the Panel found this year.
Technical Assessment Offices have been established at each of
the three manned flight Centers and Rockwell. These are small, well-
knit groups of highly skilled engineers who are on the lookout for
problem areas to prevent any significant problems from "falling
through the crack." These personnel stay abreast of the program and
determine their task areas by participating in day-to-day discussions
with subsystem managers and working; level reviews and discussions
using their own personal experience for lessons learned that may be
applicable to the current situations.
The program assessment offices are set up as follows:
16
a. JSC - The office reports to the Shuttle Program Manager
and Center management. It defines its own tasks. It has been functioning
the longest of the Center offices and has made substantial contribution
in such areas as avionics and contingency abort requirements. Currently
it has about ten specialists.
b. MSFC - The office reports to the Associate Director,
Science and Engineering, and is particularly active in assuring inte-
gration of flight systems involving more than one project office.
Thus they are actively involved in the work of the Main Propulsion
Test Office and Ascent Flight Systems Integration Group. They are
still in the process of staffing.
C.	 KSC - The office reports to the Manager, Shuttle Project
Office and is staffed by experienced trouble shooters. The office is
still in the process of staffing and getting fully underway.
d.	 Rockwell International - The Vice President identifies
critical areas where foresight and planning now can preclude problems
downstream and he staffs as he identifies the need and therefore the
expertise required.
So the groups are in place and beginning to function. Next year's
report will report on their evolution and their contributions. The
Panel monitors this system by working with these groups.
.
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ATTACHMENT 2-1
Systems integration management needs to strengthen "check and balance"
capability.
Response; This comment is similar to that made by the Hawkins team.
The actions that have been taken include;
a. A special group has been established at JSC to provide an
overview of the system engineering/integration function and will
report directly to R. F. Thompson, Program Manager.
b. Effort and scope have been increased on the RI/SD contract
for system evaluation. A few highly competent individuals are be-
ing assigned to provide independent assessments and will report directly
to W. Dean, V.P., Systems Integration. The scope of this activity
specifically includes problem evaluation and avoidance options, trades,
and alternatives; technical and programmatic interrelationships; and
contingency planning.
c. A review of the JSC/MSFC panel relationships has been com-
pleted and selective changes in membership and panel structure are
being made to improve integration across Center/project interfaces.
d. Program and system level planning is being developed in more
detail and will provide more visibility and support to the integration
management and decision making process.
18
A TACHMENT 2-1
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM DIRECTIVES
THAT ESTABLISH PANELS, WORKING
GROUPS AND SIMILAR OPERATIONS
Directive No. *	 Subject
1 Simulation Planning Panel (for simulation activities)
4 Crew Safety Panel
6 Configuration Management Panel
8 Ground Interface Working Group
9 Crew Procedures Control Board
11 Information Management Systems Panel
14 Systems Integration Reviews (SIR)
15 Payloads Interface Panel
17 Program Management Information Center Integration Panel
18 Program Performance Management Panel
21 Flight Test Program Panel
22 Electromagnetic Effects Panel
23 Flight Performance;
23.1	 Ascent Performance Panel
23.2	 Integrated Entry Performance Panel
23.3	 Abort Performance Panel
23.4
	
Separation Performance Panel
23.5
	 Aerodynamic Performance Panel
24 Main Propulsion System Panel
25 Loads and Structural Dynamics
25.1
	 POGO Integration Panel
25.2	 Loads and Structural Dynamics Panel
25.3	 Ground Vibration Test Panel
25.4	 Particles and Gases Contamination Panel
26 Mechanical Systems
26.1	 Spacecraft Mechanisms Panel
26.2	 Shuttle Vehicle Attachment and Separation SUBpanel
26.3	 Payloads Docking, Retention, and Deployment SUBpanel
26.4	 Landing Systems and facilities SUBpanel
27 Shuttle Training Aircraft (STA) Review Board
29 Communications and Data Systems Integration Panel
' 29.1	 Functional Requirements SUBpanel
29.2	 Vehicle Communications Interface SUBpanel
29.3	 Ground Based Data Systems SUBpanel
29.4	 Science and Engineering Data Processing SUBpanel
30 Flight Operations Panel (FOP)
31 Operations Integration Review (OIR)
33 Computer Systems Hardware/Software Integration Review (CSIR)
36 Training Simulator Control Panel
* Latest Issue
19
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ATTACHMENT 1-2 (Continued)
39 Guidance, Navigation, and Control Integration
39.1
	
Ascent Flight Control/Structural Integration Panel
39.2	 On-Orbit Guidance, Navigation, and Control Panel
39.3	 Entry Guidance, Navigation, and Control Panel
39.4	 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Panel
40 Safety, Reliability,and Quality Assurance Management Panel
43 Procurement Integration panel
45 Integrated Avionics Technical Management Area
45.1	 Shuttle Avionics Panel
45.2	 Flight Communications Panel
45.3	 Shuttle Avionics Checkout Panel
45.4	 Avionics Verification Panel
46 Thermal Design Integration
46.1	 Thermal Control Panel
46.2	 Thermal Protection Panel
49 DOD Shuttle Requirements Review Panel
51 Communications and Tracking Systems Ground Test Panel
52 Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification
Control Board
57 Ascent Flight Systems Integration Group
58 Integrated Logistics Panel
62 Resources and Schedules Management Panel
a
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3.0 SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
3.1 Introduction
The Panel has given special attention to the challenges during
the past few years, the concerns expressed by NASA management, and
the fact the engines are critical to the accomplishment of the Shuttle
missions. Specifically, the areas under current review are:
a. The use of new and in many cases unproven technology.
b. Adequacy of design margins to meet the requirements
for repeated use.
C. Ability of the engine electronic controller to accom-
modate the environment and needs of the engine and the total Shuttle
system.
d. Results of credible failures.
e. Hardware availability and the test program require-
ments.
The Panel considered the impact on the hardware and software develop-
ment program of both (a) cost and schedule constraints, and (b) the
numerous interface requirements involving other Shuttle elements such
as the Orbiter, Solid Rocket Booster, Ground Support Equipment, and
External Tank.
In meeting the objectives of this task the Panel and the task
team has relied on briefings, face-to-face discussions with NASA and
contractor personnel, participation in in-house reviews, and review
21
of relevant documents. A part of this effort is a follow-up on
open items In the NASA Shuttle Program Office's response to the
Panel's annual report	 The Program's responses to the last annual
report on the ngine is included as Attachment 3-1. This material
reflects the degree to which analyses and test programs have evolved
in providing answers to challenges in the areas of materials be-
havior under severe environments, weldments, POGO suppression, and
controller performance.
A brief look at the Level I (NASA Headquarters) controlled mile-
stones are valuable for they show the program's progress and the work
ahead.
Completed first preburner test 	 Accomplished April 1974
Began fabrication of Main Propulsion
	 Accomplished May 1975
Test Article (MPTA) Engines for the
integrated test of the toal system
Completed first integrated Subsystem
	 Accomplished June 1975
test
- Complete first SL firing for a 	 Scheduled for Feb. 1976
minimum of 60 seconds at Rated Power
Level
- Complete first throttling test (MPL-
	 Scheduled for Mar. 1976
RPQ
- Complete SSME "all-up" throttling test Scheduled for Sept.1976
- Critical Design Review (CDR)
	 Scheduled for Sept.1976
- Delivery of Main Propulsion Test
	 Scheduled for May 1977
Engines (3 of) to NSTL
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- Deliver first flight engines (3) 	 Scheduled for Aug. 1978
- Conduct first manned orbital flight 	 Schedu9 d for Mar. 1979
3.2 Observations
There have been a number of changes in the Rocketdyne organi-
zation since last year's annual report. This is readily seen from
the comparison of organization chart f, from September 1974 and October
1975 (Figures 3-1 and 3-2). These changes continue to strengthen the
program management system. For instance an Associate Program Manager
has been appointed for the engine controller and the engineering
areas have been "beefed-up." Mr. Norman J. Ryker was appointed
President of the ROc lKetdyne Division.
3.2.1 Review System
The management system holds a number of reviews on a regular
basis. The Quarterly Technical Review for MSFC Senior Management
and weekly telecons are two examples. In addition, a special SSME
Design Margin Review was conducted in July 1975. Prior to this
Design Margin Review, there had been a general concern about the
safety factors on many of the components. The margin review showed
that most of the components actually had more than the minimum
safety factor of 1.4.
Attendance at SSME reviews and discussions with both NASA and
Rocketdyne personnel indicate that the review system is working well
23
in that it provides a forimi for frank discussions of technical and
management areas and pro-ides necessary information on costs,
M
schedules, and techn:.ca.i performance for day-to-day work and decision-
making.
To further assure that nothing "falls through the crack," a
technical assessment group has been established and is now being
staffed. A Space Shuttle Fain Propulsion Systems Integration
Office was recently established at the Marshall Space Flight Center
to serve as the responsible body for the review and evaluation of
Maain Propulsion System design criteria and to assure compatibility
of Level II/Level III design and performance requirements. They
are responsible for the definition and compatibility of mechanical,
structural, electrical and fluid interfaces, and design verification
of the system.
JSC established a technical manager's position in mid-1974 to
oversee the integrated propulsion and fluids technical management
areas (Program Directive 24).
To support the Technical Manager they also established the Main
Propulsion System Panel. Finally, they appointed a Solid Propulsion
Integration Coordinator and an Auxiliary Propulsion Coordinator. The
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's interests are (a) the Propulsion
Panel's achievements in identifying incipient failures including the
24
imeans by which early clues to such failures may be determined, and
(b) the extent to which prior review RID's remain open, are delin-
quent or have some further impact not identified previously.
	 j
•	 3.2.2 Destj%n Progress
Previously the Panel had raised some questions in the follow-
ing four areas:
a. Allowable SSME Heat Exchanger Oxidizer Coil Leakage Rate.
b. Use of Teflon Balls in POGO Suppressor Unit.
c. Delays in Receiving and Testing of SSME Components.
d. Data on SSME Controller.
The Program's response to the Panel's concerns are shown in Attach-
ment 3-2.
The Panel was one of those groups interested in getting definitive
data on the component design margins to assure that, from a structural
and thermal standpoint, the SSME was designed to meet the environ-
mental and time requirements imposed by the overall Shuttle program.
The SSME Design Margin Review established the following points:
a. The structural and thermal audits indicated that the
current analyses were extensive and technically sound. A few items
required further analyses, such as the low pressure oxygen turbopump
housing. An example of the factors of safety arrived at during these
analyses is shown in Table 3-1. As used on the SSME the definition of
25
factor of safety is Failure Load. This accounts for those data points
Limit Load
falling within 2a'on the pressure and 3d-on vibration.
b. Many of the design requirements of "one engine out"
conditions are still under analysis and test. Consideration has to be
given to the expected impact on both the engine that goes out and the
other two engines which continue to operate. The following state-
ments are a summary of what we understand the situation to be. It
is known that a non-thrusting or shut-down engine will not be cooled
sufficiently during ascent so that the engine nozzle (sill have to be
replaced before another mission. This is based on analyses that show
a nozzle metal temperature of about 1600° F. versus an allowable of
12000 F. The engines are designed to provide for sensing of critical
parameters. The current challenge is to develop the engine controller
and the Orbiter flight control procedures that will safely shut an
engine down without damage to the other engines or the Orbiter.
c. This review produced a number of recommendations and
action items that are currently under active consideration. Among
the major ones are: (1) develop data review methods that can be
used to identify incipient failures and devise a solution that is
practical within cost, schedule and value received boundaries, (2)
use maximum throttling ramp rate, (3) limit thrust for early flights
to rated power level thereby achieving additional factor of safety
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(See Table 3-1), (4) continue to obtain materials properties to assure
understanding of the SSME hardware in various environments and in
Tight of life requirements, and (5) increase hardware confidence by
conducting tests at higher pressure and temperature.lev,:Is with added
instrumentation.
d. Other recommendations include.(1) increase confidence in
structural margin by specific burst tests throughout the program,
(2) improve fabrication producibility and thereby confidence in the
margins of the engine nozzle, the lines and ducts, the hot gas mani-
fold liner and the injector, and (3) improve post assembly inspection
procedures.
3.2.2.1 Mass Properties
As in every element of the Shuttle program both the weight
specified vs.actual weight and the inertial properties are watched
closely for their impact oa performance and payload capability.
While weights are discussed in terms of an individual engine weight,
it is important to remember that these numbers must be multiplied
by three since there are three engines on each Orbiter if one is to
appreciate the full impact of any design changes. The program monitors
three weight values - the contract end item (CEI; value, the design
goal weight which is 99.5% of CEI weight, and the control limit
weight used to manage the growth rate of the development weight
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throughout the program. The table below indicates the latest woight
h
conditions at the time of the Panel's review in January 1976.
Specification Weight (CEI) 6445 lbs. (Dry) 6892 lbs. (Burnout)
Current Weights	 6348	 6790
I	 Contingency (lbs/%)	 .97/1.5	 102/1.5
I
This would indicate that stringent controls must be used to assure
that by the time of the SSME CDR in September 1976 the weights are
still within the specified limits, always keeping in mind that one
pound overweight on an engine is in effect three pounds overweight
for the Shuttle Orbiter and system.
3.2.2.2 Engine Integration
Not only must the many engine components be designed, assembled
and operated as a system, but the engine and its controller must in
turn be a part of a well-designed and operable Main Propulsion System
within the Shuttle total vehicle. The Main Propulsion System (MPS)
includes the External Tank (ET), the Space Shuttle Main Engines, pro-
pellant feed, propellant fill and drain, propellant conditioning and
pressurization control and purge and the Orbiter interface components.
This overall system is shown in Figure 3-3. The following is a brief
description of how the MPS operates. The ET provides 1.55 million
pounds of usable ascent propellants to the SSME's. Following engine
thrust build-up, tank pressure is maintained with vaporized propellants
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extracted from the engines. The ET ullage pressures during boost are
maintained at 20-22 psis in the LOX tank and 32-34 psia in the liquid
.	 hydrogen tank. Pneumatics are supplied by a 4000 psi helium storage
system with 750 psi regulation. The helium is used for valve actu-
ation, SSME purge and backup shutdown, expulsion of residual pro-
pellants after main engine cutoff. The propellant management con-
trols propellant loading and a low level cutoff which is a backup to
the normal velocity cutoff.
The Panel is reviewing the SSME interface to assess whether (1)
there is compatibility between the SSME requirements and the MPS, (2)
the system/subsystem test programs demonstrate hardware integrity and
capability to meet system level requirements, (3) there is schedule
compatibility between the design, development and test activities and
the availability of hardware , and (4) there is the necessary degree
of management and technical liaison between various elements in-
volved in the MPS on issues related to the SSME. While the Panel,
including its task team, has not completed its review, its obser-
vations to date are noted in both Volume I of this report and in the
following sections dealing with the SSME components and assemblies
and systems testing. Requirements compatibility will be examined
I
later and the integrated test program will be examined in more detail.
Part of this work will be accomplished by participation in Ascent
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Systems Design Review Panel operations which are conducted periodically.
The last ones were on January 14, 27, and 28, 197.6. This was the
third such review conducted for the First Orbital Flight Test (OFT-1).
3.2.2.3. SSME Redundancy Management Requirements
Redundancy management deals with control and decision-making
necessary to assure the ability of the system to accommodate failures
and operate properly. Terms used in this area are defined in Table 3-2.
With regard to the SSME the Redundancy Management Requirements have
been stated as follows:
a. Fail-Safe Design in the Propulsion System. 	 In the
event of any single failure in a functional component, the engine
shall be capable of shuting down in a manner which will not damage the
neighboring systems.
b. Fail-Safe Design for Electrical Assemblies. All elec-
trical critical subsystems shall be fail-operational after the first
failure and fail-safe after the second failure.
Implementation of these requirements can best be demonstrated
by looking at typical designs. For the fail-safe design, shutdown
of the hydraulic system occurs when a specified limit is exceeded
such as pump overspeeds, turbine over-temps, loss of high pressure
oxyW,n turbopump seal pressure or ignition pressure that is either too
high or too low. Shutdown of the pneumatic system occurs when there
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is a loss of both electrical/data busses for over 50 millisecondo
or with the loss of both segments of the engtne electronic controller
unit. As currently set up the Or)iiter can inhibit all the sensors
except the ignition pressure detection device and thus has an over-
ride capability. To meet the fail operationally/fail safe criterion
redundancy has been provided for all critical electrical subsystems.
A part of this fail op/fail safe design is the electrical hold-cap-
ability to control t(. the "last" valve position cov=nd and a hy-
draulic hold capability to continue operation at the last valve
position. When there is a loss of vehicle/engine commands the system
will continue operation at the last valid command and if necessary
shutdown the vehicle. The comparison of thrust versus time for hy-
draulic and pneumatic shutdown are shown in Figure 3-4.
3.2.2.4 Engine Controller
The Panel continues to give the Controller particular attention.
From the standpoint of design and development testing, the Controller
posture at this time is very encouraging. The major areas reviewed by
the Panel included the latest design configuration, test program and
results, software and the integration of the Controller into the SSME
and Orbiter systems. In addition the SSME throttling requirements
and concerns were examined as a part of the SSME control system and
Space Shuttle ascent performance.
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The Controller design is basically completed with some redesign
,.fort to alleviate problems as they have shown up during the develop-
ment test program. While the hardware is proceeding through test
the software programs are being developed that will both test and i
,perate the SSME and interchange data with the Orbiter vehicle and
ground support equipment. The software to hardware compatibility
focuses on the computer/memory capability in terms of words and time-
to-process input and outputs as well as the expected programming
errors and deviations.
Controller design is well into the test phase. Development
testing has been continuing using the structural thermal engineering
model (SM-1). The production prototype controller (PP-1) has been
undergoing a very thorough test process since early 1975 and is now
icing used in the software development program. Production proto-
kype-(PP-2) is now being used in the test program. The Integrated
:system Test Bed program has been using flight type hardware and the
s:^: l rack mounted controller for the numerous test firings conducted over
more than ten months at the National Space Testing Laboratory (NSTL).
,since the Controller design is in the test and specific redesign period
U,iat comes after the basic design and assembly has been completed prob-
lems are expected. Most of these have been acceptably resolved.
A major challenge was to protect the Controller from the vibration
caused by the total environment system. To screen the PP-2 controller
from assembly and workmanship problems, it was subjected to the following
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environment: X2 and X3 axes at 2g sine sweep, 5 Hz to 2000 Hz up and down
for 17 minutes; 6g random duration of three minutes; 2g sine sweep, 5Hz to
2000 Hz up and down for seventeen minutes. At the same time SM-1 was used
to develop a vibration mounting for an environment beyond that of the PP-2
tests. PP-2 was then subjected to 25 hours of vibration testing with
isolators (intended use) as follows: 22.5 hours (7.5 hr per axis) at
22.5 g RMS, 2.5 hours of transient and sinusoidal vibration, and 120 starts.
The overall results were good. Four anomalies were found and all were
attributed to assembly/workmanship problems. The causes were determined and
the unit was repaired. PP-2 has been delivered to the NASA MSFC Simulati^in
Laboratory for continued testing and SSME operational support. The PP-3 unit
with isolators has been delivered and is installed on SSME engine 0002 and
successfully operating on test stand A-2 at NSTL with 16 engine tests to date.
The vibration test results for PP-3 are as follows:
a. In a soft mounted condition the unit successfully passed
30 minutes per axis of random vibration at 22.58 RMS, 25 starts and
cutoffs, and side-load simulations.
b. In a hard mounted condition the unit successfully passed a
10 minutes workmanship test in one axis at 4g RMS and 2g sine.
C. An additional test of 9 minutes at 22.5g RMS was con-
ducted successfully.
The PP-1 controller was subjected to the following vibration
conditions earlier in 1975:
.	 a. Thermal tests included 8 hours of operation at -500 F.
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and 48 hours of operation at +950 F.
b. Vibration tests included: 3.5 hours sine at 2g and 6g
random for acceptance test program; 0.75 hour with 18 to 22.58 ran-
dom for diagnostic work; 1.5 hours of 22.5g random for Development
Verification Levels; and, 8.5 hours of 22.58 random with isolators
in place.
c. punctional performance tests to evaluate the "pre"
versus "post" test performance ..... pre-thermal test and pre-
vibration test followed then by post thermal and vibration tests.
A number of small problems, as noted before, have been en-
countered and resolved, such as memory noise ; cracked solder joints,
minor circuit design problems, problems with a number of jumpers and
piggy-back components affecting circuit board reliability and some
manufacturing difficulties. The problem of electromagnetic inter-
ference (EMI) emanating from the power supply may not be fully re-
solved as yet and will be followed by the Panel.
The current major redesign effort has been directed toward the
broken wire problem where so-called "stitch-welding" of wires to pins
has been used. The connection would break under the vibration
expected on the missions. This is a problem found on both the out-
,
board Master Interconnect Board and the inboard Master Interconnect
Board.	
.
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The redesign program put into action in December 1975 was in
two phases. The first phase completed in February 1976 define( the
r
	 problem and requirements to the satisfaction of Rocketdyne and MSFC.
The second phase, if implemented, is to develop a board design that
could eliminate the wiring/weld breakage which has occurred in test
vibration environments. Such designs would be directed toward de-
velopment of multilayer boards to eliminate the wires and hence the
wire breakage. if they are used, the multilayer board design can
be used on the P-4 and subsequent controllers. If necessary a retro-
fit can be made on the pre-production units at a later date.
Controller software includes the operational programs, command
and data simulator executive program, and controller acceptance
test program. The software for the ISTB (Integrated System Test Bed)
engine has been in use since May 1975 at the NSTL. The next software
to be released is for engine 0002. The Operational Program is sched-
uled for May/June 1976 and the Command and the Data Simulator Executive
Program for March/April 1976. Updates to the 0002 engine operational
program is scheduled in two steps - the Block I update by the end
of 1976 and a Block II update at an unspecified date.
Software and hardware compatibility aspects of the SSME con-
0	 troller will continue to be studied in an effort to provide proper
margins and process times. The current situation looks like this:
.
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Memory Size
	
Process Time
SOFTWARE FOR
	
(16,384 words)	 (20 milliseconds)
UTILIZED	 BUDGET	 UTILIZED	 BUDGET
ISTB	 14,595	 -	 17.36 ms	 -
ENGINE	 15,270	 -	 18.4	 -
BLOCK I (Pre Scrub)	 20,040	 14,000	 18.265	 16.0 ms
BLOCK I (With Scrub) 	 13,585	 14,000	 13.63	 16.0
BLOCK II (Prel. Est.) 	 14,700	 14,700	 15.18	 16.0
Software scheduling problems include the availability of Honey-
well personnel and facilities to support NSTL operations on simulation
runs and software changes for the ISTB program, and an even more severe
condition when two of the NSTL test stands are operating at the same
time. The available support for the current multiple software program
(ISTB changes into the 0002 software and those within the 0002 programs)
is also a problem due to manpower and facility availability. The im-
pact of this scheduling difficulties will be an area of continuing
review by the Panel.
3.2.2.5 SSME Hardware Components
A discussion of the design progress of the engine components and
assemblies at this point in the program must focus on the development
and acceptance test programs since the engine design is basically
complete. What design work is still going on is more in the line of
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redesign and upgrading of designs based on test results. Therefore
these areas of design are covered in the next section on "Test Program
and Plans" or in the section on "Manufacturing."
3.2.3 Test Program Plans
The engine development program consists of a Design Demonstration
Phase and a Certification Phase. The design demonstration activity is
scheduled to be completed by the SSME Critical Design Review (CDR)
in September 1976. This CDR will cover the completed and released
design, the basic engine concept and the tests to demonstrate their
validity. The certification activity will then include work neces-
sary after CDR to successfully complete the Preliminary Flight Certi-
fication scheduled for November 19728 and #.U- F^ •• ^^ ^^^g''` Certi fiCatio^iI v 2828 the ia^.ai FlightI t
scheduled for Spring 1980.
Testing during the design development and demonstration phase
includes laboratory testing as well as subsystem and engine hot-firing
testing.
The laboratory testing is performed at all hardware levels to
accelerate the verification process and to minimize hot-fire tests
by detecting problems early at the fundamental part level. The test
program includes basic mechanical tests to verify material properties,
dynamic tests of turbopump bearings in the operating fluid at full
operating speed, and simulation of engine operational checkouts and
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maintenance. Since laboratory tests are extensive, they provide con-
fidence in many areas: (1) mechanical, (2) vibration, (3) flow,
i
(4) environmental, and (5) functional.
Subsystem hot-fire testing is concentrated on the verification
of those requirements and assumptions for which the engine environ-
ment is not required. Included in this test program are the ig-
nition system, preburner, turbopumps and combustion assembly.
The third element in this test phase is the hot-fire testing using
the Integrated Subsystem Test Bed (ISTB) - an engine with a develop-
ment nozzle and breadboard controller. The ISTB program objectives
are:
(a) Development of the engine control.system.
(b) Extended-duration testing of the oxidizer and fuel
turbopumps.
(c) Hot-fire verification of the engine hot-gas manifold.
(d) Verification of engine starts, shutdown, and throttling
throughout the range from minimum power level (ML) to rated power
level (RPL).
(e) Supplementary verification of preburnrer and turbo-
pump requirements.
The • ISTB with its controller provides control system and transient
performance verifications as a supplement to engine testing. Thus
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there is a demonstration of basic system integrity prior to the first
engine test.
Following the ISTB tests, hot-firing tests are scheduled at NSTL
to (1) test equipment, and (2) to extend the power level to full
power level (FPL). Equipment to be included in these tests are gim-
bal actuators, inlet ducting, and interface panels for fluid,
electrical, and thermal protection. Testing at sea level conditions
will range from RPL to FPL. A test stand nozzle diffuser at NSTL
allows operation of the engine between MPL and RPL.
An integral element of any test program plan, including that for
the SSME, is the series of Design Verification Specifications (DVS)
because these define the development plan for the engine system,
subsystems and components. Tale 3-3 , lists all of the current DVS's.
Section 3 of these documents contains the design requirements while
Section 4 contains the verification methods, hardware levels, and
other criteria necessary to demonstrate that each design requirement
has been satisfactorily met. In addition to the DVS's development
plans there are special plans for "life demonstration" tests to
ensure that a conservative margin is maintained and plans for "hard-
ware recycling'in which test components and assemblies are made up
of "new" and "recycled" units. Also, there are materials evaluation
plans for the selection, development, and specification of all materials
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and processes for the SSME.
3.2.3.1 Test Status and Results 	 a
The ISTB has been in a hot-firing condition since May 1975 at
NSTL on test stand A-1. Engine 0002 has begun hot-firing at stand
A-2. Engine 0003 when ready will take over the A-1 stand in mid-
summer of this year. All of these tests, on the ISTB and 0002,
are expected to be nearly complete by the time of the SSME CDR in
September 1976.
3.2.3.1.1 ISTB
Well over 60 tests have been conducted to date. The next
significant milestone is the achievement of a sustained 60-second
engine firing at rated power level. This test has been delayed
somewhat because of the time required for the resolution of engine
transient and high pressure fuel turbopump development problems as
well as a flow-meter problem on an installation at the COCA stands
at Santa Suzanna, California. As soon as these are resolved the
60-second test will be accomplished. Another milestone will be the
throttling test to be conducted in the midsummer with
the power level from MPL to RPL. Further throttling tests are also
scheduled for the period starting about August 1976.
So far the ISTB has been run at 76% of RPL for more than 20 seconds.
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Some of the problems that have surfaced have been resolved or are
under intensive study, include the following:
a. The main fuel valve assembly follower bearing side-
plate cracked during the ISTB tests. Cracks were found on the inner
race section of the plate. The original 440C material was replaced
with Inco 718 as an interim redesign. If necessary the redesign will
be refined at a later date.
b. Electrical "pig-tails" are subject to environmental
abuse and failures so a new connector design will be effective on engine
2004 and subsequent.
c. Preburner, LOX and fuel, temperature spikes were a
problem during the conduct of the first 29 ISTB tests. Modifications
have been made and proven on subsequent tests.
d. The low pressure fuei turbopump inlet/outlet duct con-
sisting of a flexible bellows ,joint has had leak problems. Rocket-
dyne is investigating a number of fixes. For the present they have
decided to incorporate a brazed design bellows on engine 0003 and
subs, while continuing to use the existing ducts on the first two
engines (ISTB — 0001 , 0002). Indications are that the early-type
flex ducts can withstand the rigor of continued firing in order to
meet test requirements.
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3.2.3.1.2 Engine 0002
This engine has just begun its test cycle at NSTL with 16 tests
conducted to date. Early testing has evaluated the start characteristics,
while the most recent testing has evaluated fixes to the high pressure
fuel turbopump.	 +
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3.2.3.1.3 Component Tests
I	 For our purposes the components of the SSME include combustion
I
	
	 devices, turbomachinery and the controller. Previous sections have
discussed the controller.
From a standpoint of the critical hardware for the 0003 and 0004
engines, the following problems exist. On the 0003 the bellows
assemblies mentioned above have been brought "in-house" due to vendor
problems which in turn has resulted in some changes to the
I
schedule completion dates. However, there appears to be little or
no impact from this delay since there is a pad of some six weeks avail-
able. Engine component problems on the 0004 include the high pressure
fuel turbopump, the main combustion chamber, and the 77.5:1 nozzle.
This engine is due for delivery around September 1976. To help
mitigate these problems Rocketdyne has completely revamped its so-
called "pump assembly room" at Canoga Park to do a more orderly and
timely job on turbomachinery.
3.2.3.1.3.1 Combustion Devices
A testing summary is shown in Table 3-3 covering the fallowing
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Thrust Chamber Assembly (TCA) Heat Exchanger
items:
Augmented Spark Igniter (ASI) 	 Oxygen Preburner (OPB)
and Fuel Preburner (FPB)
Nozzle with 35:1 Ratio
The 40,000 pound thrust scale model was used for tests at MSFC.
In summary, the combustion devices test program indicates that
the above items have been operating satisfactorily. Problems that
have cropped up during the test program have either been resolved
to the satisfaction of the designers or a resolution is now in
process. For instance, the 35:1 nozzle TCA tests conducted at COCA
4B show an excessive pressure drop existing between the inlet dif-
fuser of the main combustion chamber, the tubes, and the mixer at
the outlet. The measured pressure drop was 544 psi while the predicted
was 349 psi resulting in an excess of 195 psi. These measurements
were at RPL. The impact on engine balance results in tube life de-
crease and engine temperature increases. This problem is under active
investigation at this time with results expected soon.
The Augmented Spark Igniter (AST) has experienced spark plug tip
overheating resulting in erosion and cracking of the plug tip. This
problem is being worked by developing a copper-plating process, con-
trolling the ISTB hydrogen temperature on engine start, eliminating
temperature spikes during any transient and using the copper-plated
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plugs on the engines when they become available.
Steps tauten to prevent other combustion device fabrication prob-
lems include prevention of pitting in the main combustion chamber
liner by revising tooling for the electroform process and prevention
of the 77.5:1 nozzle braze and weld problems by redesign of the mani-
fold shell and modified tooling for brazing process.
3.2.3.1.3.2 Turbomachinery
The significant results of the turbomachinery tests are:
Low pressure oxygen turbopump 	 Tested to Full Power Level
Low pressure and high pressure Tested to RPL (Transition)
oxygen turbopump	 Tested to 0.92 of RPL (Steady-State)
Impeller performance defined
Low pressure fuel turbopump 	 Tested to FPL
Performance Mapped
Bearing failure experienced
Low pressure and high pressure 	 7 tests, tested to 0.75 of MPL
fuel turbopump	 Axial thrust balance difficulties
resolved; speed limitation on HPFTP
because of subsynchronous whirl
High pressure oxygen turbopump Borg--Warner wear problem investigated
Seals and Bearings	 Testing initiated on "Sealol" Seal
The problems noted can be described as follows:
(a) The LPOTP housing had failures during the RPL proof
test. Inspection of the casting is a difficult task. As a result,
the problem is being approached from both a materials aspect as well
as providing a more thorough inspection process.
(b) The HPOTP impeller performance has been lower than
expected at the RPL condition. This appears to have resulted from
3
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impeller vane resonance and resulting lowered outlet head. Modifi-
cations of the impeller are being made and further testing will con-
firm the redesign.
(c) The HPFTP rotor axial thrust balance problem has been
the cause of axial rubbing and damage during tests of this pump.
The problem is recognized and understood. A step-by-step procedure
has been followed to balance the rotor system such that during running
conditions the system will be balanced by means of internal orifices and
preclude overspeeding and rubbing of parts. The rotor system has been
balanced in tests up to 75% of RPL. Additional tests up to full power
level must now be conducted to confirm the design.
(d) The high pressure fuel turbopump subsynchronous whirl problem
has been the cause of excess shaft vibration and turbine bearing load
failures. A step by step procedure is being followed to reduce the
vibration level so that long duration engine tests can be conducted
above the 60% RPL. Moderate improvement from immediate fixes has raised
the whirl inception speed and reduced the severity of the vibrations.
However, to completely resolve the problem and enable the pump to run
up to full power level, a stiffened rotor and support system plus moving
the pump and bearing inboard will most likely be required.
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(e) The HPOTP primary LOX seal has had inadequate life
due to excessive wear. There is no immediate problem on the en6ine
test stands; however, steps are being taken to reduce the load on
the seal and provide a better seal material in the future.
3.2.4 Manufacturing
Since manufacturing is discussed in varying degrees in the pre-
ceeding sections on review, design and test of the SSME and its com-
ponents, the discussion here is limited to four items that are of
major interest at this time; (1) the increase in the turbopump
assembly area and facilities at Rocketdyne, (2) machine tool require-
ments and rehabilitation program, (3) welding, and (4) pre-production
in-house fabrication maturity. The turbopump assembly operation is
.
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being expanded so that it can handle eight assemblies simultaneously.
This requires increased supervision, mechanics, and quality conerol;
duplicate tooling; three-shift operations in most cases; and, a
setting up of a standardized assembly or flow process to optimize
the use of men and equipment. The machine tool study is also a step
in making the very best use of on-hand equipment. Welding has been a
consistent problem on the more complex configurations used in the
main combustion components and some turbopumps as well as the full-
size 77.5:1 exit nozzle. Quality of the welding is being improved
by a program to use automatic welds rather than manual welds and
upgrade the machines themselves. The following is a list of weld changes
from manual to automatic in the course of the period between October
1975 and February 1976:
10/9/75	 1/15/76
Ducts	 66	 15
Turbopumps	 7	 0
Main Combustion Chamber
	 3	 0
77.5:1 Nozzle	 1	 2
Hot Gas Manifold
	 3	 2
It is understood that the first "good" 77.5:1 nozzle has completed
its fabrication cycle with minimum weld distortion which indicates
that particular problem may be resolved.
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3.3 Addendum
ISTB testing with the reworked Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump was restarted
at the end of May and testing at the COCA IB facility has been resumed
as well.
Accelerations, vibrations and unbalanced forces on the rotating shaft
and blades of the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump have caused premature
engine shutdown a number of times. This appears to be the result of
subsynchronous whirl effects or pressure oscillations
at frequencies near 50 to 55% of the actual. pump speed itself. To
resolve this problem, outside specialists have been consulted; a
literature search of hundreds of publications and speciality texts from
several nations has also been started. The most promising fixes appear
to be increased Coulomb damping on the bearing carrier; a tangentially
vented pressure relief interstage seal; reduced interstage seal length;
reduction in shaft hysteresis; decoupled axial and radial modes;
and, of course, any combination of the above modes.
The SSME System Safety activities currently underway includes an
update of the SSME hazard summary listing all identified hazards and
cruses; preparation of the final report on the NSTL hazard analysis
for the A-1 and A-2 test stands; and the planning of an oxygen fire
symposium to assure test personnel are up to date on the current
safety provisions.
The P-4 engine controller assembly is on schedule. Power supplies
for this unit have successfully passed a 10 minute, three axis subsystem
vibration test. The P-4 controller is due at Rocketdyne in September 1976.
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ATTACHMENT 3-1
The major challenges of significance for crew safety on the
Spice Shuttle Main Engine are materials behavior under severe
environments, weld integrity, POGO suppression, and engine
controller performance and reliability. Therefore, the results
of the test program will be critical to developing confidence
in these areas.
Res- °
^ nse: SSMB Materials Behavior Under Severe rnvironments
(a) An extensive analysis and test program is well underway. The
fracture mechanics test program has been expandecl to includo more
materials and components. Fracture mechanics an, ► lyses include
load cycling and environmental condition.,;, alloy/ condition combina-
tions, weld combinations, and theeffects of corm i,ngs and ^ti^c^a.d
overlays. These analyses will. bo veri f i od by tho test procJram.
Minimum detectable flaw sizes tai.11 be cst:abli.shvd by non-dolt-ructi.vr
methods. In addition, an assn snmient of the structural mar(-Ins in
the SSME with regard to structural, weic1lit., and por. formanc c re-
quirements was conducted by a high level team composed of members
from JSC and MSFC. All 117 components reviewed meet the enctine
safety factor requirement of l.4 at full power level, and 88 of
these meet a 1.5 safety factor at full rower level.
SSME 4 old In teg ritZ
(b) Fabrication of the first engine and supporting components
revealed areas requiring improvements in weld integrity. Exten-
sive action has been taken in the area of weld analysis, redosign
of some welll joints, converting from manual to automatic welding,
evaluating of process parameters, upgrading/increasing staff, up-
grading equipment and improvements in in ,poction and quality control
procedures to assure good welds.
POGO Suppression
(c) A continuing analytical program is underway and being pursued
to understand the POGO phenomenon and its implications to the SSME
by NASA field centers and their contractors. A POGO integration
panel, chaired by Dr. Harold Doiron of JSC, has been in operation
since June 1973, to continually review analytical and test data.
The POGO suppressor has been baselined and a comprehensive test
program on individual component parts is already underway. Engine
tests will verify the POGO suppressor system. Extensive use has
been made of Saturn data in designing the test program.
Engine Controller Performance & Reliability
(d) High priority by top management at Honeywell, Rocketdyne,
MSFC, and Headquarters is being applied in this area. Because of
current problems with the controller interconnect system (inboard
master interconnect system) and the fact that it is difficult to
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ATTACMENT 3-1 (Continued)
manufacture and teproduce, two studies have: been initiated on an
interconnect redesign effort as a product improvement. Further-
more, we a ro proceeding to mount the controller on isolators (shock
mounts) which significantly reduce all vibration energy into the
controller at frequencies above 100 hertz. In addition, RTV pott.ng
and foam have. been added to the inboard master interconnect boars
to reduce wire stress concentration and dampen tho wires dynamics.
It should be noted that the wire breakage problem we have encountered
has been associated with the inboard half of the controller inter-
connect system, and not the memory plated wire.
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ATTACHMENT 3-2
Allowable SSME I leat 1•ixchanger Oxidize r
Coil Leakage Rate
We are glad that they are keeping; an open mind on this :since a ]attic r.ti.e
of 10 -3 cc/sec helium (luring field operational leak test inspection sounds
like a fairly large crack. This is a critical piece of gear. Is this a
case where the 160 hour turnaround time is the driver?
Answer;
The heat exchanger leakage rate test requirement for launch operations
has not been firmly established. The 1 x 10- 3 cc/see helium check is
being used for planning purposes. The necessary leak check and/or any
other inspection requirement will be based on the clevelopinent experic;nce
and the assessed risk of a failure. The 160 hour turnaround reclitirement
will no doubt be a considr-ration in all ground operation planning but will
not be the deciding factor.
11
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ATTACHMENT 3-2 (Continued)
Use of Teflon Balls in POGO Suppressor Unit
What are the requirements for the ground tests to verify this design?
How closely can they approximate flight conditions?
Answer:
The hollow teflon balls utilized in the POGO suppressor will be subjected
to extensive testing as individual parts as well as in component tests.
They will also be utilized and subjected to operating conditions daring
all engine testing subsequent to incorporation of the suppressor into the
R&D program. Being an internal part of the engine system, the teflon
balls should be subjected to operating conditions which closely simulate
flight conditions. The only known difference will be operation in a 1 -g
environment as opposed to a flight environment of up to 3-g's. It is not
anticipated that this difference will have an effect on the operation of
the balls.
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ATTACHMENT 3- 2 (Continued)
Delays in Receiving and Testing SS1y1D Components
What is the nature of these problems'? What is the impact on the, NS'1'1,
test program?
Answer:
The SSMD Project is experiencing; delays in the manufacture of hardware
similar to that experienced on previous engine development programs.
The delays are indicative of the complexity of the various manufacturing;
processes involved and the development learning; cycle. Ilow(wor, al
this time approximately three specimens have boOil »jade of all 11,1rd"varc,
items, except for the 77:1 nozzle scheduled for omplet• ion in early
CY76. The initial specimen experience and the hat-civniiig of Ow tooling;
continually improves the hardware sehrclule visibility. The tasting, of
components and the engine systrm is not being; driven by the hardvvaro
schedules and adequate hardware exists to perform the tests as the
test facilities and engineering planning; allow.
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ATTACHMENT 3-2 (Continued)
SSME Controller
When do you expect to have the necessary information on the problems
with the current Controller to make a decision on the backup unit?
What kinds of information will be considered?
Answer:
The test experience with the first prototype controller (PP- 1) and the
ISTB experience with the rack mounted controller (EM-1) and its
software, have eliminated the need for further backup controller
planning. While some changes are being considered to reduce sense
line noise and to reduce fabrication problems with the Master Inter-
connect Board (MIB), considerable experience has been accumulated
through functional and environmental tests of PP-1 and through the
ISTB tests conducted to date at NSTL. While long duration testing at
environmental extremes is still to be completed over the next few
months, the functional and short test duration thermal and vibration
data accumulated to date indicates that the present controller can
be made to function within the engine program constraints. Closure
of the backup controller contingency planning effort is presently being
staffed between Level 11 and Level 1.
(The November 1974 Contingency Plan for SSME Controller identified
a target date of early July 197 5 for making a decision on this subject
based on projected availability of testing experience and procurement
lead times. At the time of our review with the Panel, late April, Ow
test and manufacturing experience accumulated with PP- 1 indicated tint
backup controller effort would not be require(l. )
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TABLE 3-1
FACTr ? OF SAFETY FOR SSME
AT FULL POWER LEVEL VS. RATED POWER LEVEL
h Factor Of Safety	 (Calcul.-^ed)
SSME HARDWARE ITEM FPL RPL
Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Housing 1 .50 1.67
Inducer 1.50 1.67
'	 Turbine Blades 4.40 4.90
Turbine Stator Vanes 1.42 1.58
1	 Shaft 1.69 1.69
iLow Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Turbine Housing 2.12 2.291	
Pump Housing 1.53 1.64
Inducer 2.74 2.90
Shaft 1.91 2.02
i
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Second Stage Turbine Blades 1.76 2..03
1	 First stage Turbine Disc 1.48 1.71
First stage Turbine Nozzle 2.27 2.50
Turbine bellows 1.69 1.97
1	 Turbine Fairing 2.28 2.67
j	 Turbine Exhaust Struts 1 .50 1.75
Turbine Inlet Housing 1 . 65 1.93
Pump Housing-Inlet 1.62 1.89
Discharge 1.62 1.70
Diffuser Vanes 1.41 1.50
Preburner Volute 1.59 1.70
Main Shaft 1.50 1.75
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Second Stage Turbine Blades 1 .40 1.49
Second Stage Turbine Disks 1.40 1.49	 t
First Stage Turbine Nozzle 1.83 1.96
Second Stage Turbine Nozzle 1 .55 1.66
Turbine Bellows 1.53 1.64
Turbine Bearing Thermal Shield	 1 . 76 1.89
Turbine Bearing Support 2.66 2.86
Shaft System 1.46 1.53
Pump Housing -Mount'g flange 1.50 1.61
Discharge 1.82 1.94
Diffuser Vanes 2.12 2.26
Pump Inlet vanes 2.00 k:2.20	 t
Third Stage Impeller 1.79 1.91
First Stage Diffusers 1.50 1.61
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fTABLE 3-1 (continued)
FPL RPL
Valve Actuators
Connection Flange 1.40 1.40
Pressure Cylinders 2.00 2.00
Gimbal Bearingti
Body 1.48 1.57
Shaft 1.64 1.64	 0
Seat 1.47 1.47
Hot Gas Manifold
Shell 1.42 1.56
Injector Weld 2.08 2.29
Fuel Preburner Weld 1.55 1.70
I	 Oxidizer Preburner Weld 1.45 1.59
{	 Fuel-Side Collector Liner 9.- 9.•
Fuel-Side Transfer Tube Liners	 1.75	 1.75
Oxid-Side Collector Liner 2.90 2.90
i	 Oxid-Side Trans. Tube Liners 4.22 4.22
Heat Exchanger Weld 2.70 3.00
Main Combustion Chamber
Actuator Struts 1.41 1.41
I M	 Inlet Manifold 1.41 1.48
4	 Discharge Manifold 1.47 1.55
f	 Longitudinal Welds 1.40 1.50
Liner- Electro Deposit Ni 1.60 1.79
'	 - Narloy-Z 2.29 2.54
Acoustic Cavity 2.61 2.83
O
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TABLE 3-3
DESIGN VERIFICATION SPECIFICATIONS
(DVS)
Specification Title	 Specification Number
Engine System
Main Engine (Vols. 1,2) 	 SSME #101
Gimbal Bearing Assembly	 102
POGO Suppression System 	 106
Avionics
Controller Assembly (Hardware Vol. 1, Software Vol. 2)	 201
Electrical Harness
	
202
Instrumentation System
	
203
Flowmeters	 204
Ignition System	 205
Combustion Devices
Thrust Chamber Assembly	 303
Hot-Gas Manifold	 304
Fuel and Oxidizer Preburner Assemblies
	 305
Turbomachinery
Low Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Assembly	 401
Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump Assembly 	 402
High Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump Assembly 	 403
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump Assembly 	 404
Valves and Interconnects
Check Valves	 508
Pneumatic Control Assembly	 510
Flexible and Hard Duct and Line Assemblies 	 511
Hydraulic Actuation System	 512
Heat Exchanger	 513
Static Seals
	 514
Propellant Valves	 515
Fuel and Oxidizer Bleed Valve Assemblies	 516
POGO Suppression System Valve Assemblies
	 517
a
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4.0 ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SUBSYSTEM
4.1 Introduction
The Orbiter 101 Critical Design Review and the Orbiter 102 Preliminary
Design Reviews have resulted in a reasonably firm baseline of the
Orbiter Thermal Protection Subsystem (TPS). As a result, detailed
drawing releases, fabrication of hardware, detailed tests, have all
begun. The Panel reviewed both the management systems and their
implementation as well as the technical adaquacy of the TPS. Given
this new technology, the Panel wants to assure an adequate basis of
confidence in reliability of the TPS and therefore crew safety.
The Panel has had this critical Shuttle hardware system under
review during the pest two years as shown in Table 4.1. The Orbiter
TPS is, of course, a many-faceted system of the Orbiter. It is affected
by many factors; aerodynamic pressures; structural deflections on the
Orbiter; and the External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster elements of
the Shuttle Cluster. Given this complexity it was apparent that the
Panel could not provide detailed scrutiny of all these aspects. There-
fore the Panel and the Task Team focused on (a) the technical require-
ments for the TPS during phases of the Shuttle mission, (b) those
features of the TPS most affected by unique mission requirements,
operational restrictions, resource reductions, (c) challenges created
in using new technology, and (d) flight test requirements not pre-
viously experienced on manned space flights.
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The Panel examined the management systems in terms of its a-
h
herant capability for handling (a) communications between technical
`	 personnel and through senior levels of management, (b) the hazards
F	 identified and their resolution and risk assessment, (c) such major
technical problems and interface effects as design, test, fabrication,
logistics, maintenance, and assembly. Technical areas covered in
these discussions covered materials and processes, thermal analyses,
structural adequacy, systems integration, TPS and Orbiter hardware
properties affected by aerothermodynamics of ascent and reentry.
Many parts of the program impacting the TPS are under review by
the Task Teams for such areas as the Shuttle Major Ground Test Pro-
gram, Approach and Landing Test Program, the Orbital Flight Test
Program, Development Flight Instrumentation, External Tank and Solid
Rocket Booster Programs, and Risk Assessment,,.
The fact-finding began with detailed preliminary data collection
and analysis resulting in a discussion with appropriate program
personnel to establish the specific areas of interest, the personnel
that should be involved and the best sites for the discussions. Then
the team undertook on-site reviews with various levels of working and
management personnel and examined as appropriate the hardware/software,
tests, and documentation.
The team then reviewed the program response to their action item
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and subsequent baseline reviews and test results. This report is
based on such activities.
4.2 Observations
e
4.2.1 Organization
There have been no measureable changes in the management organ-
ization of personnel since the Panel's last report to the Administrator
dated June 1975. Based on discussions with NASA and contractor per-
sonnel the organization appears to be operating well and is producing
the necessary communication between all levels. Top management has
visibility of the overall status of the TPS program. The Panel will
continue to review the ability of the various TPS organizational
elements to respond quickly.to changing program needs when they are
defined at the Orbiter 102 Critical Design Review and as a result of
the updated "loads programs."
4.2.2 Review System
The Orbiter Thermal Protection Subsystem Design Review conducted
from mid-July through mid-August 1975 was an extension of the Orbiter
102 Preliminary Design Review (PDR). Since this is a good example
of the depth and scope of such a review, the following particulars
on the process are cited:
July 28th	 Data Packages after having been
checked and assembled were sent to
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iparticipants for critique at the
following locations: JSC, KSC, ARC,
La RC, NASA Headquarters, SAMSO.
July 28 - August 8	 The data was reviewed and Review
Item Dispositions (RID's) were sub-
mitted as a result of this critique.
August 12-13	 The Screening Group reviewed all RID's,
resolved the technical or management
questions where appropriate and identi-
fied those items to be brought before
the full, formal Review Board.
August 14	 The TPS Formal Review Board reviewed
the actions of the screening group,
resolved the issues which required
their management authority and assigned
the actions to be taken in ensuing months.
The distribution of RID's across the TPS technical areas is indicative
of where the remaining challenges were found:
Structures (reuseable Carbon-Carbon leading edge, reuse-
Surface Insulation-Tiles and Nomex, Thermal Con-
trol Subsystem-Internal, Stress/Loads, Materials/Pro-
cesses)	 83
Development Flight Instrumentation and Avionics 	 14
Aero Sciences	 27
Systems Integration
	 1
Test Program
	
2'
Reliability/Safety 	 2
Quality Assurance 	 4
Manufacturing	 4
The risk management system for the Orbiter TPS was also reviewed.
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The system is continuing to produce hazard assessments. For example,
the NASA document "Space Shuttle Safety Cox.M1 ; Summary Report," JSC
09990, dated December 15, 1975 covers the following;
a. Damage to the Orbiter TPS from the ice shed from the
External Tank.
b. Possible impact of the External Tank and Orbiter after
initial separation.
c. Damage to the Orbiter by the motor plume from Solid
Rocket Booster after separation.
Based on the material presented to the Panel and the discussions
between Panel members and NASA and contractor personnel it appears
that the review system as applied to the Orbiter TPS is working
reasonably well at all levels.
4.2.3 Documentation
The Panel selectively reviews TPS related documents covering
the various aspects of the design, test, and fabrication of the
Orbiter TPS. Table 4-2 is a partial listing of the documentation
reviewed by the Panel since its last report to the Administrator.
4.2.4 Design Progress
Since the basic Orbiter TPS has been described in both prior
Panel documents and many NASA and contractor program documents, it
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is assumed that the reader is acquainted with the TPS subsyste or
has access to the material noted above. Observations as presented
here cover several areas: (a) significant changes to data reported
in the Panel's last Annual Report to the Administrator, (b) new in-
formation developed during Panel reviews and task team activities,
and (c) observations of other Panel Task Teams that relate to the
developing basis of confidence in the Orbiter TPS' ability to support
a successful Orbital mission.
4.2.4.1 Mass Properties
The new Felt Reuseable Surface Insulation (FRSI) replaces a por-
tion of the low temperature tiles (LRSI). This change reduces the
TPS accountable weight by some 300 pounds. A description of this
newest addition to the TPS is provided in Paragraph ':. ,2.4.3. However,
there are a number of items that are expected to lead to weight increases.
These items include definition of the penetrations and closeout, beef-
up of the reinforced carbon-carbon panel, the outer moldline fairing,
the high pressure gradient flow barrier, the aero-surface seal require-
ments, LRSI coating thickness and optical property change.
4.2.4.2 TPS Material Distribution.
The distribution and configuration of the five (5) different
types of TPS materials used to cover the Orbiter surface are as
4
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shown in Figure 4-1.
4.2.4.3 Felt Reuseable Surface Insulation (FRSI)
Studies conducted in the last months of 1974 showed that the
minimum gage LRSI tiles overprotected the structure in many areas.
The temperature of the structure in these areas was below 350 0 F.
so that it might be possible to have a "bare top surface." This
was, however, considered an unacceptable risk for the first orbital
flight. The concentrated test and analysis program covered many
materials and material systems and finally selected the Nomex felt.
Therefore, the LkSI tiles covering areas with surface temperatures
of -c 7000 F during entry and at 750OF or less during ascent have been re-
placed with DC92-007 silicon paint coating on Nomex felt. There is a con-
timing effort to extend the use of this coated Nomex material to
further reduce weight and complexity of the TPS. The only major con-
cern in changing from tile to Nomex was that there might be a "flutter"
interaction. Therefore, a two-foot by four-foot specimen is presently
being tested at the Ames Research Center to determine the "flutter"
characteristics of this assembly. Table 4-4 describes the FRSI material.
4.2.4.4 Orbiter 101
There is a concern regarding the simulated tiles on the Orbiter
101 for the Approach and Landing Test program vehicle. These are
4
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a
1
made of polyurethane foam covered with Hypalon coating. The ccucern
is with the foam material and its compatibility with various Orbiter
hfluids, e.g., hydraulic fluid, APU propellants, etc. There is a
potential fire hazard due to this incompatibility. NASA and the
I
I	 Orbiter contractor are examining this area and expect to have a
resolution available shortly.
4.2.4.5 TPS Issues
At the time of the Panel's review the following technical chal-
lenges were being worked so each is discussed in the following para-
graphs:
a. HRSI and LRSI tile coatings.
b. Unique shaped tile
c. Tile-to-tile steps
d. Airframe panel buckling
e. Static door thermal barriers
f. High pressure gradient barriers
g. Use of densified fused silica
h. Use of minimum thickness LRSI tile
i. Body flap, rudder speed brake, elevon aerothermal seals
4.2.4.5.1 Tile Coatings and Unique Shaped Tiles
There is an intensive and detailed materials development program
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for the tile coating. The program has been conducted by NASA at the
Ames Research Center, Johnson Space Center, Rockwell International.,
and the Lockheed Missile and Space Company. In trying to meet the
	 I
RSI the coating goals, the program has been having problems with
cracks in the coating on the sidewalls of the High Temperature Re-
useable Surface Insulation. The Low Temperature tiles (LRSI) coating
is still undergoing demonstration tests on the mechanical adequacy
and characterization of its material properties.
The goals for the RSI coating are to:
a. Minimize devitrification during thermal exposure.
b. Minimize thermal expansion coefficient (about 3 x 10 -7
in./in./OF).
c. Minimize morphological (form and structure) changes
during thermal exposure.
d. Maintain imperviousness to water.
e. Optimize optical properties Ea0.8, HRSIE e1.0, LRSI^%O 4
f. Meet dimensional tolerance requirements.
g. Provide as much as possible resistance to ground handling
and impact damage.
Based on the latest information available to the Panel the pro-
gram has an approach to resolving the tile coating problem. The pre-
sent coating (identified as #0050) consists of silicon carbide and
72
cobalt oxide emissivity agents. The basecoat is slip cast fusea silica
with a basic borosilicate glass as the coating. The test program to
resolve the #0050 coating problems involves Lockheed, Rockwell, Ames
and JSC support during the first portion of 1976. At the same time
there is a program to evaluate the reaction cured glass coating pro-
cess developed by Ames Research Center. The so-called reaction cured
glass coatings are produced by blending the components, then affixing
them by spray or paint on the substrate and finally heating the coated
tile rapidly to the reaction temperature for the reciprocal action of
the ingredients on each other. The result is a three-layered coating
with an outer layer of Boron Oxide rich glass, a center layer of Boro-
silicate glass + Tetraboron Silicide, and an inner layer against the
tile of borosilicate glass. When the tests and analyses are com-
pleted it is expected that a final decision on the coating material
will be made in mLd-1976.
In addition to the effort to produce un-flawed coatings, Rockwell
International is evaluating the impact of flaws on mission performance.
This seems worthwhile since the coating cracking problem appears to
be applicable to the LRSI as well as the HRSI; the tiles are subject
to damage by any impact, human or natural; and there is presently no
viable test method of detecting the sidewall flaws.
For the total TPS the program, NASA approved material character-
.
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ization plan specifies that:
"The mechanical properties, as described under test
programs are divided into three catagories to prevent
unnecessary and redundant testing.
Category 1: The approach is to test enough specimens
in one or more critical properties to verify gaussian
distribution in a population of specimens taken from
multiple batches of material that has not been well
characterized previously. Where similar materials
have been well characterized or where generous mar-
gins are predicted, fewer test specimens are re-
quired. A demonstration of a 1.5 safety margin, us-
ing material properties degraded by 100 mission thermal
history, will satisfy any requirements for further
testing of that property.
Category 2: With only a minimum number of data points
scheduled in Category 1, some unsatisfactory margins
may result. In these cases, Category 1 results will
be assessed, and additional testing will be performed.
In addition, certain tests will be conducted when in-	 <
formation is required but does not result in a design
allowable. Category 2 tests cannot be completely de-
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fined until Category 1 testing is complete.
1,
	 Category 3: After satisfactory allowables are generated,
•
	
	
other conditions that could affect the useful life of
the TPS will be evaluated. These are not yet completely
defined but include evaluation of the effect of natural
environments, working fluids, temperature overshoot,
permeability, and waterproofness."
Only Category 1 tests are defined in the current issue of the
test document RI SD74-SH-0156.
4.2.4.5.2 Tile-To-Tile Steps
To assure an undisturbed airflow over the Orbiter tile surfaces
the program must assure that the height of adjacent tiles be held
within very tight limits. Figure 4-2 shows the 10-mil "forward step"
criteria which is an installation problem covering about 17% of the
TPS area. Other areas may permit a somewhat greater step difference
as shown, i.e., 30-mil forward and 50-mil backward steps in non-critical
aerothermo-dynamic areas.
4.2.4.5.3 Airframe Panel Buckling
The problem with possible cracking of thin tiles as a result of
structural deflections was noted in the Panel's last annual report.
Currently this could be a problem in some 1800 square feet
of surface compared to an original estimate of a little more
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200 square feet. Therefore, it is an issue which continues to re-
ceive attention. The program is considering such proposed solutions
as use of softer strain isolator pad (SIP), smaller tiles, strength-
ening of the structure, and the reduction in thin tile area by using
Nomex (FRSI). Trade-off studies indicate at this time that the most
cost-effective solution is to revise the structure rather than modify
the TPS with the exception of using FRSI.
4,.2.4.5.4 High Pressure Gradient Barriers
There are a number of locations, comprising fairly large surface
areas, where there are high to low pressure gradients along the tile
gaps resulting in increased gap heating and possibly flow-tripping.
Such regions where such connections between high and low pressure
flow can exist include chines and trailing edges in particular. The
problem is to preclude the flow of gas through the gaps with barriers
of some type. The manner in which these flow stoppers could be manu-
factured and installed are still under study.
4.2.4.5.5. Use of Minimum Thickness RSI Tile
This area of concern has been discussed in the previous sections
on the possibility of replacing very thin tiles with Nomex Felt; the
effect of flutter and structural deflections; and hot gas flow due
to high pressure gradients. Thin tiles have a thickness not exceeding
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about 0.3 inch. They cover some 2000 to 3000 square feet of Orbiter
surface and are susceptible to breakage during handling and launch
preparations. Their distribution is as follows;
Straight flat tiles	 1000 ft  (approx.)
Single curvature tiles	 500 ft  (approx.)
Double curvature tiles	 1000 ft  (approx.)
The straight flat tile obviously represent the least problem and
can most likely be accommodated by simple methods. However, the single
curvature tiles have not demonstrated that they have sufficient strength
to be handled in a manner like the flat tiles. Even less is known
about the handling qualities and requirements for the double curvature
tiles. In any case, it is necessary to demonstrate the techniques
that can adequately handle these tiles without undue damage.
4.2.4.5.6 Use of Densified RSI and Thermal Barriers for Doors
Densified RSI is a silicon carbide impregnated RSI for use in
those areas where improved dimensional stability and high temperature
service are necessary. Applications of this material is currently
found in localized areas where static seals are required, around the
landing gear doors, the elevon and aft Orbiter/ET umbilical doors.
The definition of environmental and dimensional requirements are still
in the process of being refined.
The thermal barrier designs for the Orbiter doors and other
77
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critical areas have been completed and will be examined analytically
to see what testing should be done to prove the adequacy of the design.
One area of continued concern is the surface smoothness requirements
over doors and other areas using seals and thermal barriers. if the
current smoothness requirements were to be relaxed it could very
well result in flow transition from laminar to turbulent at an earlier
time in the mission that is used in the design and sizing of the TPS.
For example, if the requirements on the nose landing gear door area
were changed resulting in an early tripping to turbulent flow, the
TPS weight might well have to be increased as much as 2900 pounds to
handle the situation.
4.2.4.5.7 Leading Edge Structure
The leading edge thermal protection design uses an all-carbon
system protected against oxidation by a coating of reinforced carbon-
carbon (RCC). The general design and installation is shown in
Figure 4-2. The RCC system covers about 410 ft  of leading edge
surface on the Orbiter fuselage, wings and empennage. The 3,020
pounds associated with this system is made up of some 1600 pounds of
the RCC panels themselves and about 1420 pounds of installation hard-
ware and internal insulation in these areas. The material is sub-
jected to temperatures ranging from about 23000 F. to more than 2600 0 F.
This material will be applied to two specific areas on the Orbiter 101
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and extensively used on the Orbiter 102 for its Orbital flights.
The on-going studies assess the capability of the leading edge
structural subsystem to withstand cyclic aerodynamic and aerothermal 	 ,1
y	 stresses (fatigue properties). This work will be reported upon dur-
ing the Orbier 102 Design Review scheduled for the April/May 1976
time period. There are the number of Review Item Dispositions (RIDSs)
remaining open from prior revieTs that car. be expected at this stage
of the development program. All of these items are being worked. A
summary of the RID activity through the first of December 1975 is
provided in Table 4-3.
The interface between the RCC installation and the adjacent high
temperature tiles (HRSI) has been designed with essentially complete
layout drawings as well as completed stress and thermal analyses.
Significant areas include the RCC attachments themselves and the ther-
mal barriers internal to the protected surface. Thermal barriers are
to be included in the development test program currently underway,
i.e., "Wing Leading Edge System" and "RCC/RSI Interface - Nose Cap"
tests. Additional updates are expected in the coming months to the analys -F-
used in the current design work.
It has bRen noted that the Inconel 718 metal in the fittings
used to attach the LESS is very susceptable to cracking where small
•	 flaws existed and there is an air environment of 1000° F. or more.
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This concern was discussed in some detail in the Spring of 1975 by both
Rockwell and JSC. It was noted that on all released detail drawings
that a reasonable margin of safety has been assured through the use
of decreased material values (e.g., tensile strength, etc.) which
accommodate possible cracks in the same manner as stress-corrosion
is accounted for in the design of such items.
4.2.5 Test Program
The Thermal Protection Subsystem Test Program is extensive. It
is being conducted at such locations as:
a. Johnson Space Center - Technical management and develop-
ment activities.
b. Ames Research Center - Coatings development, material
characterization, system development tests.
c. Langley Research Center - Development test activities.
d. Lockheed, Sunnyvale, Ca. - Development of tiles and
coating and the production of tiles.
e. Rockwell, Downey, Ca. - Development of total TPS system
including the assembly and installation, design and development,
maintenance alLd replacement procedures, etc.
f. Johns-Manville - Basic tile material fibers.
g. Globe-Albany, Maine - Supplier of Nomex felt.
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For our purposes this status report focuses on material cl.arac-
terization tests, development tests, and certification tests.
The current test status shows the following position at this
y	 time
a. Material selection tests are approximately 75% com-
plete with final completion scheduled for June 1976.
b. The material characterization test work required for
the Orbiter 102 PDR is some 90% complete. This phase of the work is
expected to be completed around July 1, 1976. Testing will, of course,
be continued as required t;o meet any changes made to either the re-
quirements or the material used in the TPS.
C. Design development testing will be continuous through
at least most of 1977. Verification testing is expected to begin
sometime in the last half of 1977.
d. A plan has been developed to assess the inherent cap-
ability of the TPS to withstand such natural environments as rain and
hail bird strikes. A major objective is the determination of that
launch and landing constraints that must be considered in mission
planning.
e. The effects of a "lost tile" being examined in detail
through testing at the Ames Research Laboratory. The objective of
these tests is to determine the survivability of adjacent tile in-
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stallations and their resistance to the so-called "zippering" etfect
because of entry aerothermodynamic forces. This work continues be-
cause the earlier test results were not conclusive.
The depth of the test program can be seen from the following
examples of work being conducted at the Langley Research Center:
a. Assessment of the leading edge carbon-carbon material
to assess mass loss verify the mission life capability of this ma-
terial and design.
b. Assessment of the nose gear door thermal barrier to
evaluate the design concepts for the thermal performance, leakage
rates, and reusability.
c. Determination of the thermal response and gas leakage
characteristics of the interface between the leaning edge high tem-
perature carbon system and the reuseable tile system which adjoins it.
d. Evaluation of the thermal performance of reuseable sur-
face insulation (tiles) to off-nominal high shear environments.
e. Determination of the effects of tolerance buildup on
the TPS performance under nominal (turbulent) flow environment.
f. Evaluation of the effects of the sequence and/or combi-
nation of mission environments on the TPS the acoustic fatigue life.
g. Assessment to corr°late damaged tile erosion rate with
flow shear, and determine influence of damaged tile on primary struc-
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ture temperatures during entry.
h. Definition of the design allowables for Orbiter lead-
ing edge reinforced carbon-carbon material by determining the syner-
gistic effects of stress, temperature, and pressure on mission life.
At the time of the Orbiter TPS review in August 1975 a number
of issues were considered;
a. The methods of dissemination of materials property data
by letter followed by revision to the materials handbook was reviewed
and is considered acceptable.
b. Materials test plans have been reviewed and the follow-
ing points made; (1) a plan is required and will be made available
for the evaluation of crystobalite formation in fused silica materials
(high strength/density) used in high temperature areas of the Orbiter;
(2) a plan is being prepared to define the RSI defect and crack accep-
tance and/or rejection criteria which is necessary for proper Orbiter
refurbishment and logistics; and (3) a test plan has been developed
to consider the possible effects of launch site environment on the
mission life of tiles. This test will be implemented starting in May
1976 and there will be analytical studies conducted concurrently.
c. The planned NASA technology study has been established
to continue the investigation of "lost tile" effects. This is men-
tioned above as a part of the Langley Research Center program in
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support of the TPS development and operational understanding work.
Previous testing had indicated that tile "zippering" would not occur
if a single tile were missing from the TPS pattern. However, there
was some question about the effects from the loss of two or more tiles
adjacent along the airflow path. Langley tests indicate that if flow
reattaches on the bottom of the cavity wall where the tile is missing,
unzippering is more likely to occur. This is due to the flow field
undercutting downstream tiles and erosion of the underlying Strain
Isolator Pad (SIP-Nomex Felt).
d. The scope of the acoustic fatigue testing program has
been reevaluated to assure that this program is adequate and timely
in supporting design development. This was of particular interest to
the designers of the aerothermal sea's. 'There is a feeling that such
acoustic fatigue tests should in fact contain a sequence of tests
that used combined environments to assure that the seals are adequate
to pass certification. This is another of the tests noted under the
Langley Research Center support programs.
e. The need for tests of the forward external tank/orbiter
attachment region was reviewed. Thermal testing was not considered
necessary because: (1) the attach/separation mechanism assembly is
replaced after each flight, hence damage to this assembly during
entry has no next-flight consequence; (2) analysis indicates the sub-
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structure in the attachment region will not be overheated; and (3)
the TPS surrounding the penetration is mounted on a removable carrier-
plate that can readily be inspected and serviced after each flight.
+	 f. There have been questions regarding the certification
plan for the TPS because of the use of prototype pre-production
hardware tiles in development test articles that may be used in
support of certification and the adequacy of the planned testing pro-
cedures, especially in the area of acoustic fatigue. To assure an
adequate certification test program it had been decided that proto-
type hardware may be used and if similarity exists with flight hard-
ware and is approved by NASA. The acoustic fatigue test program will
be agreed upon sufficiently in advance of the tests themselves.
4.2.6 Fabrication and Assembly
In its 1975 Annual Report the Panel noted two areas requiring
continued attention. The Space Shuttle Program office responded to
these questions about design and quality control on the TPS and the
procedures, instructions and training requirements for installation
of it. (See Attachment 4-1 and 4-2).
The TPS is still in the development stage; therefore, the detailed
9
information regarding the process for installation and verification
'	 is also under evolution. Some of the statements provided at the TPS
Design Review put this aspect of the program into perspective .
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a. Non-standard tile shapes are required to accommodate
close-out requirements, tile orientation to reduce gap heat4ng effects
and the man penetrations, such as doors, windows, access panels, vents,
etc.
b. Tile shape and carrier strip geometry has been standard-
ized wherever possible. Layouts, of course, are in various de3rees
of completion. Differences in assembly must be ironed-out as the
design fully develops.
c. The number of tools or arrays to be used in installing
the TPS on the Orbiter is estimated as follows:
Mid-fuselage	 88
Wings	 50
Vertical Stabilizer
	 83
Upper Forward Fuselage 	 44
Lower Forward Fuselage	 130
Aft Fuselage, Lower
	 33
APS Pod	 64
RCS Pod, Upper Forward Fuselage
	 26
TOTAL .........	 517
Such installation arrays are being defined as soon as the engineering
layouts become available.
d. The TPS inspection plans (15 May 1975) do not rely on
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visual inspection alone as the initial method of damage inspection.
Demage, of course, can occur during assembly or as a result of the
Pmission environment. The intent of the visual inspection is to iden-
tify both those vehicle areas where there is obvious damage as well
I
as those areas which warrant more detailed assessment because of the
fexternal appearance of the tile or similar data. This visual tech-
I	 nique is an effective process to identify areas of refurbishment.
Detailed discussion of available NDE (Non-Destructive Evaluation)
i
tests and future plans for such are contained in Rockwell International
w
Letter 044-250-75-480, dated 5 August 1975.
re. An example of the attention being focused on the instal-
1
I	 lation problem at this time is the assignment of twelve quality engi-
neers to work directly with the design group during the current phase
of the program. NASA has also assigned a quality engineer to monitor
the effort on a full-time basis. In addition, a TPS development shop
is located adjacent to the design area to assure continuity between
the development testing and the design and quality verification
efforts.
4.2.7 Logistics and Maintenance
Much of what has been stated above for the fabrication„and
assembly portion of the TPS program applies to the logistics and
maintenance areas as well. These areas are receiving increasing
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i
1
attention as the design moves forward. For example, Rockwell lnter-
nations is responding to a KSC request for a proposal to develop
Space Shuttle thermal protection system refurbishment techniques,
which consists of three basic tasks; (1) tile removal and replacement,
(2) tile repair, and (3) thermal tile tests at KSC to verify repair
methods.
These tasks started in October 1975 and will be completed on or
about October 1976.
Handling and packaging specifications and procedures are to be
prepared so that the documents covering the TPS handling, storage,
transportation, inspection, bonding, machining and coating, and water-
proofing will be published and ready in time to support the TPS fa-
cilities activation at the Palmdale assembly plant.
TPS tile identification methods are under active consideration
with a goal of identifying the tiles with an applicable Rockwell
International part number and serial number on the bottom surface
of the tile.
4.3 Current Posture
Although basically a new system, the program considers the
Orbiter TPS concept appears to be both practical and workable. De-
sign and development testing appears to supporL this judgment. An
example of the maturation of the TPS design is the large reduction in
D
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the number of thin (0.20 11 ) tiles resulting from the refinement )f en-
try aerothermal loads and the development of coated Nomex felt for those
•	 Orbiter surfaces having expected temperatures below the 650-700 0 F.
range.
Based on the data available to the Panel, the following is the
status of TPS development:
a. It is expected that 95% of the layout drawings would
be completed by April 1976.
b. The TPS design, fabrication, installation and test
activities should meet the Orbiter 102 program milestone requirements.
c. Vie TPS system design reviews are effective in surfacing
those kinds of problems requiring the attention of management and the
working levels to assure the TPS meets the requirements on Orbiter 102.
d. The Solid Rocket Booster separation rocket engine plumes
do not appear to present an impingement problem.
e. The basic TPS materials have been selected and the
"acreage" configuration have been baselined. The interface config-
uration between the leading edge RCC system and the basic tile system
has been finalized.
Specifications and test plans need to be completed as follows:
a. The Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation specification
on "heat-up" and "cool-down" rates co assure the tile materials meet
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Orbiter requirements requires further definition.
b. The material property data in Rockwell International
handbooks used by design and test personnel needs to be updated.
c. The TPS Design Specification, SD72-SH-0101-6, is to
be updated and completed on or about July 1, 1976 by Rockwell
International.
d. Requirements for acoustic fatigue tests need to be
verified.
e. There needs to be a demonstration of a full 100 mission
life for the carbon/carbon leading edge material (RCC), especially
for that section of the wing leading edge where the shock wave off
the Orbiter nose intersects the wing.
f. Aerodynamic heating in the gaps between TPS tiles is
a problem where much effort is being expended at this time. This is
most severe in those portions of the tile system where a large pressure
gradient is present causing increased local flow rates, such as on the
wing glove area at high angles of attack.
g. A test and analysis program must be defined to prove
that the coated tiles can meet the waterproof requirements necessary
for re-use. Coating development activity indicates that this is a
difficult area and resolution is expected in mid-1976.
h. The requirements for Development Flight Instrumentation
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(DFI) for the TPS are fairly well-defined. The program is in the
process of deciding the type and number; the location of sensors
in regards to edges, tile gaps, structural members; redundant in-
stallations and effects of data point drop-out. The organizational
responsibilities for various aspects of DFI must also be defined.
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4.4 Addendum
The program has just completed a major baseline review and made
number of significant decisions.
4.4.1 Tile Coating
The Ames Research Center "RCG" coating has been selected for the
high temperature tiles (HRSI) based on the most recent test results
and detailed studies. This black coating should eliminate the coat-
ing cracking problem experience during the past months. The original
grey-colored coating will be used on the low temperature tiles (LRSI)
which has not experienced the cracking problem. The thermal properties
(emissivity/absorbtivity) appear to meet requirements.
4.4.1 SSME Heat Shields
The thermal protection system design for SSME base heat shield
is shown in Figure 4-3. This shield protects the Orbiter and engine
structure from heat transfer during the ascent and entry portions
of the mission. It has been estimated that one-half of the shield
on a single engine may have to be replaced every four or so flights.
4.4.3 Thermal Seals
The Orbiter body flap and wing/elevon lower cove aerothermal
seals require failsafe design. As presently designed these may pre-
sent a single point failure condition which can be considered a crew
r
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safety hazard. Furthermore these seals as designed are dynamic systems
so that safe-life cannot really be proven and inspection for failures
is extremely difficult. Although these seal systems include springs,
hinges, linkages, rubbing plates they are not subjected to the form
of failure mode and effects analyses (FMEA's) used on other mechanisms
because they are considred to be structures. The contractor has nuted
that reliability trade studies have beer. conducted to support the de-
sign a^.d development and the :;ist program.
The test and analysis program for the seals is directed toward
demonstrating that:
a. Sufficient structural and performance margins exist so
that there is no credible single point failure in the seal system.
b. Sufficient access and ground test provisions have been
provided to permit inspection and tests to prove flight readiness.
c. Where structural and performance margins cannot be
demonstrated the design shall incorporate sufficient theI-mal protection
to accommodate a safe single entry by means of insulation, heat sinks,
etc. To assure hat the current design approach meets the requirement-F
the contractor has been directed to rview the following areas and
develop a plan and a schedule to (1) determine if the present design
can be made failsafe for all flights, (2) reassess maximum gap size
allowables, (3) determine if additional test program will increase
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confidence, (4) investigate the inspection and maintenance cone-Pts
for increasing the ability to meet turnaround times, and (J) Investi-
gate potential modlficat.ions to early test missions to enhance the iaii-
safe concept.
other areas of thermal seals still being analyzed include the
following
a. The impact of accommodating early boundary layer tran-
sition with particular attention given to the forward landing gear
door and the external tank/Arbiter/forward attachment points.
b. Use of redundant seal systems based on the results of
the activities noted above under the elevon and body flap seals.
c. Payload Bay Door areas.
d. The External Tank Umbilical Door seal.
e. Mechanical properties of thermal brush systems used
in the seal and barrier systems.
f. Door ragging on those doors that might have significant
deflections during the mission.
4.4.4 Thermal Barriers
In addition to the thermal barrier materials used in the seals
around doors and the like, there is also a need for thermal barriers
or "gap fillers" between tiles -nd between tiles and adjacent structures
such as windows, the elevon trailing edge, the wing glove and chine,
94
etc. Results from wind tunnel tests clearly indicate that gap heating;
is significantly increased when flow is driven by a high pressure
gradient. The amount of heating increase is dependent upon the mag-
nitude of the gradient. For example, a gap temperature of 14900 F.
is experienced at a surface temperature of 14000 F. while a gap tem-
perature of some 20000 F. resulted at a surface temperature of 1600 0 F.
General areas of the TPS where pressure gradients exist tnd where gap
fillers are required have been identified.
Concepts devised to meet this problem include;
a. Thermal brush bonded to the sides.
b_ Glass fabri.c shapes bonded to the sides.
c. Saffil fibers encapsulated in Irish Refrasil material
and bonded to the filler bar currently in use.
d. Saffil fibers plus a knitted wire mesh springy, encapsulated
in a high temperature fabric (AB 312) and bonded to the filler bar.
Since the bonding of the tile and coating has not been satis-
factory to date, the program is considering the use of Saffil fibers
made into a brush (Saffil = silica fibers) or encapsulated and bonded
to the filler bar rather than the tile coating.
These designs are being testev' both thermally and structurally
at this time.
4.4.5 Tile Step and Gap Effects
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There appears to be a treat teal of difficult in maintaining the
small/step and gap required between tiles %o prevent early boundary
layer transition. For instance the none landing tear door thermal
barrier .arrangement produces a 0.00-inch step at forward and alt
dolor edge,; compared with present requirements for not more than 0.011-
inch ;atop. 11uv gap between thermal tilen at the same door Ages are
in excess tit' the requirement lcor 0,034-inch width and 0.034-inch depth.
Analy tical and teht work continues in Such areas tto bring the totep and
trap problem within allowable bounds,
,4.0 ;;tructural Thermal Aijitly;sc,:;
The approach to (lit , t.truc• tural thermal analysis in such that it
supports the development tot structural anti TPS designs that are inter-
depentlent. The time that it takes to do a complete theraaaAl, and stress
analysis Calculation or iteration on a previous; Calculation is halite
long. i'ho ge programs are large, complex Wimensional mathematical
models requiring Considerable manpower and computer Usage. `those pro-
grams duo not include all three-dimensional effects that iniluo"ce the
structural temperature gradients because Orbiter design schedules prc-
clude that level of detail. Thtoso three-dimensional ellects provided
as given inputs are parameters that vary longitudinally as well an
transversel y , e.g., TPS thickness, heat loads, primary structure, and
TO insulaticn. The Contractor's TPS minimum weight therm a l design
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and analysis philosophy is to Mablish RSI thickness roquiremont;;
and vehiclN Lempvrature response based on nominal thermal analytic s
for aborts an woll as normal WTR and FTR missions. All these analvw
are planned to be accomplished at a level of detail conUstout with
shuttle program iunding and :schedules. Final vehicle overall thermal
and structural capability in to be determined through a progressive
flight NO program. Predicated on ili„ %t toot results, design modi-
fications can be e locted if required to maintain adequate vehicle
operational capability,
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A` 1"PA(:t^iMtsNT 14-1
The do N i can tend quality control  f©r the? doorn e Therm.l l
Prot oct i care System laenetrat;ions and thermal so aM should he
closely monitored by mannement~ to assure  t hart the rol i aahi
lity noeessazey to satisfy safety will be a0hieve d.
ltt-:;yonse: Thr criticality of t c^liable dosictn fcrr Worn and ttthor^
1 — not
 K O nr t hr ough thv TPS and the associat od W tativ and dyn"W o
.il`a l :7 is 1't ( • t^ to a $('dby management.	 The cal os i nq anti l iatoh i nq mk t'ha-
n i :0111'7 for tho doors and hat shot-, woro identi fi ed  ar ri'l' l s in tho
1 1MIA a.. l ood i ntl to failure to cl ca o and Potont ial ont pqor y l of t oc't :•
'1'hoso critical mechani sms
 and r • t qatod thorm.al so "In have ialro Y-pu
idont i fiod in the ©riai t or Hazards AnAysi s. Con y , in was tAt,r'+'f't:+,A
about t ho i Itlmo t ur ity of dosi on of this o"rt of t h" t hormal prat oo-,
t i c)tl
	
duri nd tho Tr'S M, ,, for veld cl o 102 c • t1 p daotod in
Mtju ,.:t	 St'i1t . klul_o milostflnos, 1)"V' boon ost,ab) ishod for nt' ' ► 1 tC'Y111
a(I) 1.7tmonts in the dos tin offor't to assure atistac't,or'y majq;ns.
Wilt . Prokir"1111 t)i a't i c'tor ht1:7 boon "' ppri mod of the stot lrt7 Ond at't'o1'q	 nh
mc ,nt of the` mi lost • eno s will ho monitorod.
It	 '1l.'-o bo nc)t t`tl that th" c)vorall ST).lo o
	
dos. i t n
hoon rovit'wod with the obioc't i vo of minimi zinq tho nombor of ;'1'.i
Bonet r otions.
	 For c`X.l11ple, af7 o i exult of . r'e'viow of door:;
,1t't uMcd in fl ictht, tho forward Ws instal! Kon wos TlloalfjwK txt
of i m i n-1t'r tht ,
 doors.
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A'1'_TAf I tl
The procedures, instructions, and training requixt i mo nt e, iol
installation and,  quality control of tho Tht-rmal I'vottlot^lon
System components should be rovi ewed by pro(iram m,ina(fomont
to assure the aero/thti modynami c roquii t`inv`nt , arty t^lt't .
Rosponsv: The TFIS (Thormal Proteotaon	 0" ati 11 ill t hti
dt % Vjlopinent stage; therefore, the detailod intoll'Lit icon re'1x;11'tlitIq
the proco gin for iiv-lt-all.ation %and vori F i caHon t i t t tit' T11 "; i s3 ,il:,
tinder dovolopment. Sictnific,int attt'nt ion is 1wintt	 oil thi,
arcio by loth the contractor rind NASA. fell' (n,,Itimlo, to i1:I:;117't'
t imp ly and adcduat;t^ developrr`nt of: quality cr' i tt'l is for tho T11;I
1 nsatallation and vorif icatioll 1 lroct':i;4, tho font 1 act or lia!i .i:;:iacillI'tl
1,1 quality c►nclinc'ers, to work directly with tit` tlt'.nitjn tji't 1 u 1 1 011 itvl
Ou... de;titIll and deve-l opmont phaso of tho offort .	 NASA i,l: ► i;,f, ittIi+ t
al tjualit'y engineer Lo monitor the effort on o 11111 time
A TI'S dovolopment shop is lo1`,it ed 41 Ci jacolit ttl Hl4' dosi gl ► t ► `t .l i to
assul. c. cant i nuitay between tit` tic+volal moist to f i n'l all(l tho tl :• 1 tail
and quality verifl.oation o1 f:ort.s. NO% (11olult`::1 1 iit't ivo ov' 1111 ' 1t ion,
Coch iliguo.n. are curren tly bointl devel•lpod and + t ::t t`tl to 1 '1;ar,111v
detection o f dolami nation of Vile bob id r., m,atvi I -il vo i (Is t C1,00.%k+,
vto. , fol lowinq installation rind fli,clht . 	 trai nillt; '11i 'l
corti£icaLion recjuiroments aat` bvinrl dovolopod e`onourrelli with
the installation and inspection processo.s.
sj°ho 1PS i s
 an arva of great conc orn lo, mkanatcji ;mrio- and it i;:
of this concern that the action was taken to as,:,ictn do'sion,
quality en(linverinq, and manufac;turin.ti 1u•r.301111t'1 to dc'Ve'1 , 11I thc)
noov.,isary voriticration procL-;,,es cant°ttrr('nt wi th tlt`volov)nIont• of
they
 design. )u rcigiient reviews are con(iticted by I)o it h the cont:r iiet of
mid NASA manage?ment to maintain full visibility nj" progress and
problems oncountervd in the TNS development.
99
TABLE 4-1
tAitlil`T1,P, MIE'tMAL PROTECTION SY VIN At'TIVICIIN
DAT E. 1AIf`AI TttNi !r l E t, I
Feb L07 14 I S C RNvio w of	 Big"i t icant	 Shutt le	 ,10 vinie+nFi ""a	 nt"' OS,
Any, IQ74 ARC Test	 a _ r matorial,. dovulopmout	 roviow and mamina°
Ielrhhe ed tion of mat(rialn chnravtori,'at ioan/ abrivat io n
Reap I Q74 Rl Orbiter TINS
An l974 38C Level	 11	 (Systems	 Integrations	 anpe'e't'i of 	 TN;
Maur l97 K KSC In:.pv	 t ion,	 ropa ir,	 ma i at-onanr y anpov t s of	 1 VS
May IQ79 RI More detailed fact finding aesoviamd With TP;S
tenting,	 installation, maintenance,	 Aafol y WPM.,;
.Tell 1979 38V TP8 design,	 installation,	 WK, safvty	 imp' iva°
tionn asooviaW With door and vent protmion
Aug 1975 RI TPb annombly for Orbitur 101 aad 101
Palmdale ParticipaLo in TPH Design Review
fief IQ79 RI Rosult, of Orbiter 101 CDR and	 input to 10? PIIR
May l el7b j",C Rosult.s of Orbiter 10) PDR rrlatintt to TPS
►
100
TABLE 4-2
DOCIItENT9 AtNIOCTATPD WITH OR1 TER TPv
1. Orbiter Thermal Protection SuLsyMem (TPS) Design Review
Board Minutes. 14 August 1975.
:'. TPS Design Review sutimnary briefings, system description briefing,
team hoard briefings, Review Item Disposition Summary, RID and
team minutes; all published in RI document SSV7 j-24-1 elated 14 Aug 1.
3. Typical RI Internal Letters relating to TPS:
"TPS Evaluation of Updated Design Trajectory Mission 3h" April 30, 1971)
"TPS Evaluation of AOA Trajectory-Nominal WTR" June 16, 1975
"Thermal Evaluation of OML Paired TPS Thickness for OV 10?" July ,14, 1975
"TPS Evaluation of ETR 'Trajectory With Dispersions" August 1, 1975
+. "Shuttle Orbiter OV-101 CDR Safety Analysis Report Volume T-
Management Summary" 15 September 1075, SD75-SH-0135-001.
"Shuttle Orbiter OV-101 CDR Safety, Analysia Report Volume 11-
Structures" 15 September 1975, SD79-SH-0135-00?.
"Shuttle  System" Safety Analysis Report:" Juno 15, 1975 ; SD7 5-SH-t)064A
"Space Shuttle Safety Concerns Summary Report" 	 September 1075.
'Shuttle Orbiter 102 PDR Safety Analysis Report (Update), SD74-SH-0323,
dated July 1, 1975.
101
TADLF, }- 3
Revieya It, his ositi em_ R_III,^,
From previous Revivo
Still v tin
LESS/HRSI Gap/Step Toleranev
LESS structural and Dynamic Analysis
LESS/RRSI Tnternal Insulation
RSI Attachment Around Windows
Thermal Deflection of RCC Expansion Seal
LESS Designs for Baseline Trajectory
(These indicate the areas of some concern from a standpoint of design
completion and understanding, of the problems involved if not resolved)
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'1'a l^1 e ,aa^i
Felt Rouseahlo Surface Insulation (FIST)
1. This is Nomea► or "N" felt coated with whito mili ► one oxiN tDc q ° -0 ► is
.'. The use of this material in 1 ieu of t iles n avon about 14) `+oa Un,
1, Physical Proportion
Maximum allowable temprrat "re for one Minnion	 900 OF
- 100 Mission Life Maximum allowable temparat"ro
	
700 1.
- OWN, 1hs/f t: x with thickness of 0.4 inche ,	 0. 24
- Coating, thicleness(DC4!-00;x`1 	 0.1)011 Who!;
- Area covered, ft-' 	 lHot1
4. Manufacturing process
Nomex felt is heat treated !o 700OF for 30 minuton, then it is
treated at a raised temperature of 750"F for another 40 minutes.
Thin ,accomplishes the pre-shrinkage step. After application of
the coating (DCQ -U07) there is a post curd for 19 min ► atos at h10OF.
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5.0 AVION7.(;S MANAGLMFNT
5,1 introduction
The Shuttle avionics system provides command functions includ-
ing, their implementation, guidance, navigation, and control capability,
communication, computation, displays and controls, instrumentation,
and electrical power distribution and control for the orbiter, I,xter-
nal Tank, and the Solid Rocket Boosters. There are also provision,
for the management and control of payload functions anti for the
communication of data to and from payloads.
Avionics was placed high on the list of ,areas to be examined and
assessed by the panel because the fabrication, test, and verification
of the integrated system of avionics hardware and software i,s vital
to the success of the current phase of the test program and later
mission operations, and it is an area most likely to affect and be -f'f0CLvd
by resources and schedules.
Attachmei,t'. 5-1 is the Shuttle t)flice response to the Panel'- con-
corn that the management system for avionic hardware and :,o twarL'
should be reviewed by senior program management to assure it is
adequate for the indicated complexity of the program.
Shuttle Orbiter avionics for the purposes of this discussion falls
into two identifiable areas; (1) the Orbiter 101 avionics used dur-
ing the verification testing; and Approach and Landing Test project,
and (2) the Orbiter 102 avionics used during; the Barbital flight teIsts
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anti initial flight, iollowiugT 11faP&F. The Arbiter 101 ,avionics system
provitlt"l (tat` nt°lt'. %Iry ;1ig;nal acquisition, handling,, processing;, O
plav and poworing; to enable tilt' navigation,  cont rol, .n d Wormat ion
intolt°haugtorequired ttu- tltc approach and landing trsl prttJect .
sped t icall y , the avionics system for 001tcr 101 crntaius;
,a.	 Guitla,lcc and Nayolat ioll
(1)	 Phrvv inertial Measuring, Units (ll`lltl.
to) Navigation Have (NO.
tl Soilwart' in the general purpose computers,
h.	 a1t1' Pat,t
Cl) .1 nonsory ovstem to mvas"rc static pressure, total
prvng"re, lower and upper alpha port pressures, and indicated total
air temperature.
(1 ) Air faata Transduevr e nsomhlOm to provide digital
inputs from the mousing; system to the general purpose vomputern.
ftl Prohvn that are mechanWed tsar stowage and dc-
plovment as required
(.i1 IpM a l at`: odynami e probe mounted on a boom
attached to none of the whiter with a dvdieiatud separate air daw
vomput t e r and panel mounted di splavn. TIM g eparat e ra y st em in used to
calibrate the operational system.
C.
	
Flig;ht VontroI
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i(1) orbiter 1111 has a backup night control nyOMIX
uning,, the independent ±lit data senors and dedicated general purport,
computer as an alternate to the primary f light control tun't i on.
t
(2) Flight control components involved in the avionic-
t o-aVt niator interlace lire
Rate gyro assembly
Accelerometer assembly
Ilotat iott hand ont rol
Rpeed brake thrust central
Rudder pedal transducer assembly
Aeronurfare servo amplifier
Rear t i,on jet driver forward
Reaction ,jet 1OW dr i ver
Ascent thrust vect or control driver
(1) Flight control digLt.al autopilot nottware to pro
-vide the basic Ilight control tunrt ions.
d.	 to maunirat i oum and Tr.acl^ cW
The RV, processing, and distribution equipment nocvssary
to provide the many input, output and process activities.
a .	 ^^.agv s and Controls
(1) Controls
Rotation Hand t'outrolle>; (this in noted above OV well)
Rudder pedal transducer assembly (this in noted aboy
an we ll)
Speed Brake Controller (this in noted above an wall)
Keyboard caned to interiaec with the (Wr di:apluv ,iud
to manage the information displayed. it is also used to provide entry
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to send control commands to the computers.
(:,) Mistllays
(a) Attitude Mirector .. ' Leator (two-axis, roll ^ !nd pitch) .
(b) Surface Position Indicator (for aero-controls)
(c) Alpha/Mach Indicator
(d) Altitude/Vert:ical Velocity lndieator
(0) Ilori.•ontal Situation Indicator
(f) orbiter Misplay ITnit (t'ItT flight computer information)
( g ') Computer Status Annunciator Assembly
(h) Fire Warning, Annunciator Assembly
(i) Caution and Warnin; *, Subbystem
g;.	 Instrumentation Subs stem
This consists of sensor transducers, signal conditioning
equipment, ITM encoding; equipment, irequeney multiplex equipment,
PCM tape recorders, analog recorders, timing; equipment:, and on—board
checkout equipment.
1 110 ay 8,t0111 it, Mad( I UI) ki t Lwo separate parts:	 (1) tilt'
opera t ional instrumentation (ol), and (.') developmont alight instru-
mentation (MFI).
Il.	 VaUl processing .lnd ;Software.
(1) Five general purpose comptlters (taPt') .
( ) 'Itao mass memories - mag;netie tape memories for
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largo volume hulk storage and organkatiottal Wormat ion.
(t)	 1-1 ghtoon l+htlt iplr;^t^r^'I>.^ntult iple^.rr,t (t+1l t:t) .
(4)	 Remoto intorIact , tin! t :a to Convert and 10111 1.1t dat it
at system intrrlaCC.
0) Milt i tunCt ion Cathode Ray `lithe (t'R1V), thrro of
t host; .
(0) Display System.
(7) Viata Bus and associated equipment .
(N) Software for all computers.
I.	 1 leetrical Power l t i st rihut ion acid control
This m ystem providvn power distribution and power von-
t rol for all Shuttle Systems during operational phases, It int ert ace;t
with all subsystems that require signal power and operational power,
following are the changes for the orbiter 101 operational t vpt'
vehicles:
a.	 The Star Tracker anJ lAght Shade l ►nit:; are added to the
guidance, Navigation and t'ontrol system.
h.	 Removal of air da ta
 components used tot' t'alibrat imi
of the system during orbiter ltll test phase.
C.	 Addi t ion of S-band.
d.	 The 1-Ingine lnt enact ,
 Unit used hetwren the Orbit er
 tou-
t roll and the 881W will he added to cotiumind and status,  the a;+Atl? during
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tarbital 11ij,11t . A brief t1Verviow tai tilt` operational sy'stc`l'l its rAlowu
ill Figureore rt -1, and tall' Dat a Provossing/So t t ware arrangement is nhtlwn
in Fi gure 4-1.
^a..^ general purvost' computer (opo)
in till' Orbiter 101 there are i We OPM in tilt° orbiter on-board
etnnputatiolal colliplex. Four e f t tilt , GPc l s, are :,ynehruni.-ed, contain-
ing tile identical primary prog ram loads. The frith OPC on tile An
phase iii orbiter lilt is dedicated to support the backup i light control
s ystem. This backup f light control system is a primary W O W tune•t iton
in this phaov of tilt' p rogram.
i•;ach t:Pe' i;, a modii ied I mm AP-101 microprogram oont rol l vd Central
Procossi"q knit (CPU) with a unique Input/Output Proco g sor int ertaee
to tilt' ;aerial data bus network. These two lint' replaceable units,
the C1 111 and the Input/Output Processor, contain portions of main
memory which area used b y either the CPU or the input/Output ProetwSsOl'
on a nondedicated basis. The CPU initiates all Input/output actions
through the execution tit instructio" g to the processor. These in-
struetio"s and data words are transivrretl between the CPU and the
Pr000ssor oil 	 bidi.reetional, parallel word data bus. 1'xcept for
init iat.ion, the processor is independent tit the CPU and executes its
own programs, which reside in the eonunlotl main memory. lead-only
s torage in used for c ont rolling a fixed setlllcnee ea t operat ions and
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internal data paths to be exomod for each inntruet ioi.
tt. t	 tt t'I t441'111(Iilt't' MonitljL_ Il	 +Vt.t t'(;1	 to' 'AR
The VMS on arbiter 101 is considerabl y lenn complex than the ones
on Orbiter 100 which is used for orbital missions. The Orbiter 101
VMS are used d"ring; the AIX proiert provides for automatic taunt dvtovt A ra
and annunciation, and subs ystem measurement management. Additional VMS
functions Nr Orbiter 10? 0l'T and operational missions include the
following: (1) subsystom configuration management, (1) consumable:;
mai,ag;ement, ( t) data recording; management , (4) t elomotr y format select ion,
(5) payload support, (b) mission proper storage and retrieval, (7) Per-
formanre evaluation and trend anaksis, and (8) cont ing oney planning; aid.
The smaller 101 VMS program in resident in each of the four ON's "sod
for tho primary f l icht control system.
Automatic lault detection and aannunciation detects subsystem lailuros
at the functional path level, which is the level corrective action can be
taken in flight. Thin system is Implemented through the avionics; noftwa ro.
When the failed parameter in one of the safety critical caution ,anti warninti;
parameter group items a backup caution and warning; master alarm signal U;
generated. A VMS crew alert alarm consisting; of a small blue light and aI
short duration buiver it initated when any parameter is declared failed.
Thus the VMS provides a backup capability for the hardwired Caution :Intl
Warning, s"bsyntom in alerting; the crow to any dotowd hazardous or
potentially hazardous condition which requires attention.
The. Subsystem Measurement Management software enables the crew
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to call upon the (TU the measurement data so the crew can assenn the
degree of a problem.
Orbiter Avionics Inst-allot ioil
The major portion of avionics can be round in the tlirht deck,
tho three forward avionics equipment bays, and the three alt avionics
equipment bays. All antennas, exceptt those used exclusively for
:satellite tracking and EVA communication, are flush mounted on the
top, bottom, and sides Of the Orbiter forward luselagv. These antenna,!
include:
a. Dour S-band seven-element antennas for phase modulated (PM)
commuYlWation with space/ground link system and : TDN ground stations and
the NASA tracking; and data relay satellites.
b. Two S-band FM antennas.
C.	 Four G-band horns for the radar altimeter.
d. One U11F aaLenna for EVA/air traffic control voice
communications.
e. Six L-band TACAN antennas.
t .	 rhree Ku-band microwave scan beam landing; system antennas.
g;.	 One integrated Ku-band communications/rendezvous radar
antenna and one Ku-band communication used with the NASA Tracking; and
Data Relay Satellite.
h.	 One S-band PM payload antenna.
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5.6 Orbiter Radio Frequencies
Vie Orbiter carries up to 23 antennas for communicat=ion wit x
ground stations, detached-payloads and crewmen doing; EWA. They ust
S-, Ku-, La , C-, and P-band frequencies. Table 'J-1 chows the system
function and the Orbiter frequency for transmitting; :and for receiving;
signals.
The I.0-band links the ground ;stations and the Orbiter via the
Tracking; and Data Relay Satellite .Iystem, It carries the same kinds
of intelligence as the 5-band subsystem, but at wider band-widths and
higher data rates. `lie Orbiter rende,.vous radar and the Wiltiple
Scan Beam Landing; System also works in the Ku-band. The Ku-band systems
capabilities and vehicle locations are shown in Figure 5-3.
5.7 Microwave Scanning; Beam Landing System (MSBI,S)
The MSBLS will provide information to he Orbiter avionics com-
puter during the critical autoland period of flight. The MSBhS is
used during; the last 75-seconds of Orbiter flight. I%Ihile the nominal,
acquisition range is about 12 n. miles, the range in practice depends
upon Orbiter flight path, attitude, and weather constraints.
The system consists of the ground station and an airborne navi-
gation set. The ground station is divided into an elevation equip-
ment group, Figure 5-4, and an azimuth/distance measuring group,
Figure 5-5. The airborne equipment is divided into a decoder-re-
ceiver unit and a DME transmitter unit. Figure 5-6 .shows the major
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olerwlltn and the radio-frequency li.11ho which art la(loti ill the VIJIaI'a.
Ii.8 Avionics
	
and Tont I'lau
There the three laboratories of major nit;nii.itance to tilt" aviollit"n
tent prol,ram. In principal tho g,oftware Ik'vclopment laboratory  .at
,1.!t' in for Ole development and ver ii i,cation of n01 twar('. The Avionien
I)evelopmcnt T®aboratory at 110ekwell International it, for the eValuatioll
of avionics hardware/software. The Shuttle Av3onicai Integration Laboratory
at JSC is for the validation of the integrated avionics, hardware and soft-
ware ;system. In practice the laboratories are also u sed as needed to work
through teelutical	 Tht' iollowint,, nectioni; dencribe each
of the labotaLo r it's and the test program for validation of orbiter 1.01
hardware and noftWare for ALT.
°a.8.1 Soi^tware I)OVelopment Laboratory hhL)
`11iisa facility at .IS(" is used for soi tware coding;, dt,velopliwnt
tl'sting, and for verification of the` ilig,llt software.	 It provide., ; t1w
capability for high fidelity execution of flight .yoitwiro, variablt
fidelity nimulaLiO nS of vehicle ,nd avionie subsystvmn to provide
nominal and off-nominal performance, diag;noSUV aid, ,  to iorct' tent
conditions and eoll'_'et/analy.av results, and an automated and !wllli-
automated set of techniqueS LO provide ri„oro%u, wi tuarl' t'^)llf l.x',-
uration management. This facility has been oper,at in ; in stlpport ot.
-1
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the SATI, and Palmdale Plant elieckoat. worh,.
5.8.:) Avionics Development Laborator y	 U)
The ADT, is an vn) ,)ineering tool t-ifth emphasi,,; on avionics hardtv,aro
development;, subsystem evaluation and initial hardwares ivrograLion. It
is 
set up as shown gehematically in Figure 5-7. TM5 facility is locat,el
at RI1,9pace Division, Downey, C.A. The major ADL flij , ht vontrol tests cover
they test and elieckoov procedures for the Orbiter 101 at Valilidalo; the
Backup Flight Control System (BFCS) closed-loop performanco-, the pritivir y 1,o
BFCS owitchover; primary flight control system performance testing and
actuator tests; and closed-loop tooving, with tiv, Flight Control Ilydraltlic.s
Laboratory (FCIU,) .
The status of work being, done at ADT, In mimmari ,. , ed as:
a, Sofrware evaluation tests are in process on those taper to
be used for test and checkout of orbiter 101. The programs or taptv ,  to be
used include SU-1, SU-IA, V1 1-101ADL-3A, FACI I
 ADL-33, OPS-9,	 and
ADL-3. These tapes will alco support the SAIL integration tasting.
b, The ADL is using two production general purpose coniptiLer;,,
(('7PC ' s) to support the dry runs of test and cht l elcout. procedt,ros and
memory loading tests for GTSE support.
c. Both Single-string and Multi-string open and closod-
loop engineering studies aria acing done.
d. Work load at ADT, now and in the future will be, quit(,
heavy to meet the required evaluations and vorifiCaLions. With proper
scheduling and no major problems this work load should be accommodated.
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X9.8. i t1 luttl.e Avionl c' ,i into ;rat icon T.ai Aor at ory W)ATL)
The	 at r1,13C gives INWA the capability too 	 clwied-
loop mission evaluation of the avionico system aas it will be used
in ilight. `]'tail capability iveludeo testint, for : , pet ific oif- nominal.
conditions. After outlining the scope of the aactivitioc planned for
)All,, the differences between the equipment used in ;tAtl, and thc equip-
ment to be flown on orbiter 101 are disc+assed to provide in undcrst:an^linr;
c ► f they capability of the SALT, to support orbiter dovelopnaont and fllg'Jlt
Zi a o^waaaa:li .
`>.t.. l Test Act.ivit.ios
To give an idea of the scope of ;!)t,! total ;iAII, host activities,
as brief definition of the four Lost phases is a.) follows:
PHASE I. TE.13` S - Aeti.vat ion and establishment of the operational
capability o f the "ALI checkout should be completed by <Tuly/August 1971)
t i 1110- 1 raft'. A prototypo/breadboard version Of the avionict,  tt'„!hard-
ware will be used.
1°11A IS1; II TESTS - orbiter avionics software' oystems pc'rtorm-
anco in support of the AhT program requirements will be verified dur-
int; this, phase. Priority has been a9laeed on verifying the 13acicup
Flit,ht Control software and then utili,ing this configuration to
buildup and integrate flight systems. It is expected that the 8011—
ware Development: Laboratory (SDL) soi aware will be uti li ed for the
buildup of those flight (3ystems not covered by thcs 11118. The final
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ilight system buildup, integration, and laboratory verification will
be aecomplit,hed with those software tapes or programs desi^;vated ns
VU-101 t;I, ADL-` IV) FAi;I, and OP,3-01 Pre-release. `iltis soi te9l-tru is
used in order to have LSATL ready to suPPort closed loop tet,UW i11
oept;ember/October iwo period.
lIT TFSTS - Test:in ; will be eonducLod to support 1_110
orbital i liy;tlt missions.
PITA;ll TV TE'o'Tg - `1'estin^, will support the ghutt-le aviolliet,
operational requirements. 'Mus there will be update of SAIL Lo they
required hardware/software configuration.
5.8.3.2	 SAIL Rqui m^ eq,
5'.€f.3.2.1 Simulated 13urface Actuators
A spacial purpose eleetronic t,imulator has been designed and is
being built in-house at JSC to appear functionally equivalent to tilt,
real hardware and interface directly with the hardware aerosurface
actuators. To assure the simulation is ade ,o(Itc, the system func:tion;,
will be compared with those from hardware at; the fli,^,Ilt control hy-
draulic laboratory and from the Orbiter 101 vehicle. Thi., comparison
will cover (1) position gain and phase shift versus frequency, (2) secon-
dary pressure monitoring, and (3) vehicle/flight control system clotwd-
loop structural movie stability.
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^^.t	 .,^• "'	 Pury t_it)II,aIf''^90.^°_idls I I1, 4— 1IR^t Fi4` Ff1 N^PIiI ,^f^i11^t^^
	 OAYa ^6^1^6 t
whiTo prototype oquida„aont in used it is planned to re st He the m
 all"r
My drat" hoon modified and "p datod to m,tintain f"nuionea1 oq"ivaaonoy
with flight-typo hardwaro.
r
	 he^ee^lam€ant I l_idat __Lnnt^reaaen_ trat_ao^a 'vot ltt_^a7T,
Ominnions are in they
 nonvors and harnena normally connvvr,Q to t w
operational instr"me'ntation m"ItiploxoroMmnitiplon"ro. `i'hen o do not
affect the flight control nvntcm or the data provooning nyntvm.
a .t. ^..'.'+	 t' ,e_ t ^lx_fa^^er {^aa1_ I^St' dioru ► t
Since KAIL does nor toot the struc tural dbnamic onvironme.ntal e1 1 0CLn
on sensors but d000 ow"lato r'mctraral knamic couplinfo, into rho flist
control nensor nivualn the Navigation dune in nim"lated Wich a special
mounting Frovinion for the IMV, The Navigation We Provides a rigid
mounting for rho three VZ {1 _^. a nd the two Star TrGai'k"ro, i11vi"dod in th(C
Orbiter 102_and-ern vehicles, vherobv precision ;alignment of th"so critical
navigation devices may be maintained thro"ghout Orbital flight.
5.8. 3.?.5 Back" =FPS Contsro1. Ontem BFCS)
`rhea t,-meter and at.tit.ude indicator are nimg lat,od and it in not a SAII
objective to test this equipment, The SAIL, however, does need theta',
franetionn rQprosont;e'd in the system for the y neven5ary system Pv"I
franc tional oval+uetionG.
`i. td. 3. ?. 6 I 1 i ^l ► t !_itirile ^s
There are a number of differences beLween flight and SAIL e+l "c-
tric:al cabling or harnesses. These• involve interfaces with sim"lated
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non-avionics equipment and DFI ommis^,ions Since EMI testing; is t',G a
SAIL, objective. t,zhile SAIL. tc c etrt le point ground due to lack of
vehicle structure, the flight hardware uses tuL vehicle structure ar
ground. The interfaces with the dynamic motion simulator require: non-
standard harness to mount Lite IMO and other equipment.
5.8.4 The Test Program for OV-101 and ALIT
The avionics verification program is now taking, shape. The con-
ceps for the Approach and Landing Test Project (Orbiter 101) is shown
schematically in Figure 5-8. The relative working; relationships be-
LN4een the SAIL, ADL, etc. are readily seen here. Additional infor-
mation concerning the SAIL system tests can be mound in the following;
documents;
a. SD75-SH-0079 ".Lntegration and Preflight Tests" (System
integration).
b. SD75-SH-0080 "Preflight, Taxi, Take-off, and Climb" (ALT
Captive Tests).
c. SD75-SH-0081 "Cruise Mission Phase" (ALT).
d. SD75-SH-0082 "Separation Sequence/boated Flight (ALT).
e. SD75-S11-0083 "Descent, Landing, and Post-Flight Taxi-
Mated Flight Phase".
The factory checkout and integrated test programs at Palmdale
for Orbiter 101 is scheduled between March and November 1976. It has
I
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I lit` I t ► l low I ►1t; t w i t 1rt't i Von :
a.	 VvI , i Iv ►ll.11itiIat t tiring Atltlt '1111 % IV t povat ions by tlt'llion-
atraIIng Orbitvr nullttvtltt` ►lt vorIorV'aut• C t 	 vnnillt'vr1no dvaign i'vquivv -
meat tl and sublll" ► t C ►it aluti t'tltttll'lnud Nul ► ttvat cm I lull'l i,onatl 1 tat ho
t	 h.	 l iemonat rat t' iunc t itl ►ia l integrity o r al l 'l .'tll vms wht'll
operated in Various flight motlt`tl and Nt'1,t't'tt''ti 406t ► 1 t , t"t'tlttiltlalut, and
i	
.list' VI 1110des ao Wt' l 1 an Vt'r ► 1 a i ilk; 'lilt va-t voI t`mo i'ttil; AI tit! 1 it !i and
t`lect romagnt't i t' Compact a h i l i t V 01 vui t tivnt vmn.
t.' # 	t l tlift 1't'!:t t3pab i1imot No	 AVitlilio 'x . 1t t uVi I Jet;
'tn. l	 vit"t t vow t' ttV It vms rest I .tht ► l at or y gI'.ST1 3
Min iat`ilitp at ,1:+t ` in to be used tt ► r .tevvlttltme"t tent-S, t'utlb
ttidt'iiti t't)mpat ibi1itV tont0 ,t and pvrI01 ,111ai1 er , Vt`1' I t ivat io" of the Shuttle
Ni^nit't` .'011U1111111 vat iOno and t ra ►mini nvnt t` ►11.	 I t Is t o have 0" 1111 t'i'taim
W it h SAIL by bo t h RV and hardware. Support o l I N prog ram in rhtt't` t t`ti
to begin with the orbital slight test 11liase.
AM.' 'Pi ► irii ►1' Simulator 1'ru p t t t ti
*ia9ar itemo t'tlmp i .ing the tiviui ►11; simulator iu't1 ,jt'rts iut`lutit`
t "lit' 1011rwilit, :
11 	 Shuttle MI..lt littt l :+i ►nulat Or	 ta•ht`tlulrti tol
:ilil'iilt; and ;4111uller U1 101i1.
1t.	 Shuttle Manion Simulator tumputt'r t't mvlt'x - tirlivt`ry
12
0t the hardware/roI twart , is oxpe t e%1 in .14multer 01 11170.
C. Orbiter AvrOtlig;ht Simulator - d0livOrY itl rtipWtt'd
in Seprembk'r 1976.
kl. tshuct1r 1)rovettures simulator - it is an in-house dvvc1oi)-
mem at .TSk' and rurrontl.y ill use there.
k'. Crew Procedures 1-;Valuator simulator - it is also an in-
house (lovelopment at .T.Sc and is, in nso there.
1. The 4hut t lr Training AirerafL (ISTA) - two tlireral t have
been built to simulate the	 flying qualities and	 traject, orit'tl 01	 the
buttlo orbiter. These alrcral L	 art'	 to bt' used t0 t rain the Shuttle
pilots by duplieaLillt;, ill	 .`ik)	 far	 ilti	 praeLiCal ,7 	the hillldlillg t'harat"Or-
i@tiCti and Visual cut't1 0*%peett'd	 to bN expt'ri.enced In dying tht'	 Shut t l.t'
orbiter in the Tk'rminal Area Landing Tra ectorV.
`i.'he management systems for the Simulat iOn at't iVi.t iOS 011Unatt'S 1170111
tho operations 111L.0 1 rat ion 01'1 ieO it Love  I T at ,T;;t'. `Pho management
1i4111'111t' i1, shown ill Figure ^l -^^.	 Ill a.idi.tJ011 L lel:' iS a ;ipaL0 ShUt tlt'
Progralll Sitli111ation Planning Panel t'St abii,hrd by Program Direct ive 1A,
dated 3iy .1 1 s 1974 which iS to prOVidk' the Meellallit1111 10r OC OmpliSh-
inn coordil)aLiOn, planning, and rvVi.OW 01 SimtllaLi011 :letiVitiOS.
).10 Avionics 1`k111ayomt'nt.
The panel in ox jljlilling L11iS broad area spent S0111N time ill lmdt'r-
Standing, the har,lwaro, SOfCwarl', lacil.i.ties and tk'St programs a!iS0-
12 3
Natt`ci with the avionics program. The Panel revit'wod the cirgalli.'atioll,z
in c`\ist c`nc'c" which matlago,-,. the avionics work
	
(1) orbiter aivltini4'.;
t.y;.trpis ottit'r It P ojoct level Ili, k! ) Technical Assistant and hilt dl-
vision covering avionics in tilt` t`n;,in oring directorate, (1) data
ti p +tc`illtl antl analysis directorate, (4) integration anti rhrc°k-anWalanvt`
tunct ions
	 inoluJim, tht` integration ofli.c•r at the program level; suvli
technical panels as the Integrated Avionics g wring t.roup, the SIR and
CSIR and associated Panels; hardware and software eontiguralti.cinlc`hanx,t`
control boards, and th y` technical review hl'clt`ess 'int' tiding system dv-
sign review4 on l'at'h m0sion phazov. The tcillowing sections indicate
come cal
	 actions to alhtlnrc` of loot i:vt` management tit avic)nivs
development .
+. 10. 1 Me Prcic• ral:l TLlna `elllvnt 11a1lc`l SM"t olll tl o  Avionics
Based can the program liirovtivo setting up till' Space shuttle Into-
grated Avionics Technical 13"agement Areas the following responsibilities
are ojvoli to the Systems E'ugint`t'iillti ,, Of t ico at l:t'vol 11-,
a. C,:isC`:Iiment of the technical allc`cicla y tit the overall per-
tormanc`c` of avionics systemsfor the ;iliaov Shuttle vehicle within the
available resources.
h. Coorclillat icin, puhlioat ion, and implementation ca t a plain,
inelulinti, ta8h definitions anti 60hraulr;:, for tho aveompli.5hmont of
the technical managers responsibilities including establishment tit
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the membership of the integrated avionics panels.
e. Management of the activities of the integrated avionics
panels to assure adequate communications and understanding; 1XILwecn
all personnel involved as well as program management. Member.:hip
on the Systems Integration Review (SIR) panel which supports int.e-
gration activities across the program.
Four panels and a steering group were established as follows:
a. The Integrated avionics Steering Group which brinks
together avionics management personncl from JSG, MSFC, IZSC, and Rock-
well Space Division.
b. The Shuttle avionics Panel which serves as :t LeChnieal
planning, reviewing, and integration team for all Shuttle avionics,
interfaces. Their work includes conceptual, studies, system analysis
and syntheses, trade studies, preliminary design, and supporting
technology essential for the specification of the functional and
pertormance requirements of the integrated avionics systems.
c. The Flight Communications Panel which bnsuroS the com-
patibility, performance, and timely definition of ccnmiunicaLions
and tracking system interfaces and identifies problems, determines
corroctive action, and reconunends appropriate action to the technical
manap.r.
d. The Shuttle Avionics Checkout Panel which serves as a
1
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lorum for the integration of the avionics checkout and prelauec°h
testily; requirements for the elements of the Shuttle system. Their
work divers review of requirements, Lost procedures, avionics tent
sol tware requirements, and tale resolution U1 avionics ehoMout issuer
iur ialctory ehockout at Palmdale, AI;i pre- and pont n ilig;ht checkout,
t-ht'ekout and maintenance testing, at NSC, and support of pro- alnd post-
flight checkout for the operational phase of the program.
e. 'Me Shuttle Avionics Verification panel Which serves
ao al special working group for planning and coordinating, the te,lt
activities of ,180, KSC, MSFC, and Rockwell.
`+.10.	 Special Requirements Reviews
Quagement has focused a great deal of Mentionion tail tilt' hal ydware-
to-soltware Qompatibility aspects of the avionics systems at every
level of the program and at every major step in the schedule. For
instaIce there have been a number of special reviews of software re«
quiretllent S for the All and the ellT phases of the Shuttle program,
Itle"+e have boon tt• rllled "scrub" activities and they are planIled as a
continuing activities to assure requirements are well defined and can
be met. The methodology used in these activities generally 1011OWs
these lilies:
a. RevieW the approach and the results of previous scrub
activities along With the most eurrout hardware Conlig,llraLions and
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performance requirements,
b. Establish the goals and basic capability requiromenni
to be used as decision criteria.
e. Conduct reviews with pertinent managers and key tech-
nieal personnel Go assure a common understanding; of the scrub ground-
rules and expectations, assess sottware module functional content re-
quirements and agree on possible delet-iors with their impact.
4. Finalize the specific roquiroMOWs moditieaLions, 00-
lotion and additions as options to be proposed to management. Par-
ticular attention is given to assure they have not reduced the cap-
ability
 to protect against software generic failures and the like.
e. Present the options to management for their decision
along; with the backup material upon which decisions can be Blade.
5.10.3 Program Activities
In response to the Panels reviews of avionics hardware/soitwavv
the following areas are receiving; special management attention:
a. Management is sensitive to the fact- that establishing
minimum levels of testing on which to base a flight worthiness de-
cision is a difficult judgment. The avionics system, of course,
must work because it is not tolerant of generic failures in the
software.
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b.	 Kinagement has established teamo to review the require-
ment,', and (looeIIS the illlpaet 01' any changes tiug,g,ested. Tile team approach
itl equivalent in purpose Lo the System lk-sig;n Requirements Reviews. A
team has, x.3w, Rockwell Internat ion Space Division and JBM member,-,,.
The membership reflects Ow, projects new approach or. integ;raLillg, RoCh-
well and IBM operations more closely on a clay-to-clay basis so potential
problems can be worked out early.
e. The II31-1 schedule is tight end initial verification re-
quirements are being`, reassessed. However, manag,etllenL is looking to
the SAIL test programs to provide a more comprehensive validation
of the software as a supplement. Lo the IBM offorts.
%i. t1anag oment is carefully controlling; new requirements
alter the softwaro, requirements are authori.'ed at Ole System Design
Rt'qu jromont s, Re'v'iew;. (currently only mandatory Chang os, are approved.
e. Because o1 recont Se-rubs, the SofWare requilM11011Ltn lot'
AL's are currently within Lhe capacity of the memory.
f. The verificaLion sclteelule for AIL is tight. The bevel I
milestone of completing; the ALT flight- software veri.iicat.lon has been
chang od from July 1970 to Novomber 1976. Management is now planning,
its respollt;o to this si Luation.
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a
g. Plans are being made to validate late modificatlov; to
the software in the SAIL facility, but if these mods are much E,rWes:
than planned for, there will be a schedule problem at that time.
`i.11 ADDENDUM
5.11.1 ALT Pro ec^
The computer program end items (CPE,'I's) provide the capability for
checkout of the orbiter avionics subsystems at the factory perform
the required preflight and flight operations. The basic programs
associated with ALT and the orbiter 101 of direct interest to the Panel
are:
a. oPS 8 and CPS 9 d Systems Management
b. oPS 1 - Preflight Checkout
c. oPS 2 - flight operations
The requirements for oPS 1 and oPS P have been scrubbed to bring
them well within this storage capability and processing; rates (time to
process) of the general purpose computer. The rosults of the latest
scrub actions and an idea of available margins is shown below:
AI; E' (orbiter 101)	 oPS 1 	 oPS
Before scrub	 64,060 wds	 107.0°x, rate	 67,170 wds	 41.7? rate
After scrub	 52,880 wds	 57.21 rate	 54,190 wds	 66,4? rate
Current schedules have the software programs for tailcone off ALT
operations to be completed first although such flights come last. Thy+n
i
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through parameter changer the ALT tailcone on softwaro projtrrams will
be completed. This, however, necessitates the verification and final
checkout of the "ON" software to bo accomplished Into in the program
at IM C,very close to flight time.
`i .11.2 OILT Pro i ec_t
The software program requirements for the ascent and entry phank , s have
been scrubbed with the fcl.lowing; results:
CWT (Orbiter 102)	 Aseent Sof tware	 I,nt3ry Softwart,
Estltnated Current Si „;e	 0,900 words	 5?,400 wot•ds
Estimated Additional 	 700-800	 1)00-600
Words to be added as
known today
iI rogram iilanagernevt is using, tho lessons loarnod in developing the
AI;r software to enhance the OFT softi ,.are developiuont. program, As a
result a more detailed OFT work plan to assure adogl ,.Ite and timely
daily direction, visibility and control is being; established. For
example "Mode 'reams” have been established to define, integrate and
simplify software requirements and to work problems as they arise.
Sixteen such teams have been or will be established to cover every major
aspect of the mission phases. `rho first meetings of some of these
teams was conducted during the last. week of May 1976 at tho RT/Space
Division.
5.11.3 Further Act;.ons
Program managemenL• has also instituted weekly telecons betwr'en
"I
130
I
JSC, RI/Downey, RI/Palmdale Co review status and pro ;reps on Hie
avionics checkout being conducted on Orbitor 101.
A permanent scrub group is to be formed soon to assure that.
all requirements laid on avionics software anti hardware will bu
compatible and that there will be sufficient margins Vo accommodat'o
the growth in requirements as the OFT mission matures.
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ATTACII?II;CI`r 5-1
They ma n agemont° system f ca
(^r 
aavi on i e hrarclwarl a and soft w,41,,.,
shou ld be reviewed by R, Yal or prnklr.am mankl(e1°11 ►ent to ! ► f,;Aelrc'
it it adequate for the indic4 ted Complexity of the prog ram
la^ w ^f+c1li.,o: Thv avioniol, mana f irmt , nt , , nd dovelopmeut plan is oon-
P:14C ect Fl ^'I It.I^`^al
 c^lc^naf►nt	 f tll( > ^iL-, aC"(^ ahuttln^ l^1"o(lrana.	 ]1!
0. ► 1a11alry of t bi c; vealr the a^violl tK'(, and f 1 i ghta cold rill ,Milt 11n; wat;
I VV i owed at the prca( lr,am d i r0t4 fi l ' and lei rovior of MET` l evt, ] .; . r'h^
a y'oa i or coordination of the	 1, ohtdeal woo). ln^l
tho decirev of the contractor rt' , ,' ,onsibi lit y woro i (t{ant i f i t- i, ^twon(i
other.,-,, as ro(luiring 1urt,her man iclement at:tontion.	 Th[' lttar;B ;'9ia11
I°( a
.stlonsibility in avionics hal:; been clari fiod and o,t : rongthcnf ,d Iq
omphrasizincl t,hoir areas of ry :'ponsibility ian(1 olk joot,ivo s.	 ifi^°
ad justments have N-. 011 made. As an examnlo, i hoy hravo boon I t -
cluostod to i nc-lude t ho overall computer memory find operwal'A a i., ; duty
cycle est im,atet, and z( , quirind thom to : taalaliA,h lo'ut's for #;1(11
of they
 program elements of the software roniclont ill Hlo e1nI^^1, 1I Ei
computer. Thoy have been required to pY0l4Ire at ( post, effect ivo
overall aavionio-s development I-A an tatilizincl eneli noori. ng
at RI and NASA ADL, SDL, and SAIL facil it ion to ,;upport 101 and
102 schedu:leti .
A review of the total flight, control area was, con ,.luct,ed and as
si ncilo individual  waas idonti fi ed. as havi nq total f 1 i (flit Cont ro l
rosponsibility for both Level 11 arid Levi)] ITT f()a° t ho	 a(.^3
Shuttle Proclram. He prepared a tonal review of tho stat;un of
flight control design, recluirc^mcant.s, m.ua.lg(^ment , ^anf3 rc^g1110 t
resources,together with a flight control, cie;velop'1ll ,nt plan. This
l:ovi caw and plan were presented to the centor di rootor who al1pl°caved
the plain in June of this year.
Tho Space Shuttle Orbiter Project Office avionics effort; ha:, 1-1,e•n
strengthened by clarifying respon sibili,tie8 and I.1y aaddincf port,(nino l
A weekly avionics system review working meeting has been
with the RI Associate Engineering Director of Avionics, the ,nftc:alr•
contract manaager, the NASA avionics systoms engineoring maanakle ,
and chaired by the Space Shuttle Project Office avionics maanaacje,r.
The avionics manager reviewed the confer plans for integra.ataing the.
avionics effort with the Space Shuttle Program Director and the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight in June.
A single individual has been identified and established by appro-
priate directives as the focal point for all Space Shuttle avionics
engineering. At this point, Level III and Level 11 hardware and
software responsibilities are combined. The chief of avionic s
engineering and the Space Shuttle Project avionics manager are
preparing an overall avionics development plan and a management
plan to be presented to the Space Shuttle Pz,jram Director and
the Associate Administrator for Space Flight on September 29.
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6.0 RISK MANAGEMEnT
' 6.1 Introduction
The first captive flight of the Orbiter is scheduled for the
first quarter of 1977 and the first free flight of the orbiter it;
scheduled for the third quarter of 1977. These significant milo-
r
stones indicate the importance of an adequate risk management pro-
gram in support of knowledgeable flight readiness decision making
1
by management.
At the top level of review the risk management program asks the
basic question, "Ts the sum total of all of the accepted risks, that,
is the aggregate risk, commensurate with the benefits to be sought
first captive flight)?" The g erm aggregate risk is used in
the sense that it is the synergistic total of Cho individual risks
accepted by management on a one-by-one basis, 'file question of wheLlier
the aggregate risk is acceptable is a matter of judgment and is the
prerogative of line management who must have both the autonomy and
responsibility for such a decision. The panel's purpose is to re-
view the management system and assess whether it has the capability
Lo do the job. To do this the Panel covered the following areas to
obtain an integrated overview of L110 risk management system.
a. The current safety system for the identification of
hazards, tracking hazards, analyzing them for resolution, risk
assessment and acceptance procedures, and aggregate risk analysis.
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b. 7`he products resulting from the above activities rind how
they are used within the program, by upper Levels of management and
others responsible for the oversigtat of the Shuttle program.
c. The management, system and its imaalementation to assure
the ,appropriate use of "lessons-learned" from prior programs.
d. 'Mae "check-and-valance" system to preclude items "fall-
ing in the crack" including the rule and work of the Crew Safety
Panol and the new technical assessment groups.
e. The ability of these review system elements of the
management, such as configuration control boards and technical re-
views, to assure that individuals throughout the program can raise
responsible safety concerns.
f. `lie role of the Cost Limit Review Board in reviewing;
safety issues
t;. The ability of the review system to assure safety
coverage of technical items while providing risk information to
management. Some of the specific questions asked in the Panel's
review of these areas include:
(1) The controlled use of Teflon in areas with po-
tenUal ignition sources.
(2) The library and control system for tracking and
understanding the use of non-metal materials.
144
(3) Reliability and Quality Assurance methodo to
annure that faotenero meta; design requiremento for their applieaat ion.
(4) The controls to preclude mire breakage where th(^
wire is subject to repeated handling, and/or oubstanLial vibration.
Special attention was given to the use of 26 AW, copper wire because
of prior Apollo experience oil 	 Lunar 11odule development d'lighL
Instrumentation oystem.
(5) `1`he sysLent for fo llow-up and closure o f Review
Item Dispositions (RID's) resulting from hardware and sofLware re-
views and panel operations.
(6) Ilse extent of analyois accorded to critical sind,,le-
point i_ailure iLems such as Orbiter clevon aeLuatoro, thrust, vecLor
controls, fluid manifolds, and no on.
(7) The adequacy of the, landing gear deploymOuL Syst;etlt
on Lhe orbiter.
(d) Adoquacy of the many door systems on Lhe Orbitvi:
to open and close as required.
(9) 'Mae control a>f° "m:lndaLory" program iLems, require-
ments, tests, etc. Lo aosurC Lhert' is adequate lnana^,l'lalVIU, iaLtentioll
when they are revised because of changing; resource and schedule
Constraints.
Many aspects of hazards identification alid risk assessment have
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been (li.ndtiocedl in other oeeLiOnea of this report. `,1liit; ii, particular Iv
Lime eoucernin^' "leocottt} learned ,, and their oiguiticauce for Gaiety
(33 the dt?oi ) ;n toot andl maint-enance actiVi,tivr,, On the a^^iYll , iir1)iter TIM)
and ooftware, LT in,ulation andl Sidi. 'iIiin section, therefore, deale,
with the safety, reliability and quality asourance oyotemo; Roca they
are implemented; ands typical exalilple, of Specific item, to demonstrate
thecae oystemn and to anowor opecific concern, rained by tAhe Panel and
NASA management during the paot year.
Very little attention has been given by the panel to file Shuttle-l'nyload
inCerface anti the a,00eiat,ed safety implications becaune thin in an
area that: will have to be covered at a later time.
t
r
r
ta. ' Responoes to Panel's Previous; Annual LP23 t
Alitioat all of the y nuit:erial contained in the
tli t ,i.ce I°espontie to the Panel's Annual report had
tikttety aspect.n of the pro,j am. ` he, ,e responneo,
distributed among the sections of this report as
elenient respollnen. However, one area is include
O-I because of its bread scope.
Shut t le Program
n01110 bear inp; on the
tliou,tll have been
a part of indiividual
liege, as Attachment
0. 3 The itisk ;Lanai*moment System and its I,mplelilent:tti.on
As cvould be expected the so-called risk management t;ysatem is in
reality nkade up of a number of on -going activities; ;It various IL-Vels
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of the prog,raia and at= various locations as well as thooe u, lort;, vl-Av
by the dedicated reliability, safety and quality asouvanee cart-,aani ,•, at ionvi
and personnel Bound throughout- the .13huttle prog,rarl.
	 th(^
decisions regarding, r.iol; as,-eeptanee lino with the project and pr os 4 ,im
rianag,ero within MOM Centers and 11eadquartero. tLU(,
 it is an accepted
fact; tll.` c "safety is everybody's bucineatt," cane 	 tarst l+cola at tlae
system dedicated by navie, and ,job deocriprion to the rellabil'ty, caii-
ty and quality aosuroanee dioeipliues and then loo p
 at the many loll;-
vertu and day-to-day activities that toed anti are fooLered by t.hio,
central core of risk rmma;,entent aetivity.
Rather than approaching; this subject from the academic point of
viE-ti; it hea 3 been approached from the "real b lite" view. in Joia,,,
011,!x, rids management as it applies to the Approach and Landint; `1'vst
project and the early It1)VA^', :Banned OrbiL al	 h.u, been t he mib-
jeetu Of the Panel's e%aminatiorl. ViL, basic Panel quest-ions are "hots
sloes the aayotem really work and what arcs the products of such activi t ica^^'?"
0.3..', broach and Landing Toot project; (ALT)
0.3. :. 1  Ba cict!round
The responsibility for decidillF; the acceptable degree of r•ivk
associated with Che ALT flights is generally viewed as the e::c lus!,Ve
province of senior management. From this standpoints, mana;. ;cment;
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locuneo 
on 
balancinn riol: arainot: benefivo on a -.1jacro-ocille, 1)(IL dOMI
the Mne Innumerable rioh-benefit, micro-decioiont; are quite naLUr,111y
viade t-ilthout recouroe to higher ri-3na),vvictic, However, prior experienet,
hao oliot-ni that some of these are reco; , ni., ed to be of rxijor significance
.hen their effects become visible. SOLIULI.Met) it io COO late for
corrective action or it is late enough that corrective action is
Costly. Therefore, the Panel has attempted. to review each type of IIAI)'A and
contractor riol-, aoneonment activity Oiero the purpose.. of these effort,,;
is to warn the program of' the ponoibility of problems; the resources
and time required to resolve the problem; or the implicaLlono of
aecej)Lint,  the problem. '11iis revio-w inel-i-iden- nucli questions as super=
vision factoring "lessons learned" into their work - are toot planners
and toot, conductors aware of safety concerns relating to the hardware
they are to Lost and to fly. Dackground on the ALT project itself
is found in See Lion 8.0, "Flight Toot program."
6.3.2.2 &II'Ll Ly Assessment
The Space Shuttle hazard identification and resolution system has been
well defined for scope of the orbiter 101, the Boeing 747 Carrier
Aircraft: and the supporting facilities and operations for the ALT projceL
rink management SySLOM includes hazard identification, failure mode and
effects analyses, risk -nalysis beyond initial I-IINA, hazard resolution,
risk acceptance criteria, and Ultimately the decloion to accept or
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reject the risk.	 So Otte =181. review both the defined meth^tdolo	 .is
well as the Jay-to-day input which together produce the final risk
assest;ment . In re gard to Lite AL'r project JSC and Rockwell are tht
primary tnanagers with direct support from DFKC, Ames Research Center,
Weing Company, KSC and Lite JS(: support contractor OMMC). 111u follow-
ing areas wvre sampled as being; repres _• ntative of the overall safety
assessment/risk tit. ut:tge ms , nt "systt-m.
h. 1.2.2.1 Approach and LandinO, Tcst Crit ical	 Itevit-t. ((Lil
'11tt • ALT/t'I t K was conducted during, Lite period trom Morch 11 to
April 22, 1970. 1`ttny of the K1U's and detailed discussions and de-
visions involved hazard identification and assessment. of the overall
safety system. '111is is, of course, a nornktl part of any major hardware/
software rt • view.
	
In addition to this AIX/CDR, two other significant
reviews were conducted on the Shuttle Orbiter 101 vehicle and they are
important elements of the Alt safety assessment system. 	 11te orbiter
101 CI)K was conducted in October 1975 and the orbiter 101 Contiguration
Review (14tase I) was conducted from February _' t throu gh March `), 1976.
Itecause of their importance for safety all three of these reviews are
dis.ussed here from this point o , view.
In support of the Orbiter 101 Rockwell provided a seven voltnnt•
"Safety Analysis Keport," SU7`t - till-0135 -001 through 007, dated 15 Sep-
tember 1975. 'lltese volumes covered six specific topivs: 	 (1) struc-
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cures, mechanical s y stems, power systent4, avionics systems;, environ-
ment Control and Litt, support, crew lit ateion and equipinctit . 	 In
addition it sunun.try volume for management wits included with it copy
of the detailed Rockwt,ll "Reliability and Satety Desk Instruction
No. 400-1" therein.	 other docttlnent;t 11F0d in flit, review include tln'
following:
SDA-sll-0004 Shuttle	 orbiter	 No.	 1	 11orizontal	 Flight
Test	 SAR
SU74-SH-Olt,8 Shuttle orbiter	 101	 DvIta	 p UR SAR
ti074-SH-0323 Shuttle	 orbiter-	 102	 I'm SAR
S p75-Sit-0064 Shuttle	 Sytttem PDR SAR
NASA Nllll 5300.4 (11)-1)
11t y	review team also considered the	 "Failure	 `k)de and	 Fttects
Analvsis	 and	 Critical
	
Item	 List," time/cycle/age	 life control
	
lints
and	 requi rement s;
	 FF.F. parts use .ind	 qualifications.	 ,pt-ci ticat tens;
and	 procedures	 for	 itient i fying and controlling spec i 1I	 processes and
more	 ;pecifically all pressure vessels,	 configuration control
	
systt,m,
sped tic at ions	 .ind handling of suppliers and subcontractors; failurt , report iny,
system and	 its	 implementation. etc.	 The following review team vomn,ents
indicate areas	 that	 needed work acid	 the	 program rvspons;c	 to	 them.
FMA/C IL Suggested revisions to the hardware
failure mode .final rsis regarding mode dc-
t ect ion nivasurentcnt s	 and moth ticat ion
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of mode et tart . All conrnt.nt r: hav I been
incorporated into the PMEA system and
doctu,K , nt.1t ion.
F F F parts	 Required Rockwc I ll to obtain sufficient
document at ion from 4uppl iers such as
part s lilt 4, st rvms .111.11yats, anJ sub-
miRsion of irregular parts requests tit
Satety Analvsis	 Requested .idditimial ha. • ard analysis on
the loss of iiady Flap cotit rol as well am
updates and clarificat ions all of which
have been accontplisht.d.
Test Program:	 Required that rertitiratiun plans t o
idernt ity those item~ of h.trdware to he
used in devt.lopnn , clt trots and in quali -
t icat ion test s.	 Assort., that SR&i^  -\ lit-.:-
Bonne l woo I  bv tin t he rent r  l heard 1 or
such tests .is tilt. 11ol . i.olital g round Vi-
it ration Test.
A tvpical hll) roncerved the mechanical system ill 	 tilt.
cotmiumder mid pilot control pedals are linked together so that Jam-
ming of either station b y debris can hrtwent operation of all Medal
mechanisms. This safety concern was resolved by providing; a protective
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boot for all affected linkages. Another RID covered the relocation
of the Hazardous Environment Breathing System musk equipment to
assure the crew quick access to bre.tthing air. Iliese were	 relocated
from the mid-deck position to the	 flight deck position.
With regard to electromagnetic compatibility of the hardware
the orbiter was baselined with it 	 point ground for the AC
power and a modified multi-puint ground for the DC power. Ilse for-
ward bay avionics has . ► X. power ground at station 76. Vie aft avionics
bag has it DC power ground at station 1307. Some loads in the nose .ind
aft fuselage are grounded to the structure. The use of it structure
return for the DC loads in the AF1' fuselage area saved weight . Struct,:.e
power grounding is used on many aircraft currently in service. A
specification is being developed that identifies the various EMI levels,
and the power quality environment for the Payload ba y . Special EMI
testing will be conducted during the Shuttle development program to
verify this environment as has been done on previous programs, in-
cluding a comprehensive test of the orbiter's electromagnetic environ-
ment and lightning protection on orbiter 102 at Palmdale Assembly
Facility in late Spring 1978.
11ie purpose of the Phase I Orbiter Configuration and Acceptance
Review was to assess and certify the readiness of the Orbiter 101 sub-
systems and related CSE: for individual subsystem testing. An important
part of this review was the NASA walk-through conducted at Palmdale
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to assess 'tie condition of the vehicle.	 I'hc walk-through team kin-
eluded that the hardware was very goad and the personnel assigned
to it were doing an outstantting job.	 1'l1c Phase lI portion of this
review concerned itselt with the readiness of the Palmdale facility
contrasted to the readiness of the hardware subsystems.
An interesting RID from the CARR pointed to the hazard of
shatterable materials in the orbiter cabin. As a result, steps havt•
been taken to resolve this issue by (1) compiling a complete list of
all shatterable materials contained in the orbiter 101 crew compart-
aunt, (2) pertorming it study to determine how shatterable glass can
be protected so that it is contained if broken, and (.l) determining
it anv of the items used in orbiter 101 for Al 'r have tound their way
into orbiter 102, and if so to assure an assessment of the ha.•ard.
When this Bata is in for management review, a decision will be mate
at it 	 meeting.
Further infornutt ion on the Orbiter 101 CAR is tound in SSV76-5- t
document dated 4 March 1976.
llie Approach and Landing CDR conducted in April was followt-d by
a Shuttle Carrier Aircratt (747) CDR in May 1976. Some items per-
taining to the safety area that were brought out in this review are-
it. Prior to each SCA/orbiter tlight, a flight Readiness
Review will be conducted and supported by all elements of the AL"r
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project including tile Rockwell/Boeing flight safety support personnel.
Wlien (tie ALT Project Safety Plan is finalized this suport should be
defined.
b. 'fir following documents are in process: 	 (1) safety
plans for the ALT site, (2) safety plans for 747 test operations,
and (i) safety controls for 747/Orbiter Mating and I)L-nett ing.
C. As a result of it RID in the October 1975 CDR, an
orbiter 101 Delta CDR was conducted for the Separation Subsystem be-
tween orbiter and 747. As a result of the Delta CDR the Orbiter ALT
program verification plan (MCR 2031) is now in work and will include
verification plans for end-to-end checkout of the separation system.
11tis plan is to be available for NASA review about June 30, 1970.
6.3.2.2.2 ALT Mission Satety Assessment Document (JSC-10888)
This document defines the results of the total safety analysis
nd risk management process. It identifies operational hazards that
,ould compromise crew safety or danutge the vehicles involved,
evaluates risks for each operational hazard, provides an overall
assessment of the ALT mission with respect to crew safety, and de-
.scribes the status and actions necessary to "close" identified
safety concerns. This becomes a major input to the Flight Readiness
Review system.
The closed-loop methodology used to fulfill the requirements of
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a Mission Level	 tiar.ard Analysis and	 the	 tinalixing of the Mission Safety
Assessment Document is shotni schematically in 	 rigure 6-1. ]'he schedule
for the ALT Mission Satety Assessment Report currently is:
Initial Document Release June 1976
Final Document	 Release February 1977
Up-tote Addendum (captive	 flight) March 1977
Addendum for Free Flight July 1977
Up-Date Addendum (tree	 flight) July 1977
6.3.3 Satety, Reliability and otiality Assurance for around Test
and Orbital DDT&E and Operational Missions
6.3.3.1 Major Satet y Concerns
There has been a need for a simple but useful means of providing
program and senior NASA management sufficient visibility of Space
Shuttle safety concerns, the means of resolution and the major accepted
risks. This need is now being met by the "Major Safety Concerns Space
Shuttle Program," (;SC 09990). This document is updated quarterly
to reflect changes in status of major safety concerns and to add newly
selected items. The latest issue available to the Patel, dated March 8,
1976 showed the following count:
Open safety concerns	 19
Closed safety concerns 	 16
Accepted risks	 7
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Table 6-2 shows the listing of open safety concerns, closed
safety concerns, accepted risks, and those design features that repre-
sent inherent risks which are considered to be justified. The details,
of course, are contained in the referenced document.
This data enables the Panel to evaluate the process for deter-
mining; which concerns are significant enough to place in this documeti
for management. The Panel has also indicated a continuing interest
in all of this data because sonic continuing interest in all of this
data because some safety concerns that have been closed or accepted
may change in "value" due to other programmatic changes which impact
them.
6.3.3.2 Content of Level 11 S A ft&QA Activity
Ilse work conducted at the Space Shuttle Program Management level
(Level 2) at JSC is quite diversified. Table 6-1 lists some of the
products of this work chat have or will be published for information,
ana l- vsis and control of various phases of the program from ground test
through flight test and operational missions.
Some of the formalized plans such as the POGO Prevention Plan,
JSC 08130 and the Contamination Control Plan, JSC 08131 play an
important role in developing successful hardware that meets the re-
quirements of the program specifications at Level 1, II and III.
	 .
The materials control program, "MATCO," has been an ongoing pro-
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gram since the early days of the Shuttle Program. The contents of the
program are constantly being updated to assure timely and complete data
to support all levels of the program at all affected NASA Centers and
contractors. Some of the requirements documents that apply directly
to this work are:
Level I (NASA Headquarters), N111 18060.1A, "Flartmwbility,
Odor, and Offgassing Requirements and Te9t Procedures for Materials
in Environments that Support Combustion." This is also applicable
to those payloads that are placed in the Orbiter habitable areas.
Level II (JSC) SF.-R-OOObA, "NASA-JSC Requirements For
Materials and Processes."
Level III (MSFC) MSFC-STD-506 "MSFC-NASA Standard Materials
and Process Control."
I_.evel III (KSC) - Docurnvnt is not known by the Panel.
Rockwell International,S02-SH-0172, "Space Shuttle Orbiter
Materials Control and Verification Plan."
Rockwell International, MC999-0096D, "Materials and Processes
Control and Verification System for Space Shuttle Program."
The Panel has reviewed some of the MATCO program and it will con-
tinue to review this area to assure that the methods for implementation
are adequate to the program needs. In using MATCO information to
evaluate materials actually used on the Shuttle, the program must have
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an effective configuration control system to assure that the nuterials
evaluated in the design phase or in tact used on the flight vehicle
and any materials subsequently introduced into the program ate also
carefully evaluated. Thus the periodic configuration control board
activities examine the materials problem for every change made to
the hardware and design reviews.
As part of NASA's continuing effort to establish uniform and
complete policy and responsibilities on areas that affect satety and
mission success Headquarter's has issued a Kinagement Instruction on
NMI 1710.3 0 dated April 8, 1976, "Ik-sign, Inspection, and Certification
of Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Syst.-ms."
Attachment 6-2 is it letter coveting; the potential problems asso-
ciated with nuclear detonations. It is indicative of sonic of the
arras of safety examined by the Panel to assure program attention to
as many details as possible.
Much of the material that follows is also a part of the work
done in the safety, reliability and quality assurance efforts dis-
cussed above. However, it is discussed separately because of the
Panel's interests.
6.3.3.3 Flight TerminaLion System
The Flight and Ground System Specification (Volume X of JSC 07700)
was revised April 12, 1976 (Change No. 30) so that the requirements for
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rang.• safety now reads as follows:
"The Flight Termination System shall comply with the
range safety Flight Termination System requirements of AFF:TRM 127 -1
and SAKrECM 127-1. The [light vehicle shall comply with the range
satety requirements of SAWE01 127.1. In those instances where
adherence is judged to be inappropriate from either an operational
or technical standpoint, such instances ihall be brought to the
attention of the DOD/NASA for resolution."
This guidanct• is developed in greater detail for those sections
of the docutTwnt that deal with the specifics of mission abort oper-
ations functions, flight system design on the SRii and ET including
destruct safing. 'Rie current effort is to baseline mutually acceptable
concept for NASA/DOD Space Shuttle Range Safety and define the mode
of resolution for problems that subsequently develop. The current
hardware safety system is called a "Triplex" system in that each S1B
and the ET have destruct systems on-board. There is sufficient re-
dundancy to assure proper operation in either the armed node or the
safe mode. Items of interest that will be examined by the Panel in
the near future include the following: the agreed-to baseline concept;
current open problems regarding the design, installation, and utili-
zation of such a system; any sched-ile and procurement constraints;
current design options and their advantages and disadvantages; and
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constraints on operational and Dur&i- nassiona.
6.3.3.4 SKB Fracture Control Board
Recognizing the importance of fracture control of SRB reuseable
components, MSFC established an SRB Fracture Control Board which
held its first form.+l meeting on October 8, 1975. Tine Board is set
up as shown in Figure b-2. This board has undertaken a number of con-
current activities to :assure both that every aspect of fracture con
trol for the SRB is properly accounted for and not information re-
sulting from this effort is furnished to other Shuttle activities
for their use. F:ach of tht , major contractors on the SRB have developed
fracture control plans which are either being implemented or in pro-
cess of being implemented at this time. Ttuse plans provide for the
following; functions:
J. Development of fracture control technical guidelines
and directions.
b. Establishment of a contractor Fracture Control Board.
11u v
 Board reviews and approves all fracture analyses, fracture con-
trol test data, and component control plans. Finally it monitors com-
pliance, and establishes necessary corrective actions and reports.
It reports to the NASA SRB Fracture Control Board and is also a
major support for the Material Review Board.
Me MSFC board, in addition to working; with the contractor units,
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Joe y its ow ►i independent analysia and testing and nwiitiLaLns a de-
tailed list of "technical concerns and action items" and assures
their resolution.
6.3.3.5 Abort Plunninj; for Shuttle Flights
liased on the m.itcrial provided to than Panel during; it s reviews
of the abort area some concerns have surfaced. These are ir regard
to the tinicliness and depth of studies to define abort capabilities,
and supporting; the ass.•ssment of aggregate risk for any given mission.
The Level 1, II and III docume ntation sets torch requirements in the
general area of aborts as well as specifics relating to intact :abort,
contingency aborts, and appropriate loss of critical tunctionti. Such
abort analyses are directed primarily at the DDT&E and operational
orbital missions, .although such analyses apply to the AL1' missions as
well. Abort planning and activities associated with ALT are covered
in Section 8, "Flight Test Program."
In :addition to the many efforts going on at both NASA Centers
and the contractors a number of Level II panels and review teams have
been examining this area in sonic detail. Sonic of these are the Grew
Safety Panel, the Systems Integration Review Teams, ['light operations
Pane, SR&QA Panel, Ascent Flight Systems Integration Group, and the
Abort Pane 1 .
Ilie Level II specifications have specified the requirements for
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intact abort and the intact abort mu les.	 Meat- sanx • specifications
have specified the requirements for contingency abort and the con-
tingency abort criteria. However, the contingency abort modes have
as yet not been defined. Attachment 6-1 is the Shuttle Program
Office response to the Panel's previous Annual Report covering this
particular area of concern. An area of concern to the Panel has been
thu abort capability during the early stages of ascent when the Solid
Rocket Motors and the Orbiter Main Engines are all burning.
The Level I requirement (.1SC 07700, Volume X) is that potential
failures in a s y stem that could cause loss of critical functions will
be eliminated by including appropriate safetv margins or redundancy
levels in the design. In addition crew ejection seats will be pro-
vided for the initial series of Shuttle OFT launches until the flight
worthiness of the launch system has been demonstrated. These ejection
seats as baselined for the orbital flight test program provide craw
escape capability up to approximately 80,000 feet. The SRB thrust
termination capability and the use of abort rockets were included in
the early Shuttle baseline. However, they have been deleted by Level II
action. The PCIn S00015 deleting the abort solid rocket motors was
approved in 1972. The PCIN 500040 .•laminated SRB thrust termination
in 1973.
6.3.4. Special Topics
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6.3.4.1 Lessons Learned
The Panel reviewed the management system to assure the approp-
rtate application of lessons learned from prior programs.
The task team met with personnel at every level of JSC, KSC,
MSFC, Rockwell, and Rocketdyne. They were supported by the efforts
of the others who also focused on the application of lessons in areas
under their review. The Panel as a whole then discussed the system
as they found it with Shuttle management.
Assurance that lessons are in fact being implemented is accom-
plished through:
a. Lessons are incorporated into such documents as design
manuals, process specifications, etc.
b. SR&QA conduct audits to assure lessons are being imple-
mented where proper to do so.
C. Contractors' reports on their implementation of lessons
at quarterly reviews and othe- in-house meetings.
d. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Pane • 1 reviews this area
on a periodic basis at various NASA and contractor sites.
The Panel is also interested in assuring that lessons learned
on the current Shuttle program are examined and applied as appropriate
here and now. Here is an example of how experience is captured,
passed on, and finally utilized. This comes from the External Tank
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data reviewed and discussed at MSFC in early Fall 1975. "11ie Martin-
Marietta team working with JSC reported, at that time, the data as
presented on Table 6-2. In addition to the many NASA documents they
tound 67 other lessons from mW and Airforce documents as well. Based
on the m.iterial discussed at that time the MSFC area showed the tollow-
ing brief statistics:
Total Number
of Lessons	 Applying;	 Meeting the
Element
	
Applicable	 Directly	 Intent
External Tank	 54b	 520	 26
SSME	 160	 148	 12
Solid Rocket Booster 	 81	 80	 1
6.3.4.2 Wire Usage and Implementation on Shuttle Elements
As the result of his Apollo experience the Deputy Administrator
requested the panel to review the use of 26 AWC wire and the use of
teflon on Shuttle.
The lesson learned is cited in NAA Technical Note, 1)-7598, dated
March 1974, "Apollo Experience Report - Development Flight Instru-
mentation."
"in LM-1, the scarcity of available space and the consequent
miniaturization of certain DFI components led to the design of a
central signal-conditioning; unit that had a density of 1600 corrector
pins over a 45-square-inch faceplate.
	 ..... and the matins; cable
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harness consisted primarily of No. 26 rt... +ire. 	 Attar it series of
requirements changes and trouble-shooting procedures that involved
moving and opening the signal conditioning unit, soni c of the wires
in the harness became fatigued and broken.
	 Iltis problem was also
manifested in the harness in other areas where cable movenw , nt was
excessive. Vie situation deteriorated to the point at which attempts
to rectify certain cable breakages precipitated further brcaka^;es
in adjacent arras. ..... From the cablin.; problems cited, three coil-
elusions can be drawn.
	
First, high-density wiring configuration
should be avoided. Second, -: ► final conditioning Should he decentrali;•rd
or made remote so that low-density connector configuration can br
achieved to permit easy access and repair and result in inflexible
bundles of cables.	 Iliird, the DFI system involved trequent equip-
ment changes; thcrefore, it should use it heavier gauge wire than
the more permanently situate, operational-type equipml•nt."
Based oil 	 received to date the use of this guaging on
Shuttle in wring and connections is controlled as follows:
a. tit the approximately 910,000 feet of wire in the orbiter,
most of it consists of 22-:\WG and 24-AWI..
	 For DFI, signal wiring
the orbiter 101 contains :about 30,000 tent of the new 2t,-AWG and
orbiter 102 about 10,000 feet of it.
b. The 2bAW6, when used on Shuttle elements, is made of
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an alloy of copper having a considerably higher tensile strength
than the copper wire referred to in the above Apollo usage. Thus the
new 26-gauge wire is closer in strength to the old 24-gauge wire. In
general the 24 and 2b gauge wire is now stranded nickel coated high-
strength copper alloy. For 22-AWG and larger the conductor is copper
as before.
C. Wherever possible high-density wire configurations are
being avoided. Signal-conditioning is decentralized in a manner which
supports the use of low-density connector configurations so as to
permit easy access and reduced chance of wire fatiguing or bending.
d. Pin-socket connectors have posed many problems in the
past due to the need for near-perfect alignment, proper `anal seating,
and the correct electrical circuitry between the lines to the pin
and socket. A somewhat different design is being used by the MSFC
elements in that the fixed-portion of the connector now has the pins
and the mating portion is the socket. This appears to provide for
easier installation and better mating of the connectors.
e. Certain sensing devices, such as strain gauges, use
pig-tails of wire in a gauge size required to meet the size of the
sensor and the connection to he main wire-run. These are ' 1 5-AM; in
many cases, but are not more than 8 to 12 inches in length and are
rigidly fastened to the associated structureat more than one point
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Along the length of the wire.
t. All wiring on the F:\ternal Tank is 22-AWG or larger
except the hF1 data-bus wire wftik-h is 24-AWC and the one toot Lang
pigtails on about 70 strain gauges which are 26-AWG.
g. 'Me Solid Rocket Rooster uses 26-AWG only as required
for sensor pigtails. Non-shielded wires are	 -AWG or larger. Aielded
wires are .''#-AW(. or larger. 11te data-bus wire is 24-AWG.
h. Ilse Space Shuttle Main Engine uses 22 AWt. or larger
except %+-here there are short pigtails
There is controlled use of Teflon insulated wire on the SSMF
and the SNIT. 'l'lu , use of 'retion inside the ET tanks is still being
studied. Kaptan covered wire is used on both the External Tank and
the orbiter wherever possible. It is a much stiffer and abrasion
resistant material. Cable or harnesses use the Kaptan covered wire
to act as a sort of "bark-bone" for the wire hundles because of
its tougher characteristics.
6.3.4.3 tRtality Control of Screw lltrcads
Me Panel during its fact-finding sessions reviewed the quality
control systcm on fasteners and their application. 	 It wits deter-
mined that contractors on the Main Propulsion System survey their
m.lnufacturvrs of flight hardware fasteners and sample incoming
lots of fasteners during receiving inspection. They are using either
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plug; and ring gauges or single element gauging to assure that r. • -
quirements of the screw thread specifications are being nict. It
appears that all contractors working with MSFC are using the same con-
t roIs now as they have in past programs with NASA.
As an example, Thiokol, which manufacturer; the Solid Rocket Motors,
audits or surveys fastener manufacturers each six-month period to assure
that inspection records are maintained. The single element gauging of
threads meets the requirements of MIL-S-7742 and MIL-S-8879. Thiokol
then samples incoming lots during receiving inspection per MIL-S-105
using plug and ring gauges.
on the other hand the External Tank manufacturer, Martin Marietta
Corporation at Michoud, does not ordinarily survey their fastener
suppliers. They perform receiving; inspection per MMC Quality Re-
ceiving acceptance plans that specify either 100% inspection or an
adequate sampling; p lan. 'Itie single element gauging; system is used
both in this receiving; inspection as well as in laboratory shear
and tensile tests.
The contractor for the ntin Engine, Rocketdyne, surveys their
suppliers yearly and samples each nuinufacturing; lot. The MIL-S-7742A
and MIL-S-8879 requirements are on contract. There is thread snap
gauge inspection on external threads, as well as visual inspection for
uniformity, damage, and so on. I'his is done on a random basis with
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major diameters measiired by micrometers. MTL-S-8879 threads are
inspected on an optical comparator for root radius. Internal threads
are checked for size using thread plug gages and are visually
inspected for uniformity, damage, etc. Material tests are performed
in the laboratory as well.
No failures attributabie to nonconforming screw threads has
been found in these or associated contractors as a result of a
detailed search of back records.
With regard to the Orbiter it is understood that almost all
of the suppliers of threaded fasteners use a single element type
gage to control their nuinufacturing process. The two suppliers that
do not use the single element type gage are suppliers of lock nuts
which are purposely distorted to provide a locking capability.
Threaded fasteners which have material strength levels above 160,000 psi
are required to meet military and contractor specifications which
contain both functional and marrosection criteria. Criteria include
single element as well as functional and special measurements or
inspections. laboratory tests are conducted on sections is well.
Fasteners with strength levels below 160,000 psi are required to meet
military specifications on thread gaging to assure proper fit and
function and to assure that the pitch diameters, root diameters, minor
diameters, etc. are within specifications. Optical projection is
employed for root radius and minor dims-ter verification. Since all
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orbiter threaded fastoners are listed in the orbiter project parts
list, other parts can onl y be procured by the prime contractor or
its subcontractors after specific engineering approval.
6.3.5 Addendum
As a result of these reviews, sti;, gestions for future examination
have been put forth, these include:
it
	 Is there value in co-locating additional S,Rb(aA personnel
within the Shuttle Program Office area reporting directly to the
S,1t,`QA office at Level II. In this way they might provide better
day-to-day support to the S,R&t1A I'anel and other rolated activities.
b. The dtrgree of participation by ;NASA Centers and all NASA
prime contractors in the activities of the S,R6t1A Panel work.
c. The experience gained from the landing gear design problem
which was exposed during the Orbiter 101 test and checkout work at
Palmdale should be provided to all elements of Shuttle.
d. Determine the background of the landing gear uplock h)ok
tailure from the viewpoint of S,R,S()A activities at both the contractor
and at NASA.
e. The degree of participation by the S,Rt.t)A personnel in
the establishment of test plans and their implementation.
6.4 Additional Mission Safety Assessments
The following miaerial further clarifies material in three
areas: (1) ALT mission safety, (2) Renuirements Reviews, and
(3) Abort and Contingency Plans.
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6.4.1 ALT Mission Safety Assessment
The mission safet y assessment document is in review at this tim,w.
The principal open and closed safety concerns have been discussed for
the Shuttle Carrier Aircraft, the Orbiter and the operations phase.
The accepted risks for the carrier aircraft, the orbiter, GFE and
f
operations are also shown. This document, JSC 10888, will be updated
as required. As an example, the list of concerns and risks for the
"Operations" phase are:
1. Open Safety Concerns (Implementation of corrective measures
has not been accomplished)
a. Lack of hazardous gases vent capabilities in the Orbiter hanger
b. Shuttle Carrier Aircraft empennage/aft fuselage buffet with
tailcone off.
C. Orbiter landing gear deployment during captive flight.
d. Incompatibility of the carrier aircraft with hydrazine fuel.
Closed Safety Concerns
a. Hazardous environment around the carrier aircraft.
b. Excessive Orbiter wing loads during nkited flights.
3. Operations Accepted Risks
Incompatibility of the carrier aircraft with :itmnonia, and pussib o
damage to the vertical stabilizer by ejection seat sy stem outer Orbiter
panels while mated.
6.4.2 Risk Assessment To Support Requirements Reviews
As in those manned programs preceeding it, the Shuttle program
:11
periodically takes the time to review and clarifv tht! program
requirements in light of the imist currant status and performance
estimates for the hardware and software and the constraints of the
resources available to meat program objectives. A parallel and
independent S,R&(A review is made with respect to every change in
requirements put forth for consideration. The degree of this review
is not fully known. These safety oriented reviews aad assessnx-nts
are provided so that technical personnel and senior n6inaFemelnt can
consciously consider the impact of such changes before making their
decisions. As an example, the flight safety and S,;L%OA organizations
examined some 340 candidate chanties during a recent requirements
review covering a period of several months. They determined that
about 185 of the candidates had no safety impact, while the impact
of the other 155 was identified for nuinagement consideration.
6.4. 3 Abort And Conti ngency Planning
To understand the current status of abort and contingency planning;
efforts and hardware/software implementation the Panel examined the
history of this work. This included a review of the decision process
to eliminate both the SRR thrust termination and the use of Abort Solid
Rocket Motors. liasically these steps were taken because (1) the Abort
Solid Rocket Motors added additional mechanical failure TM-)des and large
weight penalties, and (2) there were no cra-dible SRR failures during
the SRB burn period because of tho reliability of such rocket motors.
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Further, the Orbiter is to be equipped with two SR -71 aircraft
ejection seats for the first four orbital flights (OFT). These
have been qualified for and used under conditions exceeding the
Shuttle ascent trajectory in terms of mach number, velocity and
dynamic pressure. The ejection seats provide in .-scape capability
from the pad to approximately 80,000 feet with these limitations:
1. The seats probably could not be used for an escape off-the-
pad with engines running or in the event of an external tank blowup
and rose l t.ant fireball.
They probably would not aurvive a vary rapid breakup of
the v •-hicle in the event of an explosion.
i. They also cannot be used during; the last 30 seconds of the
120 seconds of SRK burn or between 80,000 feet and 140,1;00 f---et.
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ATTACHMEW 6-1
It is Important that senior program management
review both the scope and results of safety analyses
to reinforce early resolution of risks. Similarly,
attention should also be given to the scope and
results of technical management audits to assure that
such systems as described to the Panel are being
applied properly. Two examples are Configuration
Management and Material Control.
Response: Satety Analyses are being conducted at the project and
program level. Significant "safety concerns" are published separately
with rationale for senior program management visibility and review.
Critical Items Lists, which include single failure points that
could cause loss of vehicle, crew, or mi ssion are to be baselined
at the program level, with changes to ►he baseline approved at
program level. In addition, a Mission Assessment Report will
be prepared for senior program management visibility and review
at the program CDR time period.
Technical surveys and audits are conducted according to schedules
established by project and program elements which may cover
several technical disciplines or a specific area, e.g., configura-
tion management and material controls. Cunfiguration management is
usu.illy covered in conjunction with the annual S,R&(A surveys.
Presently, the materials control area is receiving; special attention.
A survey was conducted in materials in .June 1975 of the Orbiter
contractor (Rockwell/Space Division). Another survey is planned
for the external tank contractor in September 1975, wnd one for the
Solid Rocket &)oster contractor (Thiokol) in October 1975.
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ATTACHM wr 6-1 (Cunt untied )
Cont i milt-ncy .,n,llysus t• • 1 •cial ly f c)t	 allot I • , flit 4 :I1 i n I	 I l' ''I
,tccidt ran, and rango !:.tfoty should be ct)t., t il - ted r.it ly 4 -1-1
to	 dur.itln solid ior, rather than u l ,, , , ,,t ioll.,l wo- k
++rounds.
•	 R(t:^ )cln
 rt e i
Aborts
(.tl	 The pt t • ! -nt abort analys t t. effort ill bviwi c:c•; t t 't it  t.,t t	 fill
t ho::t • ca::es t•: i t 11 the h i tlhest prol >,,bi l i ty or of cur .— oc.e	 h'1,	 it
the i nt,lct abort caret, ..net incl u,lt• the following:
1 .	 Loss of thrust t : • om one S."MME
2.	 I•nSM Of 'I'V(:	 f0l 0111L-
. 1 .
	 I•o^tt ti !!,runt I vort one	 n' • ,	 t•ngino
4.	 I.ctt:s c)1 TVC for tint • axi t:	 tit	 SRH
'the ,lhovtn w  t h ) Ice, t l robabi l i I y of occurronev It— rt•t• r- , ,t	 1:
t ht• t'"nt in f lt'r,''y Aklrl canes.	 '1'll'0Sf ca!, • r. art , I ' i - 	 1
to ,t 1 imitt • cl	 in conson.inut , with tl., • ir I-w pl- i•..Iti 1 •	 }
ot:c•tI V 1*411100.
	
Contin tjl t•ttt • y abort- cases inclu ' lle ihr.
	
1.	 l,vtls of tlirunt f i 	 r two of t hrev ss t t[';' S
	
.	 I.ctnn o f TVC fur t till o r t hree SSI-w's
3. !ails of TVC for t .:o ctr mort • im*n of an SPt,•
4. Premature Orbiter separat icin
	
S.
	
F.lilure to sopar.lte SR13 fr(lrl Orbiter /r7'
ror cet-tain - i tu.lt iont,, it is n-it practical to piovicle for -C ,)rt
Sol lit ! g rit:.	 1'or these' vases,	 io!)ropriate sit It • ty 11 !gin:; n Vi I t ; (1h
factoi	 of rc • 1 iabi1ity h.)vt, kern lnrluded in thr• Cp.le( SI, 1' , ' - ,
det:ion to proc • lude their occurrence. These vas—i int , lltdr, th, ro'-
Iowitl,l:
	1 .	 major st ructural failure
2. Complete loss of guidance and/or contra)
	3.	 Failure to ignite, one SRR
4. SSMF. or SRB hardover
S. Failure to separate Orbiter from ET
6. Premature SRB separation
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ATTACHMEW 6-1 (Continued)
Ili t rh i nc1
(lo	 o Ili t	 I Ji i t clI i rri t	 II IvI, hvell condurte"! .11 1,.11141 1
t', • Itivr.	 P.I -d oil lh ' • I • tl	 tr;,	 1114 1 t ► , Ili1cr tthotlltl ht . .111 1, 	 t
!;.1 f1 . l y on t it,	 wotor	 oantjtttt ti l l III mA lol st r tic t 11 , -1 I I ► reakl-!
I i m l rr, ► ry vi I- tic tura I Ina I ys i :; i ntlicat w; 1st ruct m I I hrcal,I 	 r^ i
I ► tt llv.tl.l y n1 ► t orcur fc,i rvason.1111e ditrhintl .•ci1!i:
.t possribi 1 i t 	 of tit( , !:ide et'	;rivo;.	 door jamming c t ► It int'I dit -^h ne:
A 1 t. • rnato ways are bt- i nq stutiiccl to evacuate tho Orhiter 	 ill
tit, , vgrow,; tit/or i n jarinod during ditching.
Land i nq Accidents
(c)	 An.I l y.-, t s is be i iiq conduct cd by JSc and 1,111 • on the
Olisorptit ►n capability of tht , orbiter dtirina lanct iq ac•.
Tlw purposo of the analysir, is tc determine the ollility	 r
crt•w compartment aft bulkhead to abaorl, payload , loads r
from landin-1 accidents.
Runde Safct_y
(II) Thv lt. ► n(w Safoty System PDR is schcduLvd fu ► Octolw.
tl ► 1 t)utlh Nt)vt•mll,:r 7, 1975.	 This system, baselinwII over
11,1 ; rtot vct twon approved by t hr Air 1'orrc • East, I I Tess_
(AF1:'t'It) . 	 Iii order t-i rerolvl • the iattiuc!: raised concorn
,, I1 4-ty	 a joint NASA-11SAP Ad Iior Committee i
I(Ivmod to con(hict .-% technical analysis of the ha. , ,Irds of
Shuttle flirihts, both clevelopmrntal and operation..., and
off hazards against related launch azimuth eon.:tr.tints a - i i	 c:
reliability in order to dotvrminc a IndicaI approach to •-I	 : g
puhl it s aftr ty. Alternatives will be recommended to NASA ii 	 ttc•
moot and the Commander , AFETit, for decision.
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ATTACHMENT 6-2
Ir	 NATIONAL ALRONAUIICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATIONt
p	 WASHINGTON, D C 2OS46
I , •
J0%^UTfo4
P	 Q^
f
U	 ^^
QW	 2
IOPtY TO
AT IN 0{
Mr. Howard K. Nason
President, r1onsanto Research Corporation
800 N. Lindbergh Boulevard
St. iouis, Missouri	 63166
Dear Howard:
This is is reply to your letter of December 23, 1975,
concerning potential dangers to Space Shuttle missions
f:-om nuclear detonations.
The Space Shuttle Program has taken the potential hazards
of nuclear activity into account as part of the ongoing
program effort. At JSC a Space Radiation Analysis  Group
is responsible for defining and assessing al.l potential
(pre-flight) and actual (real time) radiation environments
which may be encountered on Space Shuttle missions. This
effort, as part of the JSC/Rockwell contract 14AS-14000,
includes a subcontract with Radiation Research Corporation,
Ft. Worth, TX, and is being administered by the JSC Radia-
tion Constraints Panel. For Space Shuttle, as in previous
programs (Skylab and AS'rP), part of this responsibility is
the assessment of potential hazards from atmospheric and
2xoatmospheric nuclear detonations.
The assessment of both immediate and long term hazards to
Space Shuttle from nuclear detonations includes:
1. Prompt effect computation (flash blindness,
neutrons, x-rays, etc.)
2. Enhanced radiation environment definitions with
respect tp time, altitude, position, yield, etc.
3. Crew and equipment exposure projections with
respect to time and radiation type.
4. Biological effects/crew health evaluation.
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ATTACHMENT 6-2 (Continued)
The most important aspect of this effort is the refinement
of real-time support procedures which will allow for timely
data acquisitions, hazard assessment and implementation of
related mission rules to insure minimum impact to Space
Shuttle crews and mission objectives. For example, if
there is advance warning, the line-of-sight situation is
avoided, or, if an excessive radiation environment is
encountered, the mi:.sion will be terminated'and re-entry
and landing accomplished as soon as possible.
The liaison necessary to support this effort has been
established through the Office of DOD and Interagency
Affairs. The Office of International Affairs also plays
a part in advising appropriate countries of NASA flight
plans for manned missions to help minimize the likelihood
of an inadvertant encounter with a nuclear event,
As you can understand, there are many aspects to this kind
of an effort. In connection with the planned Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel meeting at JSC next month, you might
wish to talk to Rod Rose who could give you further detailE,
Sincerely,
John F. Yardley
'Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
cc:
AD/Dr. George Lcw
APA/Carl Praktish
Gen. Warren D. Johnson, USAF'
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TA HLE 6- 2
SELECTED OPEN SAFETY CONCERNS
	
1.	 SSMF: Heat Exchanger Letkage
	
'.	 Ice From FT, Impact On Orbiter TPS
	
3.	 Post Separation Impact of Orbiter By FT
	
4.	 Ilse of SRN Nozzle Extension Separation Ordnance During OFT
	
5.	 SRN Ignition Overpressure On Space Shuttle During Lift-Off
	
6.	 Shuttle Potential Collision With The Tower On Lift-Off
	
7.	 Fire Potential In Orbiter Aft Fuselage On launch Pad
	
8.	 Pre-Entry Thermal Conditioning Requirement For Or.-Orbit Contingency Aborts
CLOSED SAFETY CONCI`RNS
1. Access To SRH At Pad For Ordnance Checks
2. Impingment Of SRH Separation Rocket Motor Plume On Orbiter
3. Shuttle Vehicle POGO Suppression
4. Propellant Mixing At ET/Orbiter Umbilical During Separation
5. E'1' Venting Of Gaseous Hydrogen In-Flight
6. Jamming Of Payload Hay Doors In 'rho Open Position
7. Deletion Of Drab; Chute Subsystem
	
S.	 Smoke Sensor Provisions In The Orbiter Craw Cabin.
	
9.	 Verification Of Crew Module Side And Airlock Hatch Pressure Integrity
	
10.	 OMS Pod And Wing Vent Mechanisms
	
11.	 Possible Forward Fuselage And Crew Module Collapse
	
12.	 Secondary Emergency Escape Provision
	
13.	 Orbiter Nose And Main landing Gear Deployment
	
14.	 Venting Of LOX Tank Into FT Nose Cap
	
15.	 SRB Separation SN-ste ►n Timing
	
16.	 Shuttle Carrier Aircraft/Orbiter Release Capability during ALT
ACCEPTED RISKS
	
i.	 On-Orbit Rescue During; Early Orbital Flights
Manual Guidance Capability During; Ascent
3. Emergency Drain System Provisions For ET
4. Smoke Sensor Provisions In The Orbiter Crew C.1bin for ALT
5. Single Elevon Hydraulic Actuator
6. Bird Impact With Orbiter Windshield
7. Thermal Windshield Panes
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!'ABLE 6-3
LEVEL iI S,R&OA PRODUCTS (SELECTED)
1. ALT Mission Safety Assessment
2. Space Shuttle Safety Concerns
3. Space Transportation System Payload Safety Guidelines
4. Vehicle/Ground Systems Integrated 11azard Analysis
	
S.	 Main Propulsion Test Safety Plan
6. Main Propulsion 'rest Integrated 11azard Analvsis
7. FMIA/CIi. Status
8. Criteria And Standards Implementation Plans
9. SSME Neat Exchanger Pedigree Plan
10. Acceptance Data Package
11. Joint Surveys of NASA/Contractor Operations
12. Non-Destructive Evaluation
13. NS''i, Quality Assurance Plan
14. Space Shuttle Personnel Motivation
15. Shuttle Orbiter Carrier Aircraft Service Bulletins
16. Shuttle/Spacelab Interface: liazard Analvsis and Payload
and Suppression
17. Space Shuttle SR&OA Plan
18. Interface Assurance Plans
19. ALT Safety Plan
20. OFT Safety Plan
I1ay Fire Detection
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7.0 GROUND TEST PROGRAM/GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
7.1 Introduction
While this section of the report covers both the Shuttle major
ground test rpogram and Shuttle ground support eq , iipment the task
team gave priority to the test program. The m:+jor elements and
major inter-element systems have reached that maturity of design
and fabrication where major ground test programs are being initiated.
These major ground test programs are conducted to prove the designs
do meet performance requirements prior to their use in actual flight
tests.
These ground test programs support both the upcoming Approach
and Landing Tests (ALT) and the later Orbital Flight Tests (OFT).
Therefore, the Panel's objectives are to assess the degree of
confidence one can have in the program meeting those goals which
are dependent upon ground test results, and define those areas of con-
cern and proposed actions to resolve them.
As for ground support equipment the Panel has been reviewing the
plans for acquisition, testing and use of such equipment, in order to
define those ALT areas which should receive priority attention.
The Shuttle Program Office response to the Panel's previous
Annual Report is included as Attachment 7-1. This covers two items:
(1) assurance that the system for defining and implementing require-
ments will give appropriate attention to safety and (2) assurance
184
that planning is sufficient for ground tooting to niximize confidence
in safe development flights.
7.2 Shuttle Master Verification Plan (MV11)
The Shuttle MVP establishes the requirements and plans for
verification of the Shuttle s y stem for operational usu, and provides
the mechanism for program visibility and control.	 Phis t)lan consists;
of eleven volumes covering thu following areas:
Volume 1	 Cener l Approach and Guidelines
Volume II	 Combined Element Verification flan
Volume III thru	 Element Verification Plans (orbiter, SRH, LT, SSME)
VI
Volume VII
	
Payload anti Payload Carrier kerification (This
is contained in Volume XrJ, JSC 07700)
Volume VIII
	
launch and Landing; Site Verification Plan
Volume IX
	
Computer Systems and Software Verification Plan
Volume X
	
Master Flight Test Assignments Document
Volume XI
	
Shuttle orbital flight Test Requirements
The detail of this documentation and the planning that it represents
is to assure the most effective utilization of program resources. The
methods of verification include analysis and/ or test. Thus decisions
on the amount of hardware in a teat program, the depth of the test
program, the degree of element assembly at which tests are conducted
are based on such factors as the sophistication of the design analysis,
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w•ic-
the design maturity at the time of r^ s atq or a%alyses, the risk
associated with degree of knowledge, the ^c° I ity of the ts:at
articles and +the test program.	 s
Phases of the verification program have been divided ipto (1)
r•
development, (2) certification, (3) 	 t/system verification,
(4) acceptance and checkout, and (5) Rroijnd system verification. This
is then followed by the "proof of the.pudding" in flight demonstration
tests of the mature systems. Theo light demonstration test& are in two
Phases: (1) the approach and landing test project dealing with the
orbiter and (2) the orbital flight test program using the entire Shuttle 	 •,;i
system of ground and flight equipmentift, After these phases khe Ltal
r	 ^.
Shuttle s y stem is available for operations.
s
The following definitions are taken from the Master Verification
Plan because they are ver y helpful in understanding the test plans.
a. Development tes t ing is the program which verifies the design
W'
approach.
b. Certification testing is the program of qualification taf,ts,
major ground tests, and similar tests and analyses required to determine
that the design meets the specified requirements. Major ground tests
involve a combination of system elements, complex facilities, and large
or expensive hardware segments. oualification testa can and usually
are conducted on components and assemblies within a single element, su.-h
as the external tank or the orbiter.
186	 ;^r)1; 
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c. Verification testing is the program to prove that the Shuttle
system meets all designs, performance, and safety requirements.
d. Acre tance testing is the program that demonstrates that the
actual part, component, subs y stem, or system used in a Shuttle vehicle
is capable cf meeting performance requirements in such documents as
the Contract End Item Specifications and so on.
V. Checkout testing is the program that verifies that the
hardware/software for a specific mission will fu • iction within the
prescribed flight limits both at subsystem and integrated vehicle levels.
f. Flight demonstration is the program that verifies the performance
of the flight vehicles under predetermined flight conditions.
7.3 Review of the Test Program
The Panel in assessing the confidence level provided by the
Shuttle test program focused on two areas: (1) the certification program
for the first captive flight of Orbiter 101 mated with the 747 car.:er
aircraft and the certification program for the first tree flight of
Orbit.-r 101 in the ALT r>roject, and (2) the certification program for
the first n►anned orbital flight with an "all-tip" Shuttle system.
Although the Space Shuttle ground tests are based to some extent
on exp.rience gained from such programs as Apollo, Skylab and ASTP and
the unmanned programs. the uniqueness and resource constraints of this
program levy different requirements and expectations. rheretore, areas
of interest reviewed by the Panel included the following:
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a. The test organizations at %ASA Centers and their contractors
with regard to responsibility and authority in the Shuttle program
organization, their pt-rsonnel numh o rs and skills, and the modes of
nuwnagement and communication.
h. Those tests considered mandatory prior to first flights +ind
the r a tionale for this determination.
c. The logic behind decisionson additions, deletions, deferrals
of the test requirertw tits and the impact on hazards and risk acceptance.
d. The contingency plans to cope with "surprises" which usually
occur during any test program.
e. Specific attention being paid by the program to criticut items
including those that have no redundancy, --.g., wing elevon actuators,
thrust vector control actuators.
f. The s y stem for assuring that the test requirements and procedures
as well as hardware configuration control for a spvcific piece of hardware
or sof' , .iare demonstrate the flight worthiness of that hardware or software.
g. The degree to which the test program and individual t,^sts add
up to an integrated test program and a reasonable basis for confidence
in decisions on the flight worthiness of the Shuttle.
h. Retest plans that assure adequate deomonstration of vehicle integrity
after replacements, modifications, repair, etc.
i. The sy stem to assess the degree to which model testing, such as
1/4-scale model vibration and wind tunnel testing, will parallel the actual
flight experience and therefore the difference that will have to be
188
t.S i,iored in defining a safe f light test program.
1. Specific test situationx such as:
(1) The ground rules for testing hardwarau so that it will
see the full mission cycle environment rather than just its operating
cycle u-nvironment.
(2) The rationale for using the structural ground text progr.im
as the basis for certifying the Orbiter 101 flight vehicle.
(l) The rigor of the testing tc assure payload doors can be
closed in orbit.
(4) The ground test program to determine control capabilities
if a contingency situation develops adhere one or more APU's fail to
operate.
(5) The program to accomplish some form of verification program
for critical mechanisms to be sure that they can meet :fie conditions
presented in long space soaks, long periods between checkout and use,
and long periods of inactivity on the ground. Such critical mechanisms
include the manv door-control units on the Orbiter, and the flight control
hardware.
(6) The rigor of the landing gear deployment test program to
assure deployment during actual flights.
(7) Planned use of test teams and ground support equipment at
factory, NASA Cen t er, and specifically at KSC to asst,re that then- is a
T-1 - imum accumulation of experience and safe test operation.
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7.4 Structural Proof Tests. Orbiter 101
Orbiter proof testis are to provide conf;.dence in earl y phases of
the flight test program by verifying; integrity and rigging of tnntrol
systems and selected doors. These tests assure that (1) control surfacu
and door mechanisms and the associated structure have the strength
and Ktiffness to withstand limi'. loads (i.e., max imtun load oxpt-cted
during mission operation) without loss of operational capability, and
(2) the hydraulic subsystem will provide the necessary stiffness to
these surfaces to withstand aerodynamic flutter. The loads are those
expected on the Orbiter 102 during an orbital mission. The tent article
is a flight vehicle except for the following itemn which would not be
installed at that time: tailcone; thermal seals on the landing gear
doors and rudder speed brake; elevon surface seals and TPS; crew seats
and rails; pyrote c hnic devices; and the use of simulated SSMF.'s.
The testing will be performed after tranufacturing checkout and
before the ground vibration tests at the RI Palmdale assembly facility.
The Orbiter 101 will be Lcrtified by analysis, and the vehicle will be
placarded to 75% of limit loaf for all critical horizontal flight
conditions. This does not include the thennal stress loads of Orbiter
102. The flight placards art- being developed using A1.1' weights and con-
figurations to derive ALT external loading; and internal loading indicators
to compare with the Orbiter 101 detail design and analysis. iiecause of
the complexity and inherent costs required to separate thermal effects
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from Orbiter 101 stress analysis the certification analysis will assume
that thermal effects are present thus resulting in an additional structural
,in.
The proof tests on the control surfaces of the 101 will develop
Jesign limit hinge moments with the actuation systems operating and
the surfaces positioned at angles of deflection at which limit loads
will occur. The landing gear doors will be proof loaded. The landing
gear itself will be certified by component testing. The crew ! ,%)d Ae will
be pressure proof loaded to 17.7 psig which is 110% of design limit
pressure. Modal surveys at frequencies of body bending and torsion,
including torsion modes of the wing and fin, will be conducted on the
Orbiter 101 after factory checkout to substantiate and update the
dynamic math model by correlating analytical predictions with the measured
test data. In addition there will be a calibration of the wind root
strain gages during free flight to further substantiate the analyses.
This will be done by comparing predicted conditions with flight data so
that inflight loads will be verified before further explorations of the
Orbiter flight boundaries.
To provide a baseline for evaluating the adequacy of this test
approach,the related information from military and commercial wide-body
test programs is summarized here:
a. The L-1011 underwent a tL t program that included development
component testing, proof bsdiiig to the limit load of control surfaces
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and landing gear components, pressure proof testing of cabin to 607
of limit pressure. The competed stress analyses was accomplished
prior to flight test. No primary structure proof loading or static
test article loading was considered necessary. The vehicle was
placarded to 80% of the limit load. Subsequent testing included a
full airframe static and fatigue test.
b. The DC-10 designs underwent proof loading to limit load and
this data was extrapolated to verify the analyses prior to fivst
flight. in addition, the controls of the flight test aircraft were
proof loaded and ground vibration tests were conducted prior to
flight tests. No placards were imposed on the flight test.
c. The Boeing 747 experience prior to first flight is consistent
with the DC-10. F-11-scale static and fatigue articles were
subsequently performed.
The primary structure will be fully certified prior to first vertical
flight (OFT). The program calls for continuing testing in conjunction
with analyses of the governing flight conditions. Thus, the static
test article will be subjected to ultimate loads. Vibroacoustic tests
will be completed on the aft fuselage test article. Vertical vibration
tests and static firing of the main propulsion test article also remain
to be done along with wind tunnel mod-A testing. Component tests on
such items as the window, side hatch, airlock seals and static and
dynamic seals continues at this time. The Orbiter will not be placarded
for vertical flight, but trajectory tailoring and adaptive flight control
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t-111 beep the loads well within prescribed limits.
7.5 Structural Test Article (Orbiter
The Structural Test Article (STA) is of a production-type Orbiter
In two sections, the airframe assembly and the crew module section, whie•ti
will be subjected to static 1,oad testing in a special test serieI conductod
by the Lockheed Company. During this major structural test, all major
parts of the vehicle will be subjected to limit, fatigue, and ultimate
loads to induce design level stresses and prove that all parts are
capable of taking the expected loads safely. The airframe for STA uses
substitute. hardware for the nose and main landing hear, control surface
actuators, crew module, OMS/RCS pods, and thermal panes. The crew
module for STA uses substitute hardware for the windows and airlock
tunnel.
Milestones for the STA program are as follows:
a. Delivery of the airframe to Palmdale test site during the first
quarter of 1977.
b. Delivery of the crew module during the third quarter of 1977
to RI/Space Division.
c. Completion of the crew module tests in the Tall of 1978.
d. Completion of the airframe tests with a simulated crew module
in the first quarter of 1979.
The four series of tests on the STA will cover influence coefficients
such as modulus of elasticity, the limit loads, the fatigue loads and
the ultimate load.
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1. b 1'lo,tcl?i;iiv__Iloors
The iollowin" quonvions w nre asked during, the Panel's examination
of the payload bay door system: What testing, is planned to assuro
payload bay boors can be closed in tlip,W What requirements aro in
Cho baseline for Extra Vehicular Activity (EYA) capability to overcome
a problem which prevents floor closure? What: is the status of the
development of this NYTA capability? Responses to these questions
are sunmarinod below:
a. The platted test program provides for subsystem tests on
latchos and drive mechanisms; development toots on structural materials,
lubrication, and mechanism latches; qualification tests simulating,
.,oro "g'," and one "g," operations as well as on-orbit distortions with a
15-foot sovtion of payload bay door and mating; fixture. Details for
this test are still being; worked out.
b. The payload bay door system is being, designed see Svc for
manual operation by a crewman in EVA in case there is an on-orbit
problem with the door. Curtain payload configurations and postulated
failure modes will preclude access to the mechanisms. Thus JSC and
RI/Space Division are currently assessing, such challenges as the methods
of ensuring, that the doors can always be driven to an "open" position
and the allowable number of latches "out" and still have a sate return.
INA routes and working envelopes roquirod for a manual operation of the
doors are under evaluation.
_­9
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i
e. Airlock, EVA hardware, and I;VA hardware servicing and recharge
are now basel.ined. EVA provisions, such as translation aids, work
stations, etc., have been developed and will be implemented in the near
future. Handrails already designed for the remote manipulator system will
provide additional EVA flexibility. The airlock locations and configur-
ations that form a part of the total system have also been baselined at
this time.
7.7 Ground Vibration Tests (GVT)
There are a numl.er
 of ground vibration toasts that have been
discussed by the Panel: (1) Orbiter GVT, (2) Mated Orbiter/747,
(3) Mated Vertical GVT including all flight elements of the Shuttle
system. The overall ground vibration test frograR, uses the baild -Ing-
block approach with tests progressing from one-fourth-scale model;
to the full-scale Shuttle system. Thus the initial verification testing
of math models and analytical techniques will use the 1/4 models constructed
of the same materials as the flight articles and made to the production
drawings. These 1/4-scale models of the Orbiter, ET, SRB's should be
ready before the end of 1976. After completion of the development
testing; phase at Rockwell they will be transferred to JSC for payload
integration studies and operational support of the program.
7.7.1 Orbiter Horizontal Ground Vibration Test (HGVT)
The objectives of this test program are to determine the Orbiter
modal characteristics for two support conditions: (1) Orbiter free
195
J
fligiv called a "soft" vibration test (Figure>, 7-1), and (.') orbiter
muted-type called it "ritjd" vibration test (Figure 7-,'). The soft
or free-flight vibration test will also define the flight control
frequency response characteristics relating; to the deflection and
slope at control system sensors for known input at the aerodynamic
control surfaceso These tests are conducted on the orbiter 101
or ALT Vehicle. Them vibrations tests are conducted following the
structural mechanical proof load tests and are all e°onductrd at the
Palmdale facility. Rigid mount testa are to begin i- late July 1976
and the soft mount tests are to begin in mid-August after completion
of the rigid tests, Figure 7-3 shows Lho Palmdalo checkout flow which
includes these vibration tests.
7.7.2 Mated Orbiter/747 Ground Vibration '.rests
The purpose of this type of test would be to assess and verify
the adequacy of structural dynamic modeling and checkout structural
response instrumentation. The need for such a test program is being
examined by Roctzwell and then rccOmmondations will be brought to the
Orbiter and Shuttle management for a decision.
7.7.3 Mated Vertical Ground Vibration Test Program (MtdT)
This test at MSFG is the culmination of the individual and scale
model testing. As described to the Paned by the ground rest subsystem
managers there will be two major integratod vibration test 111hilSeS:
(1) a model test of the Orbiterh'"r assembly on a soft suspension system
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and (2) a modal test: including the Orbiter, Or, SRB's to investigate
conditions at litc-off, high-t1, and burnout, Initially, rigid-beady
modes will W determined to insure that the natural frequencies of the
"soft" suspension system can be adequately accomodated. During these toots
special precautions will 1,4 taken to prevent damage of any kind to the
Orbiter and the Ef since they will be refurbished and used for flight
hardware. The SRB's will not be used as flight hardware.
7.8 Flight Control Hydraulic Laboratory (FCIII.)
The objectives of tests conducted on the Fein, include: (I) veri-
fication of the hydraulic system, (W) integrated tests with the avionfes
development laboratory and hybrid computer for verification of ead-to-end
flight control system, (3) verification of the structural adequacy of
the various control surface actuator mountings, (4) verification of
the flight controls operations during real-time simulated mission
sogments, and (5) development of operational procedures to maintain
a working hydraulic system, The test article as used in the FCIII, is
referred to as the Orbiter "iron bird", see Figure 7-4. It uses a
qualifiable hydraulic system with simulated main engines, simulated
aersurfaces and actuator mounts, but without landing gears. This
program has been in progress since late in 1975 and will continue
through early 1978. Current work will support the AI.T project and
later test work *.Pill support the first orbital manned test flights.
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7.9drewF:acrr ;;ystem ,lk fl `Pest
The objectives of this test are to verify the capability and limits
of the crew escape system for ALT and OFT including flare, landing, high-Q and
High-0 conditions. Current plans include one static and three dynamic
tests to be conducted at the Holloman Air Force Base test track. Part
of the work will validate the 6-degree-of-freedom computer analysis
for adverse conditions which cannot be tasted, An idea of the test
itself and the items to be examined are shown in Figure 7-5.
7.10 tether May Tests
A number of tests are covered under more specific chapter of this
report, e.g., the Main Propulsion Test program. Others have not been
examined to any degree by the Panel, e.g., vibroacous t is testing; on the
Orbiter aft fuselage. Tn addition to the so-called "major tests" the
Panel expects to review the development and testing applied to some
of the more critical hardware such as the Auxiliary Power units, the
fuel cells, thrust vector control and elevon actuators and others as
deemed necessarv.
7.11 Ground Support Equipment (GSE
GSE is classified on the Shuttle program in accordance with the
following, functional groupings:
a.The servicing; support equipment whichsupplies fluids and
power to the flight hardware and associated GSE. This class includes
equipment for supplying pressurization, purging, transferring; fluids, etc.
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b. Gheckont and Test equipment which is ► teed in all test and chov'eoaat
operations. This class includes equipment; that monitors, evaluatt's and
stiTaulaeos hardware.
c. Handling and T ransportation equipment which is required for
t;hr, movement and support of fli t,tit nardwaro, including; sling o, stands, Otc.
d. A ► txili.ar_y_ equipment which aligns, protects and calibrates fl i;;ht
hardware.
e. Umbilicals which are those items interfaving; diLectly with the
Shuttle elements to transfer electrical power, electronic signals, an(,
fluids to and from the flight vehicle systems.
This area has been given lower priority by the Panel only bocause
of the press of other Panel efforts. To some dog;ree the Panel is in the
process of scoping; the task and defining; the most: effective approach
to a continuing; review of this area. The; Panel began by reviewing,
the adequacy of management efforts to assure safe, coat-eff^IeLivc means
of processing; the Shuttle during; all of its I:est and operational missions.
The Panel has also reviewed the requirements and constraint, placod on
moeting; the turnaround time and maintenance requirements, as well as the
arrangements for alternate-fiold landings by the Orbiter.
Tndicative of the examination the. Panel expects to follow arc,
the following;:
a. How does KSC monitor the contractors for design and acquisition
of ground support equipment that is to be used at KSC? What part dot=s
199
JSC and MSFC play in the design, acquisition an i use of t;SI,'.
b. What are Clio critical elements within Clio, e:,I, svatem`:
c. What; are Chu constraints on t;Sl; development and proeuroitwnC
from the y point of view of resources and schedule, and what are their
impacts on the (;ST, program`:
d. What are the plans for GSI; to support the A1;P profeet
beginning; with Cho,: preparation for the fixat flight in earl y 19777
7.11.2 GS , Design Review Board
The group was established in early 1974 after the Orbiter 101
Preliminary Design Review conducted in February 1974. This Board is
chaired by JSC personnel from the Orbiter Manufacturing; and Test Office
and from the 'rest Division of the Program Operations Office. Other
members of the GS Board are from RT/ R? pai, o Division, the Orbiter
contractors, KSC, MSFC with ether members added as required from the
three NASA Centors. Meetings of this Board are conducted monthly to assure that
the designs are evaluated through a system of reviews similar to that for
major elements of the Shuttle system (PRR's, PDR's, CDR':) before approval
and authority to proceed are given. An example of this activity is the
CSI. Ward Review of April 7, 1970 in which 37 models of GSI were reviewed.
The results were that 28 models wore approved ( 7 for PP.R, 1 for PRR/PDR,
9 for PDR, and 1 for PDR/CDR, and 10 for CDR), and two models wero deleted
or disapproved. The remaining; models of GSI, were duferrUd to the May
Board for disposition. In addition, during, this April, meeting the hoard
handled. fourtocn (14) action items from previous meetings. In these
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1act ivit irm all personnel have an opportunitv to v i+ o Oview Item Dis-
loilt ions (RID) where they fool there is an inaNquaey. This is We
as the tiysto!n uf' o t ,in the various elements of the Shuttle syston.
Program studies ar" underway to assure: (1) common hypergolie
W V 10 my cgnipmont to the optimum e ntent, (2) appropriate hydraulic
servicing and test capability at K: C, (`i) We Solid tRocket. Vot or
hindlinn operations. `Phu greatest number, of W design rovloc,s will
of our in 1916. An expected, chi? ovolvinr maturity of r oquirom-^m has
ranultuaa in a slight Were= o f GSE models sin g e Tuly 1975. The
planning for on-lines
 mainuonan(o and turnaround oquipmen.t and fravi ll t.irn
for VqV in progresning satisfactorily. Mainnenanev pl,anniny
 for ott -lino
line 1Roplaeoable Mtn (LRU) ban boon postponed for the prooent.
7.P Addt^ndum
An updated n!immzry showltw, the cost, configuration. purp000 and
(spect ed
 date of they
 toot is shown in Table 7-1
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NUFACIRIEN'T 7-1
The program in assuring, t-he cast effectivenoss of its
req"irements for ground support wq"Ipmont nuctis to ass"ri,
safety receives appropriate attention.
ttes	 !t: one? method of minimPing HIE program cost has been to
inSULUCC an agrossive effort to assure that the mamimum number of
WE end items is common to development test progran3, the ALT
program, W., prior to OFT useage. Hazard analyses arcs being
conducted on this equipment Co assure. adequate attention is being
given to safety. Additionally, the apace Ahuttle 055 design
regniremonLs have been reduced from the reliability Nvol required
to meet launch windows (Apollo) to a "fail-saft," requ3rtm,uL. This
provides GSi. which can sustain failure without loss of vehicle
systems or loss of personnel capbability..
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A iWIV-fl^Nf' e-1 Woaitinuodl
The program is in the peri od of doQuing th" Mail&
roq"irement s and plans for rya jor development and H ENis 
noting,. Plans for g,ro"nd testing appear adequate. Dab of q
;elated testing should he monitored to itis"ro i t is var rirsl
hhrongh as planned. Tho interact ions bot-weep the Orbiter,
1, ornal. 'rank, and Solid Roc'kot Rooster, inc!"Aing sofairatioll
dvaaamics, are complex. Analyses teased on around testing; Mould
be thosangrh enough to waxinize confidence in safe dww"I ► py"nt
fl ights.
t;e s tau e; As noted by the ASAP, separation dyna is s is a <,, eJwvt
t f continuous analysis backed up by ground Gust program. "-7inel
tunnel tests of the AIX configuration tOrbiLrr /7471 and the orbital
coot igurat ion (fi rbit-r, ls'i', ,ilm) ^ l re boing conducted to ill.te eriisac
sopAration load dynamics. Actual ground costs of the separation
I ardware loader various load conditions are planned. For Ai,,Y, n ile
separation loads using; load tells in the actual flight nopavation
nvntom are being; developed. Trajectory analysis o" Cho ALI fY
away and Llle ,;lib's and Of separations arc being continually  ip-
re^ .netfaV
 L and Wn rep aratio	 .1.K ,M od to 1I1^.3e9*°i%igjittl, no+. ,t'e	 n.	 l'e ^
ipproxir"tely 4,000 comhuGel runs of diffeievc test cond!rlotr
were investigated in special McDonnell Douglas studies to a sn"s -
safe. opornWonal nQparation margins. These types of analv q is Land
testing will continue with Cho specific objective of assrosing
confidence in safe development flights.
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8. 1 lilt roductt loll
i4i_t;ht testing,; of aerospace vehicles possesses an inherelat
elemont of risk owing, Lo the e it;tence o f many utikllowns WMAI
cannot be resolved in analyses of the wind LunnCls or other grouad
t `,L1). `llo need .for a flip,ht test, program of Lhe .3paee Shuttle
,y.;tem i,, readily apparent given the unique configuration of OL,
Orbiter and an assymetrical launch configuration which includes
solid rocket boosters and the large external tank for the Orbit(,?,'.;
three rocket engines. Another new factor in the early flight re:,tr;
i;; the use of the Boeing 747 airplane as ,a carrier vehicle fo y the
orbiter in the Orbiter/747 mated configuration, Figure 8-1.
'P1t ,
 t, .atent of the flig;hL host prog;rani i, not YeL fully defined or
ba-wli.ued. E%perience has shown LhaL major ground tests combluctl
with flight LCStf, provides a syner^,i.,Aie IpproavIl Lo deiiniw. t:he
t,%pvctl°d operational characterisLics aIld utidert;Laiidinf; Oic.. pi: ,)b-
lems associated wit,ll :;lluLLle missions, The previous section "overk'd
thk , .• round test program and indicaUld the limitation of thir  tost
program. `file additional data expected i'rom ti.e fli,,,)hL Lest program
is dvocribed in this secLion.
Ille t lig;hL Lest program involves Lhe verifi caL i.on 01 ML Irc
systems and Lhus is not to be considered a development program.
Vvritication means the process that determines that the Shuttle meet.;
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the design, performance, and safety requirements for Llilht. SpCeit,ic
requirements are chosen based on such criteria as (1) flight data is
required to verify mission capabilities, (2) it is more effective
Lo gather the data in-flight than by other method:;, or (3) the data
will answer questions remaining from the ground test program.
8.2 Shuttle Flight Demonstration Programs
The Panel is particularly interested in the process for:
a. Certification of the system, for the first captive
and first free flights in the Approach anti Landlu f; Tc:,3t Pro joet,
(ALT). Certification includes both tests and analysi.s,i.o.,
design-requirements.
b. Certification of tho systems for the first manned
orbital flight with an all-up Shuttle System in the Orbital Flight
Test Project (OFT).
The Panel is currently focusing on ALT and we will review OFT
as that program matures.
To give the reader a sense of what has been accomplished and
the work remaining here is a calendar of major milestones:
- Completed ALT Preliminary Design
Review (PDR)	 November 197+
- Completed OFT Preliminary DLSi.t n Re-
view (PDR)	 March 1975
- Completed ALT Critical Resign re-
view (CDR)	 April 1976
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-	 Completed Delivery of Shuttle Train-
ing Aircraft (STA) June/July 1976
-	 Orbiter 101 Rollout 5eptemtaer 1976
-	 Complete ALT Flight; Software Veri-
fication October 1971)
-	 Complete First: Approach and Landing
Development Tests in the Flight Con-
trol hydraulic Laboratory Ilecember 1976
-
	 Complete I>esign Certification Re-
view (WR) for first CcaptiV-^ Flight
and First free Flight December 1976
-	 Complete the Flight Readinoss Review
(FRR) for the First Captive Flight February 1977
-	 Conduct First Captive Flight: (unmanned) March 1977
-	 Conduct First Captive Flight (manned) Juno 1977
-	 Complete FRR for First Free Flight (ALT) July 1977
-	 Conduct First Free Fli^;lat	 (ALT) Jul,	 1977
-	 Complete OFT Critical Design Review August 1977
-	 Conduct First Manned Orbital Flight
Test march 1979
8.2.1 ALT Project
The ALT project together with analysis and wind-tunnel and
ground tests is intended to evaluate the Orbiter's stability and
control. In conjunction with subsystem operation, it will verily
the vehicle's ability to meet airworthiness and performance require-
ments dictated by the terminal phases of the operational and ferry
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missions, in this case 11 ter»Final-flight phase" consists of all
those activities conducted from an altitude of: about 15,000 feet
to roll-out;. This project thus includes such areas as vehicle
around tests before the first drop test, preliminary flight evalua-
tion, flying; quality investigation subsystem verification, and
demonstration of the unpowered terminal-flight phase.
The orbiter 101 used in the ALT project; generally will not in-
elude subsystems required only for space operations but will employ
simulations of equipment. as necessary to demonstrate the effects
of such systems and payloads on approach and landinf, performance.
The 'Pauae:l structures ics e fforts on the ALT project so it can
provider
a. A periodic report; on the status of preparation for
AUE .
b. A flight readiness assessment which the Adminititrator
uses in his personal flight read ino review.
The panel therefore raises such. questions in its review as:
a. Ghat are the OFT riskII that would have to be accepted
U there.: were no ALT project?
b. What are the risks involved in tho ALT?
c. How does the Shuttle Training Aircraft training,, program
and other ground based programs minimiz, AI,T risks',
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Et. What are the abort mo4tt^ capabilities for the i-iatett
to0ionratien anA ter the individual 741 and tarbinv
e.	 14 the c2,tent f i t the Development t°li } ,Jit tnatrurik'n-
t act ion for ATT Hui t is ient to allow for ant icipation of ttevelopitat;
-1s. at; well as tot, real-time problem resolution'!
t• What iti the V%tent 01 "sensitivity analy0es" eona"Cint
to Mornine the vitee t of input paramett y perturbations nom o -
teruil and internal sources, and What are the ro nulttl to Matte`:
o. What are the data collection and data reduction
processes and problvmnl
11.	 What it] the dv i snit Ton. of pilotert And .tut ovuit is t ral-
ivut-r vn Juriuv iree - slight and how they are iaiatAY? What alit,
the proviHionn for auto-to-manual transition or vice-vevaa?
i . What is the proc usn for developing the Al2 Mia,airn
tiaiot y c'!;,-w n.sment Report?
An an exaiiaple of the di.alt)vue wi th the Prog ram their renpougk
.^ t 1w MAY eounent m and quest ions in last year's report tart in-
AMA a q ilt taa+`hmvnt H-1. it eoverN iour areas: fl) tree all
duplovmvut of t.hu landing near; (') : ION risks va heneiita;
t a i Me role of rlan-in-the-loop; and (4) contingency anailvnvq a mi
range satut y.
-I
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8.?,; Orbi tal, Al.^,ht Test Project. ()V,,)
oVT will demonstrate tilt: total Slntttle system'ii flight -worthiness
and capanility to conduct actual missions. This project mtends the
Orbiter slight envrlope irom the ALT limits to include hated iascent
=;ith the )IT and BIM's and then separation from them, orbital in-
sertion and on-orbit operations of the orbiter and then its entry
and landing. `iris project also is to verify the ability to recover
file W13 1 s. In sunmiary the pro,je4 t will detitonk grate the compatibility
of the Shuttle elements for the phases of pre-mission operations,
mission operations, and post mission operations.
`!.'he current; OFT project cotxtains a series of si.-.-manned flights.
8.`3 observations on Approach and Landim, `Pest (AIL)
As nitaEed in briefings given co the Panel and as written in
olillt flu Program documCnt a (such a p t; NC 08943, "Fhig,ht ` c.'A RO(JUire-
ment,a - Orbiter Approach and banding") ,"the data and u%perience
Lo be ;rained from the Approach and Landing "feat, (ALT) pro;,ram ju3tily
pert ormia^, the tests. No :sint,le test reyiiremt.s :t. ,justifies the effort; b000ver,
the aggregate return from the several tests does ,justify the test; program".
Based on earlier discussions, prior briel'in;s, and individual
Panel member eNperience, it was assumed that the All program was a
mandatory part of the overall Space Shuttle A:,aster Verification Plan.
however, the most current. Panel/J ISC discussions indicate that, the ALT
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p't+ject is not a required precursor for the first manned orbit<<I t it"OLt o'Ai'l a
Unt rather a very worthwhile program to be used in con'atnetion with .3aaait,^c
wttad tunnel tests and ground tests to evtaluate, during, approaa h anrt irau(,i , ^ ,
{tae Orbiter 1 t> structural, avionics, electrical., hydrauliU, environmentfal,
ant rol , and landing subsystems. This observation is reinforced by a
oa one of the djscuo:aions that tlae crew for OVT slid not have to have tl'. 1
experience.
fi. 1.1 ALT '"Una,,em«.-tits
i'tae ory,anizrtti^,n that, mana k,es th4 , various eleneaatt, that sinke Eap
,ho c" TI anit OPT pro jeer o, withiaa the 13hut t le program arc . worth not int,
^'or ,,everal reasons:	 (1) the t fanol. t annot verify all decisions hill
elf pentl pan he adequacy ox the baoic,• management System, (2) ris,2h
a:^auap,ement (ICCiIA011r, depend on the ort,ani , °ation(.a) involved in the
cicclslon makiug process, and (t) the review System an(I its :alsility
it) prevent t hing,o from "tallim, through the crack" is reltat.ed to
owlinitiou of ory,ani.,ation reoponoi.biltieo. The organization it,
<)utlin^A ill 	 i3-" and 8- 3. t'hillIg r, to this;, organisation
+a a°cat ,;c;uat'nt: „hould lac ,
 L:..laec ted as the AI,T and OFT pro jec t o evolve
there it, a be tter understanding, of the work to IW done and
c,ia re the, emphasis should be placed. `Me remarks, that Y011OW iden-
ticv the more salient details.
The ,Johnson Space Center 11it,11t Operations Dimcwrate has over-
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rall responsibility for planning stn(: eot4ueLing she A.T project So
it satisfies tv-t objectives and Li Gt rcqui::etnent;s. The develop-
'	 gent of an ALT program and t ecoaical maflagertrnt system was the work
of the Orbiter Atmospheric Pli,;ht TeSL Office at ,IS(; within the
Might Operations Directorate. While the Orbital 11iA;ht Test
(OFT)program detailed plans and organization are being developed by
the Operations Integration Office at JSC which reports directly
Lo the Space Shuttle Program Manager.
Management reviews are of two types: (1) those dealing wit.4
the Orbiter 101 vehicle, and (2) those deali pg, with the ALT program
itself, These reviews are similar in type to those described for
other elements of the Shuttle program. An example of the reviews
is the Orbitat 101 Configuration Review (Phase 1) conducted in
February and March 1976 to assess whether Orbiter 101 subsystems and
05H were ready for the subsystem test phase. In the process a list
of constraints was established which were to be worked off before
or during; the test program. Another milestone review is the Approach
and Landing Test Critical Resign Review (CDR) in March and April
1976. It gives management another opportunity to review in detail
the test and test support operations to be performed, the facilities
and equipment to be used, and the management and working relation-
ships of the test organizations conducting the ALT project:. This
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CUR eoVero-d the activation of the ALT capability, the conduct Ott
thu test program, and the deaetivation of the AL'r capability. Vat
tte., vivw teams for the CUR inc lu" KSC, JS(,, DV RC, Rockwell, and Doein?,,
personnel. 'There wus a similar CUR for the Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
which was conducted during; the April.-May 1976 time period
to assure that the detailed production design meets the specifie,l
requirements.
The ALT baseline has been defined as to the number of fliPIILS , tht^
conlig;uration of the Orbiter (i.e., tail-cone on or off.) for Specilie'
tlfl;lit.s, data requirements and on-board computer capabilit:iCl s, etc.
These areas are covered in more detail in later sections of this
report. NASA titanahement at every level, from first-line supervi.. ors
to the y headquarters' Mnag;ement have been and continue to g,iVv tYua
ALT p-og;rani a great deal of attention to assure that this most
nigniticant area has the decision-maiwing system it needs.
8.3.2 Palmdale to IlRFC
'rhe orbiter 101 can be moved the thrity miles from the Palmdale
Assembly plant to the UFRC either by a ground transportation systtem
or by a ferry ilig;hL using; the 747 carrier aircraft. A number of
factors were considered: (1) legal aspects ol: overland movement on
and oIf of established roadways, (2) safety aspects of accomplishing
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a series of taxi tests at the Palmdale lac iX.3 t y prior to actual
berry operation, (3) ability to abort the first flight, (4) rela-
tive costs involved in the move one way or the Other, (5) and
probability of Orbiter or 747 damage either way. The overland trans-
portation of the Orbiter has been baselined. This decision was based to
a large degree on the operational questions dealing; with mated-taxi tests
and flight out of Palmdale versus taxi and first flight at DFRC with
zegard to safety margins.
The configuration for the first flight, it made from Palmdale
is:
-
	 Orbiter
	 150,000 pounds
-	 Carrier	 00,000 pounds of fuel using flaps at 2Oo
-	 voted	 550,000 pounds and a vviociLy of rotation
(V,) of 136 knots
The Palmdale runway is 12,000 feet in length. The V r,	 110 knots
would be reached at about 3650 feet, lift-off at 147 knots would
occur at about 4000 feet and the following 17 seconds at the lift-
off speed would be available for abort (i.e., from 4,000 feet to 8,850
feet along the runway). 	 The remainder of tho runway, from 8,850
feet to the 12,000 toot mark would be required to halt the mated
Orbiter/747 vehicle. At the DFRC/Edwards AFB runway capability on
the concrete is 15,000 feet and over 71! miles on the lake bed. Thus
Were is treater flexibility available at DF.RC to handle variations
_1
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in take off and extended taxi testa. In fact there is a capability
°	 to go slightly beyond taxi tests to actual short-term very low
altitude tests.
8.3.3 ALT Baseline
The ALT has for some time consisted of the following components:
-	 Test of modified 747 aircraft by Boeing and DFFC
-	 Mated 747/orbiter taxi tests
-	 Mated flight testa
-	
Free flight tests after mated take off and flight
A typical tailcone off free-flight ALT profile is shown in Figure 8-4.
Various NASA and contractor organizations associated with the
flight; test program have been investigating the many aspects of
ALT to maximize the information return versus the flight capabili-
ties of the 747/orbiter system. Studies concern such areas as
747-orbiter separation altitudes and attitudes, 747 buffet problems
associated with mated flight, separation velocities, effects of
variations between wind-tunnel testing and actual flight aerodynamic
performance, crew safety, data and data reduction requirements,
crew training and the final approach trajectory f.om preflare to
landing.
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A major item affecting the implementation of the ALT baseline is
the impact on the mated vehicle's flight performance and the asso-
ciated buffet characteristics if you fly the Orbiter without a tail-
	
U
cone. All other concerns are of second order importance in defining
(lie mated and free-flight program.
'Me mated Orbiter/747 will take off with a fixed Orbiter inci-
dence angle of 4.5 to 7.5 degrees. The weight will probably be
between 150,000 and 170,000 pounds. The mated vehicle will climb
to a ceiling altitude (maximum climb thrust) and cruise for approx-
imately 15 minutes. A special rated thrust will then be used to
achieve a higher ceiling, altitude at 200 feet per minute. The time
duration of this special thrust rating is 10 minutes. Once the
ceiling altitude is achieved, a descent maneuver will be initiated
to accelerate the mated vehicle to the. desired launch airspeed in
an equilibrium glide condition. This will be based on derivatives
of pitch rate, flight path angle, sum of aerodynamic and thrust
pitching moments all equal to zero. The acceleration is performed
after the thrust is reduced from the special rated thrust !;o the
maximum continuous thrust level. The Orbiter elevon is tc be
positioned to a predetermined value to achieve a relative normal
load factor of 0.75g and an Orbiter pitch acceleration of approx-
imately 4.0 degrees/second 2 . During the mated descent phase, the
_'1
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747 will be configured to increase drag in order to enhance separati.ou.
Separation is to occur as the launch airspeed and equilibrium glide
conditions are achieved. The typical ALT baseline is shown in
Figure 8-5.
The baseline ALT program, taking into account: the many studies
conducted, is:
a. Reduction in the 747 tests by Boeing.
b. Mated tests with 747 and Orbiter with tail-cone on.
Taxi tests plus G flights with int rrt Orbiter.
Taxi tests plus 5 flights with active Orbiter,
c. Free flight tests conducted with tail-cone on.
4 flights to land on the lakebed runway.
1 flight to land on the concrete runway*
d. free flights with tail-cone off if possible. This
decision will be based on data obtained in all of the previous
flights along with wind tunnel tests and a detailed analysis.
Currvintly the program calls for 3 flights to land on the lakebed runway.
This would be preceded by a mated active flight test with tallcone off.
The number of flights and their content is under review.
The tailcone refers to they aerodynamic co Jeal shaped body
attached to the Orbiter to reduce drag and reduce buffeting of
the 747 tail sections in particular due to carrying the Orbiter
piggy-back. The extent of the buffeting with tail-cone off would
be severe tests and analyses indicate that. The buffeting can se-
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verely reduce the structural We of the 747 tail particularly the
aft body structure and vertical tail section. It can also prevent
the crew from achieving necessary proficiency during the critical
release and separation maneuver period. Finally it can generate a
general fatiguing vibration during all portions of the mated flight.
Uncertainties exist in scaling buffet loads from model scale to
full scale because there is no real methodology to accomplish such
scaling; therefore, additional critical areas could be affected.
If buffet loads were in error by a factor of two, the resulting
fatigue life calculations might be in error by a factor of as much
as ten. Considering such uncertainties the Shuttle program has
used a conservative approach to defining; the expected fatigue life
values.
The 1.4 hours of a single ALT test mission approaches; the age
life of the aft- body section at the tail. The vertical tail section
computed life is about 10 hours. These times can be increased through several
means including the use of an 11.7 degree Body Flap Up and beefing—up the
structure in the body and fin areas. This is being done to increase the
Lifetime to approximately 50 hours before the first crack appears. While
flying the Orbiter with the tail-cone on relieves the buffeting
problem, the aerodynamic performance of the Orbiter during free flight
is not exactly equal to that which would be experienced with the true
Orbiter configuration. This has also been examined and it has been
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suggested that the Orbiter with tail-cone-on can be made to behave
more like the mission configured Orbiter by deploying the rudder
speed brakes. This does .appear though to cause a some degree of
loss in pitch control.
For the reader to follow the evolution of the program it is
worthwhile for tho reader to understand the terms used (Figure 8-6),
the requirements for unpowered landing; (figure 8-7), unpowered flight
constraints (Figure 8-8), and the Autoland logic (Figure 8-9).
8.3.4 I)oployment of Orbiter Land_ ins Gear
The Panel was interested in the basis for confidence in the
ability of the gear to deploy and lock into place prior to touch-
down and the aerodynamic affect of having the gear deployed during
mated flight.
The tree-fall deployment system has been examined not only by
they engineering and test personnel but also by the highest levels
of Shuttle management to assure that, it will operate properly. As
a result of this review the free-fall mechanism has been augmented
by additional spring devices. Once the doors are open and the guar
are partially deployed the combination of initial downward anom^^tatum,
aerodynamic Forces and the mass of the gear appear sufficient to
fully deploy and lock the gear. hydraulic actuator deployment
force is also available. There will, of course, be a detailed
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and thorough test program to provide further confidence in the
adequacy of the system. The specification for the deployment
window of time (luring which the gear must safely be lowered calls
for a maximum of 10 seconds, but at this time analysis indicates
that it will take about; seven seconds. The gear retraction is
accomplished only on the ground and cannot be done in flight,.
It is planned that during one of the mated (captive) flights
that the Orbiter landing gear will be deployed during landing rollout.
This will permit information to be obtained on the aerodynamic
characteristics of the Orbiter as it will appear in actual flight
just prior to touchdown. Current indications are that this will
not cause undue buffeting of the 747 carrier aircraft.
Further discussions of this area of concern are found in the
"Risk Management" section of this report.
8.3.5 Orbiter/747 Separation
The separation sequence, when tree flights begin, is perhaps
one of the more significant areas of concern. The overriding re-
quirement is that there be no recontact between the vehicles once
separation begins. The degree to which analysis can define the
envelope of separation is dependent on the accuracy of wind tunnel
data and the inherent aerodynamic uncertainties therein.
The variables associated with this maneuver are:
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(a) OrbXLQr/147 aerodynamic uncertaintico,
(b) Orbiter incidence angle (currently 60 i 1. 5o i
(e) ortAter body flap, speed brakes, elevon posit-i-ut • .-v iti
capabilities.
(d) Separation "g" requiremenL3.
%0) FlIghL control System COMIalld MO&I and rilt%A.
(f) 747 spoilers, thrust position and capabiliLito-
(r) Mated altitude and spc"ed.
In order to obtain a greater degree of understanding v , L:lv
ALT 0(4sij,n and poz, formance characteristics as well as tho ri	 n-
volvod activity continues in the following, areas: ( 31 ) Ti'S L'..
Partleularly wind tunnel work, (2) analysis, particularly t a u , I-
oovor areas that can be improved, (3) simulaLions and pilot.
(4) refinements ot iiighL Lest data and instrumentation retj ul i . ,t-  11 C S
to ilt t the most data for the effort involved.
figure 8-10snows pictorially the clearance requirement.-
% pararioti. Ilse aesign goal and maximum allowable motion c•:.
-'11(jim.
SimultiLions have been conductQd many times on the ALT
`Lliese have been run by Lhe "Svparat-lwu and Pilot OperattoL..-,
at Rockwell ana ac leaSL five pilotj from the NASA/.TSC at;f-ronau t cort),,.
P
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Results from these simulations indicated that there would
be no vortex clearance problems for either the tailcone oil or off.
The effect of Orbiter weight and c.g. location, did not have a sig-
nificant affect oil the separation or Orbiter perfortlulnee. While nn
increased launch speed from 200 to udU Kean did not signif=icantly
affect the separation trajectory, it door appear to improve per-
formance for the final approach condition.
The tailcone oil 	 was noted to have a benc,fieial
f
	
	
effect from two aspects: (1) Orbiter/71 7 separation was better
with a near vertical deplacement; of the Orbiter relative to the 747
for the first few seconds, and (2) Orbiter ALT final approach con-
ditions were significantly better than for the tailcone oft; con-
figuration.
The effect of wind/shear, discrete trust, and random turbulence
were within the baseline capability and did not present; a ;separation
problem or appreciably affect the Orbitur handling qualities. As
a result of the simulations and analyses to date, the following
reparation and post separation conditions have been established:
(a) Separation Initial Condition
1. Normal relative load :factor " 0.75;.
2. Orbiter pitch acceleration - 4.0 degrees per sec`'.
3. Launch airspeed u 260 Keas.
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4. 1,quilibri,um glide.
(b) POSL Separation Conditions for Orbiter
1. Autotrim enabled at separation.
2. Post separation	 FC3 surtace
limits wi. 1 1, be Seleetd'd at setaarat ion.
3. Maintain 2
0 1see pitch r,ILV e011111kind WV i seconda
followed by a 2 second stabili.-ation period.
4. Maneuver to ALT interface.
(c) Post Separation Conditions for 74?
1. initiate 747 evasive maneuver (bank) at, I fiep
4 5.0 seconds 747 wheel command of 500
for to seconds with 747 VCS' in autopilot
mode.
"^. Iliere is a possibility that a recomatkndation
will be made to use a bank mineuver of 300
at approximately loo /sec, with the 747 Ft,i,
in a manual direct mode.
S. 3. G Cr ow Enermenc y F; gees
L'mergency egress during ALT means both escape from the 747 tald
escape Irom the Orbiter. The system for the orbiter 101 vehielc
consists of ejection seats traveling on rails with overhead ejection
through doors cut in the top of the cabin. Ttte emergeney sy^;tei^a
for the crew of the 747 has been somewhat more difficult to base-
liuc°. After technical studies and management; discussions it was
determiTLQd that there, should be a specific escape syt,tcm 1f1a,^Ud
into the 747. The design selected is a tunnel going; from the l'iight
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deck where the two crewmen are located to a point on the lower left
side of the 747 fuselage, Figure 8•11 The lower end of the tunnel
is opened by a pyrotechnic severance system that cuts the fuselag„e
thereby permitting, the crew to exit from the flight, deck to the
outside. At the same time a ,  the fuselage is cut it is necessary
Lo equali.ie the pressure between the cabin and the atmosphere by
blowing; out (or in) windows and a portion of the lower rig;lht side
skin. The Teledyne -WCormick-SeI f Company has been aelected to
provide this egress system. Tests and analyses will be conducted
on this arrangement to assure the smooth cutting; oL the metal akin
and the proper rate of decompression. Training„ of cuuxse, will
be required to assure the crew can and knows exactly how beat to
escape is the need arises. The system will be designed for the
')0 1 000 feet to 2+,000 feet range of altitudes.
The Orbiter ejection seat is a "zero-zero” seat. The first static test
of tine Orbiter 101 ejection seat is to take place at the Holl.oman AFB 111 01
Speed Test Track during; ,January 1977. hatch jettison tests would begin in
March 1977. The first manned ALT flight (captive or mated) is set for May 1977.
Testing; of the overhead hatch has been in process for some time and
qualification testing; on the energy transfer subsystem is essentially
complete. Two anomalies were noted regarding, the operation of the
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hatch: (1) detonation velocity indication was lost duriug ,  one t, ^,,t
but the output 01 the charge was satisfactory, anti
	 one 0.5 6ccoad
Lime delay Lime-dat" was lost during testing. Neither of these
appear significant and their resolution is expected soon.
The Critical Design Review oil the outer panel severance syutem
was completed. Qualification of this sytem is to start in May 1976.
During the development. testing, of the inter panel severance systi,m
the following anomalies were noted: (1) failure of the panel LO
sever, and (2) gas leakage into the crew CoMparLt-aellL. 'We inner
panel failure was due to using the wrong material in the subscalc
tOSL panels. A new test using proper materials is in the:
now. The gas leakage into the Crew compartment was due to e.i.pend-
ing, tube rupture during overload or hot temperature nominal load
tests. Apparently there is small margin between severing; 	 panel
with an 80% charge and containing the gas using a 1157, chart;:.
fore start of the qualification program this problem will have to
be resolved. See Figure 8-12.
8.3.7 Additional Notes of interest
Ule Gulfstream Shuttle Training Aircraft, as an inflighL Siriti-
lacor, will provide some important data for the first free
- flip,*
231
of the Orbiter. However, the fidelity of the simulator is based on
the wind tunnel data and it will be as good as the interpretation
of the data by aerodynamicists. The USAF and NASA have frequently
seer. significant differences between wind tunnel data and flight
data.
8.3.7.2
The 747 flight test team is in a monitor role with the 747 crew
in control of "going ahead" and the Orbiter crew in control of the
decision on separation or "abort" of the free-flight mission. There
is to be no overlap of authority and the communications system is
to in no wad* "shut off or overlap" the flight crews.
8.3.7.3
The factors wrich need co be accommodated in planning the Approach
and Landing Test Project include (1) possibility of limited or no
capability to carry and launch a tailcone-off Orbiter from the 747,
(2) definition of the flight performance margins afforded by a
tailcone-on first free flight, and (3) need for exercising ALT cur-
tailment options for unanticipated contingencies, cost constraints,
schedule constraints, etc.
8.3.7.4
A preliminary ALT manned Orbiter contingency operation plan has
F
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been produced. nic evolution and implementation of this plan will
be followed by the Palilol. Vie purpose of the doeument is to describe
t'he immediate actions and responsibilities to be used in the event
of a eatastrophic situati,olt When the orbiter is lrlanned during the
ALT operatiuns. Procedures for catastrophic events occurring alt other
r3mrs will be described in appropriate documents for both the ground
crew and the 747 teams.
i3.4 Kinned orbital FliOu ' osC Program
AL this time the OFT guidelines are that the 01-"1` will eon:,ist.
tit li,% ilight,s. '111e first flight will be manned and eoluiuc• ted with
great et than nominal performance malrgings. `111e per for111atnee envelope
will be t,radually expanded sLtIying within the operational design
capabilities 01 the Shut t.le vellie le .
It's crew will consist of two nleu on ilit;lit s one through four
t?itil all option of tour mon on flights live and :ii: ► . 1111 dALal LV—
turn requirements are to be principally for ellgineeri,ng '1nl.orimition.
Scientific data will be obtained on al nogg^interlerellee basis, tli'i
will be flown oil all six flights. e`andidate pa yloads will be used
whenever possible, Consistent with the a1vrtilability and cost calloc-
t ivenes;i of the' payload versus the mission Co be Mown.
`Mlle maior areas of planning include the following:
(a) N-,Unition of orbital flight test plans.
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(b) Ikivelopment of operating, concept s and requirelllent,i.
(e) Ik'V'elopmellt o1 training; roquirem011Ls and implementation
of trainers and simulators.
(d) IkwelopmenL anti implemenLaLion of Control center and
neLwork requirements and capabilitio.s.
(e) 1?c1 velopme L of flight planning; capability.
(h') Development of the launch and laluiing; ground oper-
ations and interface with flight control.
one problem noted during; our ,18t: discussions was the use of
"acld-on" units containing; large quantities of liquid annnoni:a to be
used as part of a cooling; system for DFI equipment . Those add-ons
were located in Lhe Payload bay but the vent: system was not. dis-
cussed at Lhat time, nor were the steps Ghat would prevent corrosion
due to the allmlonia fumes. This area will be hollowed by Lhe Panel
in huGuro reviews.
R.5 Addendum
Tho first flight of the modified shuttle carrier aircraft is
schodulod for the end of November or early December 1970. The aircraft
dosign gross woig;hts havo boon statod as follows:
Taxi	 778,000 pounds
Takeoff	 775,000 pounds
Landing;	 505,000 pounds.
Most of the modifications made to this aircraft aro shown in Figs 8-11,11.
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The Orbiter flare techniques are still under study to assure that, the
oelocted mode will be most effective in achieving the objectives of
they ALT project. Float time requirements, the time interval available
to the pilot during which he can adequately perceive sink rate and
adjust it to arrive at an acceptable value for touchdown, should
fall near the following:
a. A minimum time of seven (7) seconds and an optimum of
11 to 14 seconds.
b. For precision landings the last three (3) seconds should be
flown at essentially constant altitude.
The need to have a least one free-flight landing on the concrete
runway at DFRC is predicated on the difference between lakebed surfaco
and conrete runway surface on landing gear-wheel-brake effects. Th+t
difference in coefficient of friction and other surface effects on tho
gear dynamics and anti-skid tuning are sufficient to make a conreto
runway landing worthwhile.
Landing gear test problems have occurred during the checkout and test
work being conducted at Palmdale Facility when an uplock hook failed.
In addition they have found that the other uplock hooks had cracks.
Plans are for an investigation by RI/Space Division and NASA/JSC t..-
be done in two phases: Phase I for Orbiter 101 and Phase II for
Orbiter 102 and subs. Ground rules being utilized are:
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a. Review all criticality I single point mechanical failures
that can cause loss of vehicle or crew.
b. Both sides of the loaded interface will be reviewed for
4	 design criteria consistency, for example, the actuator load rating
versus mechanical ,joint design load used in the analysis.
t	 c. Phase I and 11 refers to hardware first usage and not loads.
M
1
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rATTACHMENT 8-1
Frei; fall deployment of landing sear may introduce safety
problems. Therefore, the use of a positive system for rapid
extension of landing gear should be considered.
Response:	 The basic design of the landing sear system is conser-
t
vative with four forces acting to deploy the gear, the up-lock
actuator, the weight of the gear, the strut actuator, and the locking
spring; bungle.
The concern about positive rapid extension has been recognized.
Plans to utilize pre-loaded springs as additional forces Lo pop the
doors and speed the gear deployment are being investigated.
A comprehensive Lost program using both a nose gear and main gear
simulators with flight type gear and door hardware with hdraulie
systems and electrical syste ►;ss in the OV 101 configuration will be
tested at Rockwell International. Loads simulating, aerodynamic
forces obtained from wind tunnel tests, will be applied to the gear and
door assemblies during these tests. Wind tunnel tests of a 1/3 scale
model will be conducted for aero loads with gear retracted and deplOYCd
as well as tests on a 0.04% model for loads at incremental positions.
Additional studies are continuing on the usefulness of extending the
landing gear during a 747 captive flight.
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ATTACHMENT 8--1 (Continued)
More information is needed on the risks of Approach and Land-
ing Testing in comparison with the value of information which
would be obtained in such flights.
Response:	 The Approach and Landing Test (ALT) program objectives
are as follows:
1. Verify an Orbiter pilot guided approach and landing capability.
2. Demonstrate an Orbiter subsonic auto TAEM/auto land capability.
3. 'Verify Orbiter subsonic airworthiness, integrated system oper-
ations and selected subsystems operation for first orbital flight.
4. Demonstrate Orbiter capability to safely approach and land in
various center of gravity configurations.
These important objectives can be accomplished with acceptable risks.
Extensive analysis, wind tunnel testing, and man-in-the-loop simu-
lations have demonstrated the safety of the ALT test flights. A com-
prehensive matrix of separation configuration and aerodynamic 15ara-
meter variations has been analyzed. mere have been approximately 2,200
hours of wind tunnel testing, 200 piloted simulation runs, and 3,000 12 de-
gree of freedom separation trajectories completed. Numerous variations
in configuration, control modes, aerodynamic coefficients, altitude,
velocity, and flight path angle have been studies. Safe, acceptable
separations are produced within a large envelope of conditions.
The top launch concept has been employed successfully in the part.
Programs employing the top launch concept include the British Mayo
Composite Aircraft, the German Mistel, and the French Leduc.
The ALT program decreases overall Space Shuttle Program risk. The
Orbiter is a highly sophisticated combination aircraft/spacecraft
with a digital, fly-by-wire, flight control system. ALT provides
for the detection and correction of problems in the important approach
and landing regime prior to the orbital flight tests. The ALT tests
will essentially verify the aircraft capabilities of the combination
aircraft/spacecraft Orbiter.
The remaining issues being examined relate to the launch altitude of
the Orbiter from the 747 and the launch configuration of the Orbiter
(tailcone on or tailcone off). These issues are being reviewed by
the OSF Management Council with JSC and FRC on October 8, 1975.
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ATTACI114ENT 8-1 (Continued)
The role of man-in-the-loop, especially during landiul,
rollout and braking, needs re-examination as the program
reaches the point where avionics capability and limitations
are better known.
tteaponse:
	
The Space Shuttle Program engineering simulation activity
has been reviewed as a part of the overall avionics development plan.
This review reconsidered all the simulation requirements and adjusted
the plan to better balance the design freeze dates with the avail-
ability of adequate engineering data. The ,final, decisions on the
role of man-in-the-loop particularly during landing have not been
made and are not scheduled until early 1976. During this time period,
AIL testing; including some tie with the hydraulic systems will have
further defined the control system characteristics. Gain and brake
characteristics together with landing aids analysis need more work
before final decisions in this area are committed. The program is in
agreement with the necessity for good judgment coupled with adequate
data in this area. Reviews of the specific landing; characteristics
and techniques are planned.
239
ATTACHMENT 8-1 (Continued)
Contingency analyses especially for aborts, ditching, land-
ing accidents, and range safety should be completed early
enough to assure design solution rather than operational
work-arounds.
Response:
ABORTS
(a) The present abort analysis effort is being concentrated on those
cases with the highest probability of occurrence. These are the in-
tact abort cases and include the following:
I. Loss of thrust from one SSMC.
2. Loss of TVC for one SSME.
3. Loss of thrust from one OMS engine.
4. Loss of TVC for one axis of SRB.
The aborts with a low probability of occurrence are referred to as
the contingency abort cases. These cases are being studied, but to
a limited degree, in consonance with their low probability of occurrence.
Contingency abort cases include the following:
1. Loss of thrust from two or three SSME's.
2. Loss of TVC for two or three SSME's.
3. Loss of TVC for two or more axes of an SRB.
4. Premature Orbiter separation.
5. Failure to separate SRB from Orbiter/ET.
For certain situations, it is not practical to provide for abort
solutions. For these cases, appropriate safety margins and high
factors of reliability have been included in the Space Shuttle design
to preclude their occurrence. These uses include the following:
1. Major structural failure.
2. Complete loss of guidance and/or control
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ATTACHMENT 8-1 (Continued)
3. Failure to ignite one M.
4. SSME or SRB hardover.
5. Failure to separate Orbiter from ET.
6, Premature SRB separation.
Ditching
(b) Orbiter ditching tests have been conducted at Langley Research
Center. Based on these tests, the Orbiter, should be able to land
safely on the water, assuming no major structural breakup. Preliminary
structural analysis indicates structural breakup will probably not
occur for reasonable ditching conditions, There is a possibility of
the side egress door jamming during ditching. Alternate ways are being;
studied to evacuate the Orbiter in case the egress door is jammed dur-
ing ditching.
Landings Accidents
(c) Analysis is being; conducted by JSC and LRC on the energy absorption
capability of the Orbiter during landing accidents. The purpose of the
analysis is to determine the ability of the crew compartment aft: bulklicad
to absorb payload loads resulting from landing; accidents.
Range Safety
(d) The Range Safety System PDR is scheduled for October 15 through
November 7, 1975. This system, baselined over a year ago, has not
yet been approved by the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AVETR). In
order to resolve the issues raised concerning range safety requiremeaaL:;,
a joint NASA-USAF Ad floc Committee is being formed to conduct a technlc4tl
analysis of the hazards of Space Shuttle flights, both developmental ­.ad
operational, and to trade off hazards against related launch azimuth
constraints and vehicle reliability in order to determine a logical.
approach to assuring public safety. Alternatives will be recommended
to NASA management and the Commander, AFETR, for decision.
241
ORBITER/CARRIER. AIRCRAFT
8 FT I IN.
9 FT 6 IN.
12 FT 2 IN.,
ENGINES
MODEL:	 JT9D-7 ACN
THRUST:
	 48,570 LB
WEIGHTS
MAXIMUM TAXI GROSS WEIGHT: 778 1 000 LB
DESIGN LANDING WEIGHT:
	 630,000 LB
OPERATIONAL EMPTY WEIGHT
	 330,200 LB
13 FT 4 IN.
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9.0 EXTERNAL TANK
9.1 Introduction
Information contained in this section of the report is current
through the second quarter of calendar 1976. The latest data Includes in-
formation for the period through the External Tank quarterly Re-
view in May 1976, which was conducted at the Michaud Assembly Plant
in Mississippi. This overview covers the design status, weight status,
development and qualification tests, significant concerns and issues
associated with this program. The results of hazard analyses and
failure movies and effects analyses are contained in Section 6 (Tusk
Management) of this report. Discussion of schedules and milestones
are provided where it is felt that they have a bearing; on the status
and/or problem resolution or interfaces with other Shuttle elements.
The External Tank consists of five systems - (1) structures,
(2) propulsion, (3) electrical, (4) thermal protection, and (5) inter-
face hardware. Related ground support equipment is discussed in the
GSE section of this report.
9.1.1 BackgrounC Description on the System
Most active components for the propellant system are contained
in the Orbiter to minimize throwaway costs. At liftoff, the External
Tank (ET) contains approximately 1,550,000 pounds of usable pro-
pellant. The liquid hydrogen tank volume is 53,000 ft  and the liquid
oxygen tank volume if 19,500 ft 3 . These volumes include a 3% ullage
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provision. The hydrogen tank is pressurized to a range 
of 
17-19 pair;
and the oxygen tank to 20-22 psig, Antivortex and slosh baffles arcs
4	
mounted in the oxygen tank to minimize liquid residuals and to damp
fluid motion. Five lines, three for the hydrogen and two for the
oxygen, come together with the same number of lines in the Orbiter
at the ET/Orbiter interface. Both tanks are constructed of aluminum
alloy skins with support or stability frames as required, and their
skins are butt-fusion-welded to provide reliable sealed Joints. f3pray-
on foam insulation (SOPI) is applied to the complete outer surface in-
cluding the sidewalls and the bulkheads. SLA-561 iablaWr material is
applied to selected areas, such as the aLcachwien ttl- aLructures, where
shock impingement causes increased heating.
9.1.2 Structures
Structural design is complicated by the need to Meet the inter-
active load effects resulting from (1) the temperature;; and pressure
requirements of the internal propellants, (2) external heating,, and
pressures due to aerodynamics, and (3) the loads associated with
Orbiter and Solid Rocket Booster interactions during the ascent phase
of the mission. The hydrogen tank is a fusion-welded assembly of
barrel sections, I-Ring frames, and dome sections. A frame at the
juncture of the forward dome and forward barrel contair 'j an integral
flange which joins the hydrogen tank to the interLank and also provides
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the structure for the Orbiter forward attach point. 11w 	 tank
is of olive shape to reduce aerodynamic drat, and aerothviviodynataic
heating. A ring frame at the juncture of the dome and cylindrical
section contains an integral flanf;e for joining the oxygen tank to
the intertank. `1"he intertank is a skin/siringer/frame structure of
cylindrical shape and includes a heavy beam which spans the inter-
tank. The ends of the beam contain the 31111 thrust fittings which
area the ET/81M forward interface paints. Flanges at either end of
the intertank provide the attachment to both the oxygen and hydrogen
Lank elements. A frame at the juncture of the aft dome and the aft
barrel of the hydrogen tank contains the structure for the aft €31111
attachment; and also the structure for the aft: Orbiter attachment.
9.1.3 Propulsion System
The PT contains all the hydrogen and ony,ien for the Orbiter's
main engines. Also, the LT propulsion system Nerves the primary
function of delivering the oxidiser and fuel to and from the pro-
pellant tanks and the Orbiter interface. Delivery rates to the
Orbiter are approximately 45,300 gpm for liquid hydrogen and 17,000
gpm for liquid oxygen. All controls and valves are located in tile
Orbiter except for the LOX and h11 2 vent/relief valves, the tumbling-
system pyro valve=, check valves in the helium inject line, and those
valves integral to the interface disconnects. Propellants are loaded
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and off-loaded through the arbiter into the ET. As for loading; rates,
maximum flows are 12,000 gpm for hydrogen and 5,000 gpm for oxygen.
9..1.4 Eleegical 1 stem
The electrical system provides for propellant level sensing,
instrumentation functions, electrical power distribution, tumbling
capability and light ping protection. There are two disMA sets
Of instruments, the operational instrumentation and the development
flight_ instrumentation. The development flight instrumen tation is
carried on the first six flight articles. .subsequent flights will
have only operational instrumentation, which is hard-wire interconnec-
tions of sensors without ET electronics. All ET electrical power is
derived from the Orbiter.
9.1.5 Thermal Protection Syst4m
The TPS performs a multipurpose role during prelaunch and flig
phases. Its major functions are (1) to maintain the primary structure
and subsystem components within design temperature limits, (2) control
prelaunch boil-off rates, (3) contribute to maintenance of proper
propellant temperature at Orbiter interfact, (4) prevent liquefaction
of air on the hydrogen tank surface, and (5) help prevent accumulation
of ice on the external surfaces of the HT.
During the ascent phase the TP3 helps to minimise the unusable
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liquid hydrogen resulting from thermal stratification. During entry
of the ET, structural temperatures and tank pressure contribute to
the tank fragmentation process and the resultant debris size and
impact footprint. The TPS assures safe separation from the Orbiter
and low altitude fragmentation to meet a required 100 x 600 n.mi. foot-
print.
The types, areas of location and thickness Ws were designed to
handle worst case environments induced by an "abort-once-around:
condition. Briefly the TPS materials and their application are as
follows:
SLA-561 is used in two forms, molded (SLA-561m) and
sprayed (SLA-561s).
CPR-421 is a fluorocarbon-blown, rigid-foam
(polyisocyanurate).
with strength characteristics, and dimensional and thermal stability
at low or high temperatures, that exceed those of standard urethane
foam. A more complete description of the TPS usage is shown in
Table 9-1.
9.1.6 Interface Hardware
The External Tank interfaces with the two Solid Rocket Boosters,
the Orbiter, and with the launch facility. SRB interfaces are six
flight-separable structural attach points and electrical connections
to allow Orbiter-to-SRB communication and control. Orbiter inter-
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faces include three flight separable structural attachments as well as
electrical, propellant and pressurization umbilicals. A launch fa-
Q	
cility umbilical interface located at the intertank provides ground
services to purge the intertank and to actuate vent valves for pre-
launch operations. A more detailed description of the interfaces
can be found in Figure 9-1.
9.1,7 Rang Mfet
I3ecause of incompatibilities between the Shuttle baseline range
safety system and the Air Force Eastern Test Range safety requirements
a decision has been made to implement a new baseline Flight Termination
System, which includes an External Tank propellant dispersal system.
It will be carried on operational flights as long as required. The
system will be "triplex" in that charges will be placed in the Ex-
ternal Tank and one in each of the SRB's. The details of the exact
system design are still under consideration. Trade studies are now
underway regarding: ZT electronics redundancy versus cross-strapping;
intertank ordnance versus linear tank length charges; SRB charge; and
redundant open-loop versus closed-loop dual initiator.
9. 1.8 Schedules
A brief look at the Level I (NASA headquarters) controlled mile-
stones for the ET identifies the program's accomplishments and the
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work ahead.
- Completed Preliminary Design Review (PDR)	 Sept. 1974
- Completed Critical Design Review (CDR) 	 Nov. 1975
- Complete delivery of Main Propulsion Test
Tank to NSTI,	 May	 1977
- Complete delivery of ET Ground Vibration
Test Article to MSFC	 March 1,978
- Deliver first flight tank to KSC fer FMCFT
	
Sept. 1978
9.2 Observations
A general overview of the FT program indicates that the program's
management systems have been in place and working well for some time
now. The basic detail engineering design/drawings are about 75Z com-
plete with full assembly and installation release due sometime in the
third quarter of 1976. A study has been in progress for some time to
determine if the Structural Test Article test requirements can be
simplified and reduced. T'nis, of course, is a cost/schedule saving
procedure which involves an analysis of what each test returns for
the money and time invested. Many of the actions (RI.D's) from the.
GDR are still being worked, while all those from prior milestone re-
views have been closed. Manufacturing facilities (plant., tooling,
etc.) and procurements of materials and effort appear to be support-
ing the ET program at this time. ipecific areas of concern and
efforts to resolve them are discussed in the following segments of
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this section of the report.
n	 9.2.1 Review System
With the completion of the External Tank Critical Design Review
in November 1975, the ET program is considered sufficiently mature
to allow fabrication of the deliverable tanks for flight. The re-
view established a baseline configuration. Almost all changes will
need to be approved by MSFC. In addition to the day -LO-day activities
normally conducted at both MSFC and at Martin Marietta, regular reviews
and Shuttle Panels dealing with the External Tank continue to be the
major technical management control exerted on the program. Reviews
include the ET Quarterly Technical Management Review conducted at
MSFC or the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF), weekly teleconference
meetings to examine problems and expectations, and the Configuration
Control Board operations. Further discussion of what transpired at
the CDR will be helpful in understanding the depth of the reviews
conducted on the ET.
The CDR was conducted at the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility, in
New Orleans, Louisiana, between November 10 and 21, 1975. There
were a total of 363 Review Item Discrepancies (RID's) submitted.
These were distributed as follows:
	
Structures	 129
	
Propulsion	 77
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Total - 363
Electrical	 98
TPS	 59
Of these RID's 81 were withdrawn, combinej with others or disapproved,
leaving; 282 "working;" items. More than halt of these have been closed
out since the CDR by completion of the work or that; the activity is
fully in process, The remainder are being worked with expected
completion before mid-year 1976.
The CRD may then be summarized as follows:
(a) Structures and propulsion system design has been
thoroughly reviewed and found to be technically adequate. Production
can proceed with baseline design.
(b) The TPS baseline concept has been found to be tech-
nically sound. Development can continue on that baseline.
(c) The electrical system components review has highlighted
three hardware problems - (1) Cryogenic Connectors (Low Temperature
Limitations), (2) Ullage Transducers (High Temperature Limitations),
and (3) Instrumentation Sample Rates (MUX Impact).
(d) MPTA (Main Propulsion Test Article) requirements re-
quire further iteration to match the requirement to vehicle capability.
The action items resulting from the CDR included such things as:
(a) The contractor (MMC) is to perform a cost trade study
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on the use of Inconel 718 for the aft SRD thrust fitting. They are to
consider the procurement schedule to determine if it would be less
costly to change out the material than to continue with the develop-
ment cost of a titanium fitting.
(b) JSC is to assure that adequate handling, and logistic
plans exist in support of the MGVT.
(c) Rockwell International, Space Di •iision, is to investi-
gate the problem of overheating of the ullage pressure sensors. MMC
is to evaluate other components for compatibility with the predicted
gaseous oxygen temperatures. This will apply to both the flight
vehicle and the MPTA.
(d) MSFC will review Volume X of the Level II requirements
documents and SN-C-005 (contractual specification) and initiate the
appropriate change request to make the External Tank contamination
requirements compatible with the system contamination control re-
quirements.
There are a number of major Level II working Panels that deal
with the External Tank as it relates to (1) the integrated propulsion
system (SSPM Directive #24), (2) Range Safety (SSPM #42), and (3)
thermal design (SSPM Directive #46) and so on. Since these Panels
meet and discuss technical and management problems on a continuous
basis, they support the day-to-day operations as well as the major
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reviews such as the CIA.
9.2.2 Design Progress
This section will focus on two areas of interest - (l) those
design areas that are significant to the operation of the Space
Shuttle System as a whole but which have received a minimum of atten
Lion from the Panel before, and (2) significant concerns regarding,
design requirements, design implementation, red:sig;n due to test.
The test program and its status is covered in another section of
this chapter.
9.2.2.1 FT Venting and Tumblin
A liquid oxygen venting; system is incorporated into the I.T. Along;
with its associated tumbling, system, it i, designed to enhance the
separation safety between the Orbiter and the F.T. The vent system
relieves the liquid oxygen tank pressure if it increases to 23-25 psig;.
I9ie nearly nonpropulsive design limits thrust to less than 50 pounds.
The liquid hydrogen tank may vent after separation if the tank reaches
a pressure of 20-22 psig;, but its direction of thrust will not affect:
the tumbling motion. The tumbling system associated with the liquid
oxygen venting system operates by opening; a pyro-operated valve in 	
n
the nose cap. This allows the oxygen gas to escape through a single
port located such that its thrust moves the nose of the External Tank
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away from the Orbiter at a slightly greater rate than the rear tank
movement to create an increasing rate of tumbling. This energy is
not related to the function of separation. The tumbling motion con-
tributes to a more predictable trajectory by preventing atmospheric
skip, and helps cause the External. Tank to break up into fragments
at about 185,000 feet altitude, This technique of entry results in
a smaller, more predictable ocean impact area of about 100 x 600 n. mi.
for tank pieces.
9.2.2.2 Flight Test Configuration
The first six External Tanks ro be used in the Space Shuttle
Orbital Flight Test Program (OFT.) have additional development flight
instrumentation (DFI) over and above that to be used on the operational
vehicles. These are installed to confirm the External Tank design,
provide for diagnostic analysis to analyze flight anomalies and support
operational planning. The instrumentation has been added with a
minimum of changes being made to the base vehicle.. The changes in-
volved segments of the structure, the propulsion, electronic con-
ditioning and thermal protection systems. An additional Orbiter/ET
interface has, however, been added. The DFI electrical system,
supplied by Orbiter power, consists of 342 measurements including bus-
voltage monitoring and PCM multiplexer BITE monitoring; as well as hard-
ware for signal conditioning to assure a compatible data interface with
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the Orbiter. The DFI measurements interface with the Orbiter Fre-
quency Division Multiplexer. Measurements associated with POGO,
acoustic and other vibration measurements interface with the Orbiter
through the HT frequency modulation multiplexer to tape recorders.
9.2.2.3 SRB Thrust Panel
The intertank cylindrical structure consists of two machined
thrust panels and six stringer stiffened panels joined mechanically.
No weldments are used. The two thrust panels distribute the con-
centrated axial SRB thrust loads to the LOX and liquid hydrogen tanks
and to adjacent intertank skin panels. The panels are selectively
machined with tapered skin thicknesses, and 26 external parallel rib-s
are integral with each panel. The panels are machined from aluminum
plate, 2219-T87, to a finished sire of 2.06" x 130" x 271" height.
This panel must then be formed into the 165" radius after machining.
It contains thicknesses ranging from 2" around the SRB Beam to 0.135"
in the web sectinns. AVCO, the subcontractor, planned to hot-form
these panel at about 3750 in their "Bump Press." Because these panel;;
are already in the so-called "T87" condition no temperature higher '.,han
3250 is actually allowed. Given their experience on another contract,
AVCO indicates that if the hot-forming is to take place at 325 ) F. the
panel will break. The options under consideration are: (a) ship the
job to Denver Martin Marietta where there is a "Break Press" of suffi-
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cient size, or (b) consider changing the material to the T37 con-
dition for the fabrication process and then age it to the T87 con-
dition. A decision has not been made and the Panel will follow this
item.
9.2.2.4 Range Safety Tmplementation for the ET
The following tentative agreements have been reache,4 regarding
that portion of the range safety flight termination system that is
to be designed for the External Tank:
(a) The range safety system will be triplex (one per SRB,
one on ET).
(b) ET electronics for this system are to be on the ET.
(c) It is assumed that the External Tank termination
system may no4 be required on all launches, and will be designed for
easy installation and removal at the launch site.
(d) MSFC is determining the desirability of locating the
ordnance in the intertank area versus running a charge the length
of the ET.
(e) Studies are being made on the best way to achieve
system redundancy. Redundancy is not required if the system is "cross-
strapped" from the SRB system. So far these studies indicate there is
inadequate antenna coverage during the early part of the ascent flight
to support redundancy requirements.
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(f) Requirements in Volume X of the Level 11 Shuttle docu-
meats will be changed to meet. the "triplex" requirement;.
',these artionr and their implementation will be followed by continuing
Panel attention.
9.2.2.5 Structural Loads Upda_ ti.n4
in November 1975 the Orbiter/lntegraLion Contractor genera Led
new structural loads indicating that there will be significantly
higher liquid hydrogen tank body loads as a result of time phasing
of the moment and lateral loud combinations. In audition when newer
High-Q cases are examined it would appear that High-Q loads will in-
crease the interface loads. As a result it would appear ?hat either
a higher pre-pressure or structural beef:-up may be required. This
area is under study at this time and will also be followed by the
Panel in future examinations of the HT.
9.2.2.6 Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) MulLiplexer (MUX) Capability
Current data requirements are close to the limits of the hard-
ware Lo accommodate the data bits. Tile PCM Mux capability is 16,000
BITS with current usage at about 15,500 BITS. Tho s potential for
overload is obvious. Such a problem is not uncommon at this stage
of the program. Scrub-down of the requirements for measurements and
sampling rates is currently underway. This area will be examined
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at future reviews by the Panel.
9.2.2.7 Weight Status
The ET current inert weight is calculated or estimated to be
73,756 pounds. The specificztion weight at this time is 73,999
pounds. The margin is obviously small and will continue to require
stringent management attention. The weight status is based principally
on calculations and less than 15% is estimated.
9.2.2.8 Thermal Protection -(TPS)
A number of significant issues have surfaced and are in various
stages o#' resolution at this time. Some of these are of particular
interest to various Panel members and therefore are discussed here.
(a) Rockwell indicates that revised ascent heating loads
are somewhat higher than used by the ET designers in their design of
the TPS. RI is edrrently evaluating their latest calculations of
ascent conditions. These calculations, along with further high
energy plasma arc/wind tunnel testing, should provide a more accurate
picture of the thermal and structural load provisions to be made for
the ET. The greatest effect appears to be on the forward section
of the liquid oxygen tank and on the intertank. There is less im-
pact on the liquid hydrogen tank. If the loads are higher there will
be substantial increase in the amount of insulation required and a
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corresponding growth in weight. Both the trajectory parameters and
the analysis methodology using lower altitude trajectory, wind tunnel
data recovery factors, and roughness effects are under review.
(b) There is possibility of the lift-Off of the CYR-4:11 in-
sulation at the interface between the CPR insulation and the so-called
"super light ablator" material. This would be due to the heat of ie-
action from CPR in liquid phase expanding the volume of air in OW
ablator material. The pressure increase forms voids at the inter-
face of the two Materials which then bubble, out. There is also it
possibility that the CPR-421 interacts with the adhesive and primer
used to hol;i the i nsiil -a ftons to the tank. finally, the angle at.
which the two materials interface may result in aerodynamic lift-off.
All of these areas are being; studied and appropriate tests are under-
way.
(c) Material development and installation methods are
still causing some problems. 'nie low stx ngth of thick SLA-561s at
the substrate is under intensive study and test; to resolve this
material problem.
(d) Minimization of damage to the orbiter TPS tiles from
ice on ET protuberances is receiving; intensive study. There: are more
than 70 that can collect ice. Studies focus on reducing ice formation
to a minimum by further protection of the ET areas o£ concern and
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understanding the tole.-Ance of the Orbiter tiles to damage from ivc
impact including; the extent of tile thermal degradation.
9.2.2.9 Lightning Protection
The EIT design incorporates features to protect the structure and
subsystems from ttie diree ► and indirect effects of triggered au i-
pheric electrical discharges during flight operations. `Ibe EIT is
designed to function after an initial strike of 2,00,000 amperes
peak at the ET lightning rod and a second lightning; strike of 50,000
ampere peak across the I;T body while it is in motion. Lightning pro-
tection criteria for the Space Shuttle Program are found in detail
in the document JSC-07636 with changes 1 and 2 updating it to March
1976. Lightning protection is provided by the launch site until
liftoff. Thereafter, the bare 20 inch long, 20 degree nose cone
at the tip of the ET nose cap serves as a lightning, rod. Preliminary
lightning tests indicate that a 0.03 inch wall-gauge gaseous oxygen
line running along the outside of the tank can accommodate restrike
currents with a foiward motion as low as one foot per second. Wur ffivr
lightning tests are being conducted to confirm the design. Simulated
lightning tests indicate the minimum (0.013 inches) the skin gauge
on the liquid oxygen tank will withstand expected strike currents.
9.2.3 Major Ground Tests
i
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There are three major ET ground tcst programs, or better still,
three programs using the ET as a major test item: (1) Structural
Tests, (2) Main Propulsion Test, and (3) Cround Vibration `rest.
Structural tests will be performed at the MSFC facilities to
r
confirm structural analyses and to verify the design. The general
objectives of this program are:
(a) Verify structural integrity of the ET for critical
internal and external design limits, yield and ultimate loads.
(b) obtain data to substantiate dynamic and stress analyses.
(c) Verify the structural integrity of the interface hard-
ware.
(d) Obtain influence coefficients (stress and deflection)
for structural and functional characteristics.
(e) Verify the structural integrity of the substructure
and of primary structure bracketry.
(f) Determine growth capability for future missions.
(g) Determine weight savings candidates for the production
article.
The hardware used for these tests has been designated the STA
or Structural Test Article. It consists of the following major
test assemblies: Intertank Static, LOX Modal, LOX Static, Liquid
Hydrogen Static. One LOX tank and one LH2 tank simulator section
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f	 are used in conjunction with the STA elements.
The Main Propuleion Test (MPT) program is to be performed at
the National Space Technology Laboratory (NSTL) in Misslasippi. It
will assess and verify the integrated Space Shuttle main propulsion
system performance. The MPT External Tank will be mated to a simu-
i
	 lated Orbiter midbody made of boiler-plate, and a flight weight ,eft
fuselage with the main engine cluster. The ET MPT article is flight
configured with modifications to meet the needs of the test. A
total of fifteen test firings are planned with eleven being; either
full duration or approaching full duration.
The ground vibration test (GVT) program at the Advanced Dynamic
Test Stand at MSFC will measure frequency, mode shapes, and damping
characteristics of the mated Space Shuttle vehicle. The GVT External
Tan1c is a flight configured structural article that will be returned
to MAF at ehe completion of the GVT for refurbishment and recycling.;
into a production ET. The experimental results will provide a basis
Eor updating the math model so that follow-on analytical studies
will yield refined and more accurate data. Substantiated or updated
coupiad dynamic math models will provide more confidence in the
Orbiter guidance and control system design, POGO analyses, structural
load predictions, and flutter analyses in support of the first Space
Shuttle flights. It is understood that a 1/4--scale test program is also
in the plans.
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9.3 Hazard Analyses and Safety Concerns
Both NASA and its contractors have developed a hazard analyses
and safety program on the External Tank program that is working; well.
Typical products are the "Space Shuttle External Tank Critical De-
sign Review Hazards Analysis Report" (MMC-ET-RA01-A dated October 17,
1975) and the "Space Shuttle Safety Concerns Summary Report" (JSC 90090)
which includes the ET as a part of the total picture. The elements of
the process used by Martin Marietta in arriving at risk assessments
include;
(a) Process of hazard identification, analysis and corrective
action.
(b) Review and evaluation of changes for hazards.
(c) Trade studies.
(d) Safety assessment summary
(e) Catalogue of hazard and then resolution.
The ET Critical Design Review summarized the hazards at that time
and most of them are now resolved.
SYSTEM
Structures and TPS
Propulsion and Mechanical
Electrical
Transportation and Support Equipment
TOTAL ...........................
HAZARDS
19
27
10
2
58 (Most of these have
been resolved)
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To provide the reader an understanding of these hazards, the
following were selected from the Summary Safety Concerns report:
(a) The impact of ice forming and breaking; away from the
ET and impacting the Orbiter TPS. This was mentioned in previous
sections of the report.
(b) There is no provision for draining the LOX and hydrogen
from the ET except through the Orbiter f.eedlines and the propellant
lines in the aft fuselage. The concern is that detanking during an
emergency must be accomplished through a system which may be in-
volved in the emergency. An emergency drain sys':em is under con-
sideration.
(c) Th^re may be post separation contact between the ET
and Orbiter because of undesirable motions caused by post-separation
venting. This is under study.
(d) The flammability of the ET tank insulation and adequacy
of the wire insulation are both under further review.
9.4 Material to Update the Basic Infcrmation
To assure the reader the most current information, this section
has been established to include new, pertinent information developed
by the Panel since the prior sections were written. This update adds,
modifies or deletes previous data contained in this report.
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9.4.1 Boundary Layer Tripping
Analysis of the "yoke" fitting on the forward Orbiter-to-I IT attachment
indicates that the fitting; will cause the boundary layer to be tripped
on the Orbiter (laminary to turbulent flow) earlier than desired. This
will result in an increased heat transfer resulting in increased material
temperatures of perhaps 80 to 100 degrees F. The extent of this problem
is still under study along with possible redesigns of the yoke explosive
bolt hardware.
9.4.2 Implementation Of Range Safety Requirements
The current design approach is to mount two conical shaped charges
in the intertank between the LOX and LII ,) tanks, along with the two
antennas, two batteries and associated electronics. The development
of a cost/effective method of implementing range safety is under study
with the objective of establishing an acceptable level of hazard from
Space Transportation System operations and determining criteria for
employment of a full or partial flight termination system. Total
system definition and ET design requirements are expected to be established
by August 1976.
9.4.3 Thermal and Structural Loads
Since thermal analysis data will not be available to support the design
of the TPS for the External Tank the TPS design must include margins for
any surprises. This may result in excessive weights and additional
expense for TPS development now and further changes may be required a
year from now whe:. the revised heating data becomes available. The
latest structural loads data (April 1976) may cause .9erious impacts on
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the current ET hardware, in the i,ntertank, hydrogen tank and inter-
face hardware. If load relief trajectories now under investigation
do not reduce the loads, the weight impact may exceed some 300 pounds
and affect many pieces of hardware already designed.
9.4.4 Ice Protection
There are more than 70 ET protuberances which can collect ice. Steps
have been and are being taken to alleviate this problem. The application
of spray-on insulation (SOFI) has been examined and can provide ice
control for about 85% of the surface area (-584 ft 2) with about 83 ft2
remaining to be covered. The application of the insulation in these areas
is somewhat more complicated than that for the remainder of the External
Tank. Tolerance of the Orbiter and tank to the ice/frost accummulations
during pad operations and ascent portion of the mission are ,till under
assessment.
9.4.5 Thermal Protection System (TPS)
CPR 488 which is a reformulated CPR 421 deleting the cobalt is currently
being evaluated. Preliminary results indicate that  either may be used
to provide the needed thermal protection.
9.4.6 TAX Anti-Geysering System
The test setup at Martin Marietta Corporation division at Denver, CO, to
test the efficacy of the anti-geysering system is now in the final stages
of installation and checkout. Baseline flow tasting is scheduled to
start soon after July 1, 1976.
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ATTACHMENT 9-1
Thv major chat 1 ongrs on !_,hr External Tank of -, afety sitillifi,
cancv Tiro thor°mol insulation, ico fo rmat ion, HIC U'it' of tofl(a
electrical wi r o .insulation in t ho liquid ©xykjon tank, and
provi n,ions for control of reentry.
Response :
Thermal Insulationon
(a) The nose of t-hc LOX tank has been revised from a hemi-,phor i.g.,ii
to a double cone configuration  t:o avoid bow shock rent:tachi-t vt o'-,
the ogive ind therv))y reduce the heating. Wind tunnel tc^:^t.iy+^^,
analysis of thermal data and dovelopmont tasting of TPS mator.i alr
on coupons and subscale tanks are continuing to char,?ctori ye thn,
TPS properties..
Ice Formation
(b) Tests have boon run in the Eglin A1't3 environmental civnil:Irr,
using a 10--foot diame-er tank in nulated with CPP- 921. of cover al
different configurations. Thc , specific, objectiv(^ of thc.so
is to determine for selected worst erivironinental c;onditionn the
thickness and density of icL./frost. Other, objc.c y t ives were:	 (;3) i ,
verify the soarchli qht concept- as a method to provont ice/frost
formation on TPS surfaces and (b) to domonstratr- the feasi hi,li t;: r
using conductive paints to provont ice/frost for°m.ation. T(-.;t cage.
are being analyzed.
Teflon Electrical Wire 'Insulation
(c) During the Apollo 13 investigation, a test program was roan
(according to procedures outlined in NHB 8060.1A, Test 4) on the
tef.lon insulated instrumentation wiring used in the Saturn vehiclo-..
The results of this program showed: (a) that the Saturn harness
insulation immersed in LOX could not be ignited by any elec,tr.ical
overload; ('b) in gaseous oxygen, the Saturn harness could be i g
-nited when overloaded by approximately 800 percent, electrically,'
(c) in the unlikely event of ignition, fire would not propogate
through the feedthrough connector at the tank wall because the con-
nector pins, rated at 7 amps, would fail open preventing praparat,ion
to the other side. As a result, no changes were made in the Saturn
stages LOX tank instrumentation wiring.
The smallest wire in the ET will-be No. 22 (except for 1/2-mil
platinum wire in loading and liquid level sensors). Maximum design
current for the No. 22 wire is 2 amperes. The maximum current into
the tank under any single failure in sensor or signal conditioner
is 1.5 amps. The duration of current will only be long enough for
the 1/2 mil wire in the tank or circuit components in the signal
conditioner to fuse (open).
The ET Project plans to conduct configuration tests using ET hard-
ware and worst case conditions to assure no hazard exists.
280
ATTACHMENT 9-1 (Continued)
Control. f)f }toont,ry
(cif	 i ,lw mlopt- i can n r non—pi c)IMIs i Ve VoIl t i nq Wi ll ( 4 1 SUY0 t1(i.1 i 11:.t.
pt vmot m i, hrvakup ciao to LOX and hycli ciclon t n ► 4}: 1 u } ► t uI'0!i .	 Thr
l inincl ()t 41 tumid iil'l iy;;t ('m utiliz irnl a gyro v.ilvo with illii i:ct i
°	 it(	 }its poI II i.cm wil l provid( , the 11(!t-( —!-iIVy C' etntTc^l^lcucl
rovnt.ry.
cif' POOR, QUTA.i, ^Y
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A ♦W VIA ^
TPS CONFIGURATION TABULATION
TFS MATERIAL
	
THIi'kNESS-INCHtS
Acreag.
Nose Fairing	 SLA-561	 0.15
L02 Vent Louvers	 SLA-561	 TBD
Conduit Fairing	 SLA-561	 0.4
L02 Yank Ogive	 CPR-421	 Taper
L02 Tank Barrel	 CPR-421	 1.0
L02 Tank Fwd Bulkhead 	 CPR-421	 0.5
L022 Tank Aft Dome 	 None Req.	 -----
Intertank	 CPR-421 i 5LA-561	 0.5
LH2 Tank Fwd Dome	 CPR421	 0.5
LH2 Tank Aft Dome	 CPR 421	 2.0
LH 2 Tank Barrel	 CPR-421 / SLA-561	 1.0
Penetrations
L02 Feedline	 CPR-421	 1.0
L02 Antigeyser Line	 CPR-421	 1.0
G02 Pressurization Line	 None Req.	 --->
LH2 Feedline	 SLA-561/CPR	 0.4/1.0
LH2 Recirculation i.ine	 SLA-561/CPR	 0.4/1.0
GH2 Pressurization Line 	 None Re el.	 ----
Electrical Cable Tray	 SLA-561	 0.05-0.35
LH2 Vent Line
	
CPR-421
	 0.5
L02 A/G Line Fairing	 SLA-561	 0.4
L02 Feedline Fairing 	 SLA-561	 0.4
GH2 Press Line Fairing	 SLA-561	 0.4
IT Conduit Fairing	 SLA-561	 0.4
Structural Attachments
L02 Feedline (5)
	
None Req.	 ----
L02 Antigeyser Line (14)	 SLA-561	 0.4
L02 Press Line/Cable Tray-LO Tank (17) 	 Req. TBD
GH2 Press Line (15)	 SLA-561	 0.2
Instrumentation	 TBD
Interface Structure
Fwd ET/ORB Attachment Strut
	
SLA-561(Fwd Face)
	
0.25
Aft ET/ORB Thrust Strut	 St.A-561 Fwd Fare)
	
0.10
Aft ET/ORB Vertical Strut
	
SLA-561	 0.15
Aft ET/ORB Diagonal Strut	 SLA--561
	
0115
Aft MORS Crossbeam Fairing	 SLA-561	 0.30 Fwd/Aft Face
0.20 Top/Bottom
Fwd ET/SRB Attachment	 None Req.	 ----
L02 Line Aft Interface Attachment	 Req. TBD
LH2 Line Aft Interface Attachment
	 Req. TBD
Isolator RecSuuirements
ET/SR8 Aft Attachment (4)	 Glass Phenolic
	
0.4
ET/ORB Fwd Attachment (2)	 0.5
ET/ORB Aft Vertical Attachment (2)
	
n.4
ET/ORB Aft Sway Attachmegt (1)	 0.4
L02 Feedline Attachment (8)	 0.4
L02 Pressurization Line/Cable Tray	 Glass Phenolic
Antigeyser Line Attachment (14) 	 0.5
LH2 Pressurization Line Attachment (15)
	
13
Miscellaneous Areas
Intertank Forward of SR8 Attachment
	
CPR-421
	 1.0
Intertank Forward of ORB Attachment
	
CPR-421/SLA-561	 0.5/0.1
Intertank Umbilical Plate	 None Req .	 ----
Intertank Umbilical Plate Cutout 	 5LA-561
	 0.2
LH2 Tank Aft of fwd ORB Attachments
	 C,PR-421/SLA-561
	 110/0.{
Acreage Around Structural Attachment	 SLA/CPR	 0.1/
Variable
I/T Vent b Surrounding Area
	 SLA/CPR
	 TBD
- 1
0
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FIGURE 9-„_1
EXTERNAL TANK ATTACHMENT HARDWARE
a
-^ ---- EO-1
Aft Right ET/ORB Attach (EO-3)
(	
^/
I	
E7/ORB Right Umbilical (EO-5),
i^	 Fwd ET/ORB
Attach
lT-I*N
EB-1 Left, EB-2 Right
ET/SRB Fwd Thrust
Attach Point
i
r^i
1@ ^j
a9 I
Intertank Ground
Umbilical (ET-1)
ET/ORB Left
LKnbi 11 cal
EO-4
3',^^Aft Left
ET/ORB Attach
(EO-2)
ET/SRB
Electrical
Connector
Interface
(EB-9 Left,
yI EB-10 Right)
IFT/SRB
Aft Upper
Top Attach
(EB-3 Left,
EB-4 Right)
ET/SRB Aft
Upper Bottom
Attach
j	 (EB-5 Left,
EB-6 Right)
ET/SRB
Aft Lower
Attach
(EB-7 Left,
ED-B Right)
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10.0 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER
10.1 Introduc tion
Two solid rocket boosters (SRB's) burn in parallel with the
Orbiter main propulsion system to provide initial ascent thrust.
Primary elements of the booster are the solid rocket; motor, forward
and aft structures, the thrust; vector control (TVC), operational
flight instrumentation and recovery avionics, separation motors and
pyrotechnics and recovery parachutes. Each 3RB will weigh in ex-
cess of one and a quarter million pounds.
The major milestones for the SRB project provide a perspective
on the current status of the program and the work ahead:
a. IX-liVery of the first machine finished case segment
to Thiokol for filling is scheduled for September 1976.
b. The firing off the first solid •rock.et motor as part of
the development test program is to be completed in July 1977.
c. The SRB Critical Design Review (CDR) is to be held in
May 1977.
As further backgrounu the response from the Shuttle organization
to the Panel's last Annual Report on the SRB is included as Attach-
ment 10-1.
1^'or the purposes of both description and data reporting, the
SRB section of the report is divided as follows: Project Management,
Solid Rocket Motor, Booster Separation Motors, Structures, '.Thrust
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Vector Cout rol, p.Iectric;11/Fleetronics/I list runwMation, ht , c- every
Equipment., Range	 ',Germination, ^;ru id : upport Equip-
mcmt, Major (round Tests, and Development Tests.
The ORB overall desigi-i and control i s eurrent ly heiu^, done by
MFG. The project; management system utilir,ecl by P3^V;A and at8 maJor
SRB contractors is similar to that uncd on othk.r elemunts of the
Shuttle! program. 7'hcre are quarterly reviews conducted for NASA
management and tovhnical personnel, wi th the ►mast recen t olio held
can April l-^!, 197ta at. the M:iFC. Poriodic • design reviews for the
major compouents of the ISRB are conducted about once a month. `h'ele-
cons and special mee: ings are a normal. pram of the technical mana;re-
ment and working, engineer system. The review Jy1,t('m also includes
it'-,,`! ation reviews and program level reviews as required.
Recent additions t'o the list of major contractors working on
the SRB include:
a. Mc Donnell Douglas  Ar, t rouau t ic, company will provide
the structures subsystem.
b. United Technologies, chomical 11 y.-mems Division,
will provide the Booster Separation 2lAors.
c. Moog, Inc., Controls Division, will provide the Thruet
Vector Control Actuator.
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(d) Bendix Company of Teterboro, New Jvreey, will, providt,
the IntegraLed Electronic Assembly.
The Martin Marietta Co. has been selected as the recovery system con -
t:ractvr. Plans are underway to acquire the Booster Assembly Contracti;.r (BAC).
The intent: of MSFC is to phaseover the log ,;Jstics and operations
planning, as well as other assembly integrati on 	taskro to this eon-
tractor starting in the last half of 1970. The 8til' has becn issued
and a contractor will be selected around mid-yeas;.
10.3 Observa ti ons
10.3.1 Weight,
`l.'he SU weights are of course important. Since there are two
units weigh( increases oil the SRB have to be doubled to tipprCcia,e
their impact. on the total Shuttle. `tics table.. below shows the wei^;iat
stati.ntieta:
Siff, x 2	 365,454 pounds inert 2eciiivation control weight,
357,738 pounds is the current inert. weight
7,716 pounc s m:ar,I;ixi
2,586,034 pounds total control. weight.
2,220,580 pounds solid propellant weight
The available margin for the SRB's is roughly 2.2% on the inert weight.
This is a somewhat tight figure at this time considering the
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possible growth due to desku additions and m odifications result-
ing from the devclopMCnt Wt promram.
The solid rocket motor in Pyre titan 1?5 tact My; and 12 beet
in diameter. The sotid propellant in cast and curod in dour casting,
scgmcntt; ,Aael. art transported by roil to the launch Nato where
they arcs to be 3sat ,,mbled into the tiOWA nxotor. The :iRM pro-
pellant is the same type as that used its, the Mscidoaa and the First
Stage MinuLeman motors. lie nonple in neatly 11 Joni	 long, and	 is
also Is feet in d-ailleter at	 the eAt,	 It weighs "early 11 tons,
ley femare of this nonale In a tl.rsai P bearing, constructed of
""iteruate layers of claastromcric rubber and steel which permits the
novile to be gimbaled taaad deflected tor A t i tude control of the
Shut, tle system duiinq ascent port ion of tlit, mission. The ;;RM
ignitor mounted in the NO of the .aotor weighs about_ 660 pounds
and is larger than many tac't.ital rocket motorn. The igniter con-
sints of a safe and arm device, a pyrogen initiator, and the main
pyrog,cza	 The .;101' , rams detaig,ned to burn for about two
minutes carryinh the shuttle cluster to about, 3) miles altitude
:after which the ;`)U will separate, parachute to the ocean for re-
covery and reuse.
The SHIM i, deep in the phase of component design, development,
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and testing. The SRM Critical Design Review (CDR) is set for mid-
1977.	 The ground tests of interest include the following:
(a) Subseale Flexible Bearing (Nozzle) Completed Successfully
(b) Prototype li l.ex Bearing Tests December 1976
(c) Ignition System Development & Qual February 1977
(d) Ignition Safeing and Arming D & Q Mid -1977
(e) Case Hydroburst September 1977
(f) Nozzle/TVC Confirmation .,,+cember 1977
(g) Railroad "Hump" Test Mist-1978
To accomplish the program the following types and quantities
of motors are being produced: four development motors, ."ree qual-
ification motors, and five ground test motors. Two of the around
test motors are inert
	 two are empty and one is for structural
Lest. In addition, the present schedule includes six flight motors.
The motors will be used in the following test schedule:
(a) Development firings
	 Number 1
	 July 1977
Number 2	 September 1977
Number 3	 February 1978
Number 4
	 April 1978
On the Number 2 and 3 firings the same refurbished case will be used.
A refurbished nozzle and flexible bearing will be used on the Number 4
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development firing while the number 3 firing; will use a non-relur-
bished or used flexible bearing.
(b) Qualification firings	 Number 1 July 1978
e
	 Number 21	 August 1978
Number 3	 December 3,976
On the Number 1 and 3 qualification firings the same refurbished
case will be used.
10.3.2.1 I)e siign Loads
'rhe magnitude of the flight and wat , rr impact loads and the
resultant attrition rate or loss of tht> SHB's during recovery is
of concern because of the effect such losses have on the cost per
flight figures for the Shuttle mission. The design load consider-
ations for reuse of the SRD directly affect the SRM. The SRM case
is designed for the maximum expected operating, pressure. ',I,'he no::<,1e
and aft skirt are subjected to support loads from the launch pad,
reentry acoustic (organ pipe effect). The aft end of the SRM is
designed for water impact and the water cavity collapse loads after
the rocket strikes the water.
The major concern regarding design loads has centered on the water
impact loads. Originally, the project anticipated a water impact load
based on 100 ft/sec vertical velocity. As a,result of analysis and
model tests by MSFC, their contractors, and other federal agencies,
C
d
i
t
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the project has determined that a vertical velocity of 85 ft/sec
is more realistic. This means a reduction in total program cost,
reduced risk of losing an entire SRB during entry, and a more
acceptable weight margin. The change in expected attrition rates
is shown in the following gable;
Water Impact Attrition Tar 85 ft/sec
85 ft/sec	 100 ft/soc
Aft Skirt	 7.2%	 20.0`
Aft SItM Segments	 1.3
	
9.5
Forward SRM Segments	 1.9
	
1.3
SIOI Nozzle	 3.6
	 7.0
`l'VC Actuators	 S.3	 12.;
TVC Power Supply	 3.6	 10.0
No attrition analyses have boon done on a configuration using; less
than three (3) parachutes.
10.:3.2.2 Case Heat Treat
Shuttle SRM components are unique in that they will be recovered
and reused again and again. `ftiis requirement involves complex
strength requirements in both material fracture toughness and ten-
silo properties. Considerable effort is being; expended in base-
lining a heat treat process to achieve the proper mechanical prop-
erties. The work so far shows that the heat treat profile used
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Iproduces acceptable tensile properties in all materials LesLed to
dale and the heat, treat has produced acceptable toughness properties
0	 with the exception of one, questionable sample. As a result: the baseline heat
treat profile appears acceptable for meeting the SIOI case material
mechanical requirements.
10.3.2.3 Corrosion of the SRM Case
Essentially, Lhe 8101 is a segmented stack of large cylindrical
shells made from IOAC steel, joined together by a clevis arrangement,
and fastened with W35N pins. The Slot case design is such that it;
should prevent corrosive aLtack, accelerated galvanic corrosion,
crevice corrosion, and stress corrosion. The optimum scheme for
joint protection will be determined based on results from Lests
where parts are immersed in flowing seawater. The majoriLy of the
case is to be coated with organic films of proven protective cap-
ability and the ,joint' s will use a sealant and an organic barrier
combination.
it has been recognized that the female portions of Lhe clevis
joints present the greatest uncertainty regarding proLeeLion. This
uncertainty has been taken into account as far as possible and such
,joints will receive special attention during assembly and be sub-
jected to non-destructive test techniques.
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I10.3.:.4 Thrust-Time Sha in
Thiokol Chemical was directed by HSFC, to provide a support
study on SRM thrust:-time (performanc() shaping; to the Rockwall Inter-
nationa, Space Division. ','his thru.9t-time study involved grain de-
sign and inhibiLers. The studies indicated that through the per-
formance-shaping it would be passible to desensitise Ivey :ascent Ilig;ht
parameters .laid reduce flight loan problems. Thoso requirement
Changes occurred after the base-lining, of t-he S M design and there-
fore will have an e ffect on the SRM schedule, Most and l:aell ities.
'11io changes to the SRM propellant will have. only a minimum impact
on the SRM program.
10.3.2.5 No.,  le Flexible Dear nli
`11e SRM no.;.;le design is shown in Figure 10-1. The flex bear-
g is a nozzle subassembly which gives	 ^g, 	a - 8 degree omnidirectionalin
thrust vector control capability to the SRbI. Sub-scald testing of
this flex bearing indicated material problems that would have to be
resolved prior to ehe faxbrieation of the full-scale unit. scheduled
for testing at: a later date.
The problem appears Lo be in the use of the elastomers (rubber
material) and their stability during processing; of the bearing, it-
self in the hoc-mold process. Studies to date have identified lour
candidate; elastomers that appear suitable for SRM flax bearing; use
so that there should be no real difficulty in building, and success-
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Ifully testing a prototype bearing.
A	
10.3.2.6 Ignition System
The ignition system is large and somewhat: sophisticated. Figure
10-2 shows both the igniter assembly which has a large quantity of
propellant, and the safe and arm unit which is a motori:-,ed assembly
Lo open and close the ports used to ignite the system. 'Posting and
development of this component; is currently in full swim; and will
be monitored by the Panel.
10.3.3 Booster Separation Motor
1'o meat the SRB separation requirements listrd below it was
decided that small racket motors would be best in translating the
SRB away from the Orbiter and Ixternal Tank at the Josired time in
the Space Shuttle ascent: trajectory.
'Phew requirements include the following:
(a) Separation of the SRB should preclude damage to or
recontact. with other Shuttle elements during or after separation.
(b) Exhaust gases from the rocket: motor's separation sys-
tems should not cause damage to the remaining Shuttle elements which
would require repair or replacement of the Orbiter 'PI'S.
(c) Installation of the separation motors shall be in the
SRB nose Frustum and SRB aft skirt.
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i(d) Rolease of dill structural attachments shall occur
within 30 milliseconds and the thrust of each set of BSM I H shall reach
55,500 pounds of thrust in each set within 30 to 135 milliseconds of the
separation command.
(e) The design should provide for sale separation for
angles of at Va(— and sideslip over a range oi' 
't 
15 degrees including
the rates and dynamic pressures which follow. °11u o maxitintm dynamic
pressure Shall be 75 psi and the nktximum rates shall be 
t 
2 degrees
per second in pitch and yaw. Iliese rates and dynamic pressures will
be sensed or computed by the Orbiter and when exceeded shall inhibit
Clio separation of Clio SRB's.
The status of motor development indicates that there are no
major concerns on this project. The propellant, has Isom baselined
and characteri.:ed. Detailed design drawings and preliminary analysis
reports have been completed. The PDR was conducted in February 1970
and motor case .fabrication has been initiated. Further definition
of the interface between the I3oosLo r Separation Motors and the
SRB T/Orbiter are required. The exact nature of this definition
is not known at this time.
By mid-1976 testing of the igniters should be completed. The first
four test motors should be completed by mid—January 1977. Qualification
is set for 1977 and the delivery of the flight hardware is set for 1978.
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i10.3,4 Integrated Electronic Assembly (UA)
The IEA system utilizes orbiter power for the arbiter data bus.
1
t
t
R
It provides support to the following SRB functions;
(a) Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Subsystem
(b) Development Flight Instrumentation
(c) Range Safety System
(d) Recovery System
(e) Shuttle Flight Control System (through the Orbiter)
(f) Separation System
(g) SRM
Figure 10-3 shows the IHA unit in simple detail. There are
actually two types, one mounted in the forward skirt and one mounted
with the aft External Tank attach ring. Both are watertight. They
weigh about 190 pounds ready-to-go and are about 12" x 13" x 45" in
size. The PDR was completed in December 1975. Mockup vibration
testing is underway, and stress corrosion susceptibility studies
have been completed. The only concern is the lead time required for
the procurement of the watertight connectors for the units.
10.3.5 Structures
This area includes all of those structural items that tie the
various subsystems together - the aft skirt, ET struts and attach-
ments, systems tunnels, forward skirt, forward ordnance ring;, tow-
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ing pendant, altirude sensor assembly, frustum assembly, nose cap
assembly, and flotation installation, This program is in a very
early stage and will be reviewed by the Panel as it evolves in the
#:utux'e.
10.4 Range Safety System
This has been partially discussed in the section devoted to
the FAternal `lank. Therefore only that portio.t of the 'Range Satety
Flight Termination system dealing with the SRB is covered here. it
was determined that a conizal shaped charge was no longer needed
in the nose cone of the SRB, and that the SRB would use a linear-
shaped charge along; 10`rS of the SRML portion of the SRB. Such a
charge would be placed on either side of the SM. This system is
to be applied to both the SRB's. The specified requirement in
Volume X, JSC 07700 will now sta ge: "The SRII's shall be providod
with ground-commanded systems to destruct the SRB's. System com-
ponents shall be reusable 4here cost saviitgs will result."
Trade studies are currently being conducted with regard t,o the
use of a redundant open loop initiator versus a closed-loop dual
initiator. Closed-loop refers to the initiation of the charge from
both ends, while open-loop means setting the train off from only one
end. The Panel will follow the evolving, system to assure tbat the
decisions being made receive appropriate management attention,
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10.5 SRB Reuse
The reuse requirements "drive" the design of the SRB and its componentK.
The total number of times the components are used is as follows:
(a) Structures (excluding nose cup and thermal
shield) ...............•, ► .................,.. 40
(b) Thrust vector Control ...•.... ► ..•.•.....e...• 20
(c) Electrical and Instrumentation (excluding
batteries, lights, exposed cables) ........... m0
(d) Recovery System (parachutes, et.al .) ...•..,.. 10
(e) Solid Rocket Motor (except; as below) ......... 20
Flex Bearing Materials (elaatomers) ..... 10
	
Nozzle Ablator Material ...... .......... 	 1
0-Icing Seals 	 1
(f) Pyrotechnic Devices .......................... 	 1
(g) Booster Separation Motors .................... 	 1
Specific design features to assure reusability include the use
of protective coatings over a relatively small percentage of the SRB, a weld-
free SRM case, watertight compartments for electrical/electronic/in-
strumentation installations, stiffening rings for water impact loads,
flexible aft-skirt heat shield, and similar design items. To achieve
the design requirements a good deal of effort continues to be expended
on the case heat-treat process, Thermal Protection Subsystem materials,
the paints and sealants, and flotation materials. The status of these
areas is to be monitored during the Panel's future reviews.
Decisions on the reuseability of a piece of hardware will, of
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course, depend on what wears ott y MO whIt causes ,111 item to b+ ,
 Con-
sidered worn-Out. The point At which a piece o1; hardware is con-
sidered worn out, is not a discretely defined point but will resul,a:
from the cumulat=ive effects of exposure to i^nvironrwnts and handling.
Loss from water impact damage is the most significant .`attrition
factor. Retrieval operations once the 81111 is in. the wa.aver poses the
next major possibility for losing it since there can be problems lo-
cating the vehicle or towing it; a'.ao, there is Lite possibility of
storu;s severe enough to preclude retrieval or damage the vehicle
while in the water. other factors that would preclude reuse of
specific it%:,mra include:
(a) Structures - wearout or damage due to accumulated
clings, dents, and corrosion.
(b) Recovery, - excessive parachute ribbon damage from
inflation and retrieval.
(c) Electrical and instrumentation - Mechanical fail-
ures, e.g., cracked solder joints, broken wires, "drift" o!: piece,
parts.
(d) TVf. - Failures in the actuator rod end bearing; the
power supply flex hose,, valving, exhaust ducting, pumps; as well
as general corrosion.
(e) SRM - Accumulated abnormal loss of metal from grit blast
298
t^
preparation during refurbishment.
10.6 Test. Program
The SRB will be qualified at the motor level (IBM) in addition
to the normal qualification of components. because it is a recover»
able and reuseable item there are special tests not required on
other elements of the Shuttle program.
The common structural tests conducted on all segments of the
Shuttle vehicle are a part; of the SRB test program as well. These
include static sQuctural tests to verify material selection, vali-
We stress analyses and design margins, etc. Dynamic model surveys
w:ll provide data on dynamic model analysis. Separation tests, in-
cluding full-scale tests of the separation motors, will verify de-
sign and performance. The SRB component environmental certification
test requirements and methods are included in the WO report "SRI
Component Environmental Certification Test Requirements and Mcthods''
SE-019-067-2H. Rather than disc'= the details of this program in
this report the reader should examine the MSFC test document itself.
Finally, requirements for retest of the refurbished hardware
is crucial to this program.
The test area will be a subject. for further examination to
assure that the confidence level achieved through the test program
is of sufficient degree to support the first Orbital Flight Test
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as well as subsequent; missions.
10.7 Fracture. ConLro
There is a very detailed fracture control program now in full
operation. It is undcbAood that fracture control requirements nave
been included in all procurement packages along with a requirement
for fracture control boards. On October 8, 1975 the first formal
meeting of the MSFC/SRB Fracture Control Board (FCB) was held. The
SRB/FOB staffed by MSFC is responsible for the overall SRB program.
In addition there is an SItM Fracture Control 1',oard cstabliished and
staffed by Thiokol which has been iat operation for some time.
To i '^f .e!»wn loci ther	 f the iSIry ti.,a f t_..	 .I	 ..4iV4I. _ UAA4. wc...	 ^i t:1ty i•^t'b i^Jts14(t ttic iti .GivJug on December
10 0
 1975 reviewed the Booster Soparation Motor (BSM) Fracture Control
Ilan. 11iis review covered ,nt.a FCB's organisation and responsibilities
and the imflementation of the fracture control, plan at the contractor
with particular attention to part selection loftic and file design/anal-
ysis, fabrication and test procedures,
a,\n example of the hardware placed under fracture control is
seen in the Thiokol FCB activities. Thiokol has reviewed the
various parts which make up the SIN and, based on fracture control
selection Logic, has made a determination of the fracture critical
items. The items which have been identified for fracture control
are the case segments, igniter chamber and adapter, and the nozzle
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stationary shell and flex shims. These items, in most cases, have
high tensile stresses. However, the selection process save par-
ticular attention to the impact on mission success and program
Rchedule if tho hardware should fail and have to be replaced. The
clevis joint and the basic-part membranes are the most significant
items on this list. More detailed fracture mechanics analyses
have been performed on such parts to determine the expected flaw
growth, critical number of cycles, stresses, and test proof factor.
In particular, testing has been completed for the clevis joint to
determine its mode of failure. The testing and analysis completed
to date have shown that these parts can withstand significantly more
cycles and higher stresses than expected during the actual mission.
In additon to the fracture mechanics analysis, some stress
corrosion work has been completed. Areas of investigation in-
clude effects of material exposure to sea water, coatings, heat
treating effects, and fracture toughness determinations con-
sidering temperature effects. This work is to be supplemented.
with testing on forging sections, hydroburst testing, etc.
A point brought up during MSFC FRB discussions with Thiokol is
important. They were asked what they would do differently in test-
it
ing, traceability, inspection, etc., if a part was not under frac-
ture control.. The answer was that all parts of the SRM would be
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subjected to the same rigor regardless of fracture control dispo-
sition. The pri.noary difference is the level of review for any item
that is out of specification or is considered to have a discrepancy.
Vie M9FC/FCB is in the process of evaluating; the nood to place the
SRM propellants under fracture control. Thiokol has not considered
this necessary at this time.
10.8 SIOI "Burn Through"
Burn-through relates to the loss of case integrity because the
propellant; burns a hole in the case. Previous solid rocket. exper-
ience, particularly on military rockets, has been examined and
applied to the design of the Shuttle SM. Potential "burn-through"
.failure modes identified during the Panel's review were:
(a) Propellant grain defects.
(b) Noz le ablatives.
(c) 0-ring seals and clevis joints.
(d) Internal case insulation.
(e) Propellant inhibitor.
(f) forward case segment: igniter bolt holds.
(g) Propellant-liner-insulation-case bonds.
The design appears to be based on demonstrated concepts to
preclude case burn-through and there are adequate safety factors
of 2:1 or higher to accommodate uncertainties. Pxtensive component
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testing will be performed to validate this design approach.
10.9 SRB hazards
The following listing is provided to indicate the types and
numbers of hazards on the SRB. Many of these hazards have been
eliminated; others have been accepted by management based on a
thorough review of the problem. Some are still being worked.
SRB ignition overpressure
Late ignition of one of the SRB's
Failure of fore or aft BSM's
Public hazard from impact of SRB (in work)
Contingency abort capability with IORB (in work)
Hhergency escape in flight
SRB mechanical safe-arm device to be enabled in the
VAB (in work)
Excessive q-alpha and/or q-beta on Shuttle ascent.
10.10 Lightning Protection
SRB equipment requiring protection includes the pyrotechnics,
TVC sensors and switching circuits, integrated clectronicr; assembly
plus all exposed Electrical cables. The governing; design document.
is the JSC-07636 Rev. A, dated November 4, 1975, "Space Shuttle Program
Lightning Protection Criteria Document." Briefly the SM nozzle
I
9
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lightning design measures being; taken include: single point ground
on power circuits, use of twisted wire pairs, ? i 1/11jillisecond
delays for switching functions, cable tunnel protection, multi-
grounded overall lts-- ,ds on ordnance cables, and tests,
	 `111is area a
will continue to t,, ^ , rnitored by tho panel.
10.11 Addendum
This is the period in the SRB development when requirements are :sill
in evolution. A revised SRB Verification Plan (Volume IV, SF.-019-019-11)
has been released since the earlier sections were written. Some of the
latest updates are to assure complete records on test programs, procedures
and results.
The "SRB Component Environmental Test Requirements and Methods" was
issued in December 1975 as SE-019-067-211, It establishes the detailed
environmental test requirements, test methods, and test criteria to be
utilized in the environmental acceptance and certification testing;.
The SRB safe and arm device critical design review was conducted at
the subcontractor's site in June 1976. Final closoout for the resulting;
actions is scheduled for July/August 1976,
v
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ATTACIROW 10-1
The Solid Rocket Rooster is in an early stage of development. Crit-
ical areas must be monitored closely for the earliest possible de-
tection and resolution of problems to assure that trade-offs provide
for the maximum Space Shuttle system safety. Such areas include re-
covery and re-use of the booster.
RESPONSE;	 Space Shuttle Program Management and especially the SRB
Project Manager are sensitive to the areas affected by the reuse-
ability concept. Special analyses are continuing to maintain high
reliability of the components and subsystems which are affected by
planned reuse. In addition to the activities within the SRB project
at MSFC, a special SRB review function was established within the
JSC Space Shuttle Systems Engineering Office to provide an
independent assessment of the SRB design and development activities.
This function includes review of subsystem designs (structures,
avionics, recovery, TVC, etc.) as well as the refurbishment planning.
This review group is involved in source selections for these sub-
systems all the way from design through RFP preparation to participation
in SEB's. They are currently assessing the design criteria for re-
covery system parachutes and the planning; for the parachute drop test
programs.
It is important to note that hazards to personnel involved in the
wa'.er retrieval of the booster and parachutes are no longer a major
concern, since divers are not now planned for the no.,-.,,,le plugging
operation. The Naval Undersea Center is developing an underwater
remote controlled device to accomplish this without diver participation.
In addition to these independent review activities, study teams have
been formed to establish r Jurbishment operations requirements for
returning the SRB reuseable components to a flight acceptable condition.
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